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Recognizing the ever-changing landscape and the increasing challengesthat face justice systems committed to achieving the promise of “equal-ity before the law,” the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic
Fairness in the Courts works to share its collective knowledge about best
practices within court systems for achieving fairness and access to justice for
all. In celebration of the consortium’s 25th anniversary, Court Review is
pleased to present a special issue in collaboration with this organization. 
The issue begins with an article by Professor Keith Richotte, Jr., who pro-
vides a brief history of tribal courts. The article discusses how tribal courts
have blended older tribal common law with Western-inspired sources of law,
resulting in innovative ways for tribes to make the common law of the tribal
nation speak to issues of the present. Unfortunately, the innovative work that
many tribal courts are engaged in is not always
recognized and appreciated outside of Indian
Country. As a consequence, there remains a
fair amount of trepidation about tribal courts.
The article posits that this trepidation is
founded in the same presumptions about
tribal peoples that existed in the nineteenth
century and were expressed in the Indian law
cases of that era. 
This concept of understanding the commu-
nities we serve is then further examined by the
Honorable Liana Fiol Matta, who discusses the
need for judges to understand the dynamics of
communities in poverty and the significant
barriers they face to accessing justice. Justice
Fiol Matta suggests to all judges that “true access to justice can only be
achieved when a judge uses the law, not as an end in itself, but as a tool for
justice.”
Next, lawyer Joanna L. Visser and Professor Jeffrey L. Shook provide timely
views on recent United States Supreme Court decisions exploring under what
circumstances states are permitted to give juveniles life sentences without the
opportunity for parole. Although this article is not explicitly about racial and
ethnic fairness in the courts, readers should keep in mind the drastic over-
representation of minority youth in our nation’s justice system. 
In other articles:
• Douglas Marlowe provides a review of what is currently known and what
needs to be known about racial and ethnic impacts in drug courts. 
• Kimberly Papillon provides an in-depth explanation of the neuroscience
behind judicial decision-making in the criminal context, demonstrating
how the application of the four principles of criminal sentencing (i.e., ret-
ribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation) may be affected by
these neurological processes.
• Pamela Casey and coauthors outlines seven research-based strategies that
have been identified for reducing the influence of implicit bias in decision
making.
—Liz Neeley
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 13 of this
issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
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The American Judges Association is pleased to salute thework of the National Consortium on Racial and EthnicFairness in the Courts through this special issue of Court
Review. The Consortium is celebrating its 25th anniversary with
a conference being held March 20 to 23 in Washington, D.C. 
This cooperative effort between the AJA and the Consortium
is typical of the ways in which AJA partners with—and helps to
spread the reach of—other organizations interested in similar
objectives. One of the members of the Consortium’s Board of
Directors, Liz Neeley, is also a member of Court
Review’s Editorial Board. She approached Court
Review’s coeditors, Steve Leben, a past AJA presi-
dent, and Professor Alan Tomkins, about this col-
laborative effort. In keeping with the AJA’s long
tradition of working with other groups, they
readily agreed.
Among the AJA’s great strengths are its flexi-
bility to respond to situations and its willingness
to collaborate with other organizations. The AJA
is an independent association, not a subgroup of a larger entity,
and we have not divided our organization into separate groups
for different segments of our membership. AJA’s member judges
are found throughout the United States, and we also have a sig-
nificant number of Canadian judges as members. We are
mainly state and municipal judges, but we also have federal
judges as members. We encourage our officers, our Board of
Governors, our education planners, and our publication editors
to be active and innovative. When contacted by the
Consortium, the AJA was able to collaborate easily and effec-
tively because of our organizational structure and track record.
Over the years, the AJA has engaged in joint ventures with
many different groups. We have worked closely over the years
with the National Center for State Courts, including projects
like devoting a special issue of Court Review to the National
Center-sponsored conference on public trust and confidence in
the courts. We held a joint meeting with the National
Association for Court Management, and we are working on a
joint meeting with the National Association of State Judicial
Educators. We have combined our annual educational confer-
ence with the state judiciaries in several states in recent years,
enhancing the programming offered both at our conference and
to judges in those states.
I raise the subject of the AJA’s collaborative work with other
organizations so that readers of this special issue—AJA mem-
bers and others—may keep in mind the possibility of future
collaboration on issues of interest. We are always glad to hear
from AJA members about suggested initiatives,
projects, or educational efforts that the AJA
might pursue. We are also glad to hear from
those presently outside the AJA membership as
well. And, of course, we would also love to bring
more of you who are not currently AJA members
into our group.
Our dues are a reasonable $150 for active
judges ($50 for retired judges). Members receive
quarterly issues of Court Review, regular email
updates on issues of interest to judges (like new ethics cases or
advisory opinions), and our electronic newsletter, Benchmark,
which reports on AJA activities.  You also become part of an
active association that works to make its members better judges
and the judiciary even better at providing justice. And you can
attend the AJA’s annual educational conferences. No other orga-
nization has provided better judicial education programs over
an extended period of time than the American Judges
Association, which recently held its 50th annual educational
conference.
So we salute the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic
Fairness in the Courts on the work it has done during its 25
years in existence. We are glad that the Consortium reached
out to the AJA to collaborate with it. We hope that those who
read this issue—AJA members and others—will keep AJA in
mind as you think about ways in which the performance of
judges and their courts may be improved.
I hope to see you at an AJA conference soon.
President’s Column
Toni M. Higginbotham
R ecognizing the ever-changing landscape and theincreasing challenges that face justice systems com-mitted to achieving the promise of “equality before
the law,” the National Consortium on Racal and Ethnic
Fairness in the Courts (“National Consortium”) brings
together thought leaders and delegates of state justice sys-
tems from around the country to share their collective
knowledge about best practices within their court systems
for achieving fairness and access to justice for all. For 25
years, the National Consortium has served as a conduit to
provide a forum for discussions on relevant topics pertaining
to identifying and eliminating bias against people of targeted
racial and ethnic groups both through its annual conference
and through peer-to-peer technical assistance. Additionally,
the National Center for State Courts, as secretariat for the
National Consortium, serves as a warehouse of information
by compiling the annual reports that the National
Consortium members present at annual meetings; bibliogra-
phies from each jurisdiction; and information regarding task
force/commission structure, governance, staffing, research,
and the issues addressed by implemented projects
(http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/ref/). Thanks to the
collaborative efforts between the Board of the National
Consortium and the American Judges Association, we are
happy for the opportunity to provide education through a
new forum, Court Review. 
This March the National Consortium will celebrate its
25th Anniversary during its annual conference in
Washington D.C. (March 20-23). The conference, titled
Celebrating the Past as We Envision and Embrace the Future,
offers a fantastic agenda filled with nationally renowned
speakers on a broad range of topics. 
In collaboration with the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum, the conference will offer an in-depth
look at the failure of the judicial system in Nazi Germany and
an exploration of whether such a failure could occur in the
U.S. court system. Other days of the conference will include
sessions on the intersections of race, ethnicity, gender, and
poverty; the history and future of the National Consortium;
perceptions of justice held by juveniles and young adults;
best practices in ensuring access to justice; and fairness and
access in the criminal, juvenile, civil, and family court sys-
tems. We encourage you to register online at http://www.con
sortiumonline.net/. 
Although the National Consortium recognizes that courts
across our nation are faced with unprecedented budgetary
and program challenges, the National Consortium maintains
that courts must recognize they have an obligation to treat all
of the people that come before them fairly.  This obligation of
fair treatment should apply equally to racially and/or ethni-
cally diverse populations.
On behalf of the current members of the Board of
Directors of the National Consortium, as well as the emeritus
members of our Board of Directors, we would like to extend
our profound appreciation to Judge Donovan Foughty
(N.D.), Judge Orlinda Naranjo (TX), Dr. Yolande Marlow,
Ph.D. (N.J.), Dr. Elizabeth Neeley, Ph.D. (Neb.), Lisette
(Mimi) McCormick, Esq. (Pa.), Erica Chung (Wash.),
Gregory Conyers, Esq. (Mich.) and John Douglas (Colo.),
and the members of this Ad Hoc Project Committee for its
time and effort in furthering this publication.
Edward C. Clifton (J.D. UCLA 1975) has
served as an Associate Justice of the Rhode
Island Superior Court since September 1994.
From 1996 until the present, he has been a
member of the Rhode Island Supreme Courts’
Permanent Advisory Committee on Women
and Minorities, serving as chair from 2010
until 2012. Judge Clifton has been a member of
the Board of Directors of the National Consortium on Racial and
Ethnics Fairness in the Courts since 2006, becoming presi-
dent/moderator in 2012.
H. Clifton Grandy, J.D., ICM Fellow, is a
senior court manager for the District of
Columbia Courts focusing on fairness and
access issues. He is the secretary/treasurer and
a board member of the National Consortium
on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts
and was the director of the First National
Conference on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in
the Courts, which was held in 1995. 
National Consortium on Racial
and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts
Celebrates 25 Years
Edward C. Clifton & H. Clifton Grandy
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“It can—and must—be said that
the Consortium has served as a 
catalyst for innovative 
partnerships, engaging public 
discourse, and creative problem
solving, from which Maryland has
benefited. Again, on behalf of the
Maryland Judiciary, I congratulate
you for your twenty-five years of 
services to the state judiciary and,
most important, to the citizens 
they serve.” 
Hon. Robert Bell
Chief Judge
Maryland Court of Appeals
“The National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the
Courts is an extraordinary voice for the judiciary and the justice
system on the issues of race and justice in our courts. It has played
an important role in ensuring fairness in the justice system. 
The most recent efforts with respect to language access to 
the courts will, I know, prove very fruitful in again providing
equal access to justice. I congratulate the Consortium and its 
historical contributions. I know the Consortium has a great 
future in these areas.” 
Hon. Richard B. Teitelman
Chief Justice
Missouri Supreme Court
“The Consortium
has been a valuable
resource over the years.
We look forward to 
continuing our 
partnership as we
work together to
ensure that all 
persons have equal
access to our courts.” 
Hon. Petra Jimenez Maes
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of 
New Mexico
Footnotes
1. Determining who has jurisdiction over criminal activity can be a
particularly confusing analysis that requires an assessment of sev-
eral questions, including the status of the land on which the crime
occurred, the type of crime committed, the race of the perpetra-
tor(s) and other interested parties, and other assorted factors. To
use the criminal context as an example, in general, the federal gov-
ernment has the authority to prosecute Natives for “major” crimes
and non-Natives for any crime that occurs in “Indian Country”
under various federal statutes. See Major Crimes Act, Act of Mar.
3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9; 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1153); Indian Country Crimes Act, Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152). However, if the
reservation upon which the crime occurred is a “Public Law 280”
state, then the state will likely have the same criminal jurisdiction
that the federal government otherwise would have had. See Public
Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321—1326, and 28
U.S.C. § 1360. Nonetheless, Public Law 280 exempts certain tribal
nations from the statute, thus maintaining federal jurisdiction on
those reservations. Tribal nations have concurrent jurisdiction over
Natives, subject to some limitations on sentencing that will be dis-
cussed later in this paper, and no jurisdiction over non-Natives,
which will also be discussed later in this paper. See Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03, and Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). For a concise analysis that
offers some guidance through the jurisdictional maze of criminal
law in Indian Country see DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 483-487 (6th ed.
2011). Civil jurisdictional questions involve a slightly different
analysis that is nonetheless confusing in its own right.
No other branch of any government at any level in the
United States faces the same sorts of unique challenges, juris-
dictional quandaries,1 resource limitations, and threats to its
authority than tribal courts. Yet, despite the challenges tribal
courts face—not the least of which is a wariness and some-
times outright hostility from other American courts—tribal
nations and especially tribal courts have grown increasingly
adept and innovative at finding ways to overcome the myriad
of hurdles that confront them.
The role of today’s tribal court often requires it to blend two
different, although not necessarily competing, legal traditions:
older tribal common law and more recent Western-inspired
sources of law, such as constitutions and codes. Many tribal
courts have risen to the challenge, finding innovative ways to
make the teachings, traditions, and rules of previous genera-
tions—the common law of the tribal nation—speak to the issues
of the present and provide guidance in how to read the contem-
porary law of the community. This valuable work has helped
tribal nations develop and engage in American legal, political,
and financial life like never before, with substantial benefits to
tribal peoples in a changing world with greater opportunities.
Unfortunately, the innovative work that many tribal courts
are engaged in is not always recognized and appreciated out-
side of Indian Country. As a consequence, there remains a fair
amount of trepidation about tribal courts, particularly in other
American courts and perhaps especially in the Supreme Court.
This trepidation is often founded by the same presumptions
about tribal peoples that existed in the nineteenth century and
were expressed in the Indian law cases of that era.
It is time for judges at all levels to reexamine the bases of
their perceptions about tribal courts. This article hopes to pro-
voke that critical reflection through a brief examination of the
history of tribal courts. The first section of the article will dis-
cuss the history of tribal adjudication and some of the innova-
tion in which tribal courts are currently engaged. The second
section will trace the Supreme Court’s understanding of tribal
courts and that understanding’s lack of change from its nine-
teenth-century roots. The conclusion will return to the discus-
sion of what American courts and judges can and should do to
rectify the situation.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL COURTS
As tribal nations have become increasingly sophisticated
and have extended their reach beyond the boundaries of their
reservations and communities in recent years, tribal courts
have become an increasingly important component to the suc-
cess and vitality of those nations. Although tribal nations have
always engaged in dispute resolution and the effectuation of
justice, tribal courts are playing a more practical and visible
role both inside and outside of their nations. Tribal courts are
shaping the future in ways never before thought to be possible.
To more fully understand their current role within their com-
munities, it is important to know something of the history of
tribal courts. 
It should be noted at the outset that any description of the
history of tribal courts or where they stand now is going to be
particularly broad and cannot adequately account for the com-
plete range of experiences of all tribal nations and courts. Akin
to the descriptor “European,” terms like “Native American,”
“American Indian,” or “Native” are relatively loose, describing
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A Brief History of Tribal Courts and Their Perception 
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Keith Richotte, Jr.
2. SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 108 (1994).
3. Id. at 108-09.
4. Id. at 110.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 105.
7. For example, in their classic text The Cheyenne Way, legal philoso-
pher Karl Llewellyn and anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel stud-
ied the legal structure and reasoning of the Cheyenne. Although
the text is burdened by language and assertions that many would
find troubling today, the two scholars nonetheless detail a com-
plex and reflective system of law that they appear to have antici-
pated their readers would find unfathomable. “It might bear a sur-
face appearance of romanticizing for us to attribute legal genius to
a people of those aboriginal American Plains which have long
been thought to be so relatively barren of legal culture, if the data
has not been laid before the reader.” K. N. LLEWELLEN & E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 310 (1941). For an enlightening reflec-
tion on how tribal visions of law, peace, and commitment affected
early treaty negotiations, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING
ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND
PEACE, 1600-1800 (1999).
8. Indian General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 1, 24
Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331), repealed by Indian
Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. 106-462, §
106, 114 Stat. 1991, 2007 (2000).
9. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04, at 77-79 (Neil
Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter, COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
many groups of peoples within a wide geographic area with
quite a bit of diversity among themselves. Nonetheless, some
generalizations are reasonably applicable to the many groups.
Before contact with Europeans, tribal nations resolved dis-
putes within the nations through their own processes, and
many tribal nations continued to engage in their own dispute
resolution for some time after contact. While many of the
numerous treaties in the long history of relations between
tribal nations and the United States contained some lan-
guage—often referred to as “bad men” clauses—as to who had
the authority to punish wrongdoers, in general tribal nations
punished their own, and the federal government was autho-
rized to punish non-Indians who committed wrongful acts on
tribal lands or toward tribal peoples. A brief example of one
tribal adjudicative process is illustrative of not only the tribal
system but of the purposes and goals of that system.
In the summer of 1881, Crow Dog, a leader among the Brule
Lakota, killed Spotted Tail, another member of the Brule
Lakota. Although it is likely impossible to ever know exactly
why Crow Dog took this action, internal tribal politics were
undoubtedly involved. Crow Dog was a leader among the
Brule, having arrived at his position among the community
through traditional means. Spotted Tail, on the other hand,
had been appointed by the federal government as a tribal
leader and enjoyed the spoils of a relationship with the federal
government.2 The two men were political rivals who looked to
disrupt each other’s authority and were potentially at odds for
personal reasons as well.3
The Brule Lakota community moved quickly to address the
crime and resolve the dispute among the families. While it was
the federal Indian agent on the reservation who called the
tribal council the day after the killing, the council proceeded
under Brule law.4 Peacemakers were sent to both families to
negotiate a settlement, to restore Spotted Tail’s family to as near
to whole as could be accomplished, and to return the greater
community to a position of balance and harmony. Crow Dog
and his family agreed to give $600, eight horses, and a blanket
to the family of Spotted Tail—an astounding sum in the 1880s,
and a show of respect and deference for the slain man.5
It is perhaps easy to misunderstand the arrangement
between the families of Spotted Tail and Crow Dog that was
facilitated by the leaders of the Brule Lakota, and that misun-
derstanding may help to explain at least some of the federal
government’s insistence in inter-
jecting itself ever more deeply into
internal tribal affairs. The negoti-
ated settlement was not a payment
of hush money or an example of a
privileged member of a society
buying his way out of justice.
Rather, it was reflective of the resti-
tutive nature of Brule Lakota soci-
ety, and many tribal societies. The
purpose of criminal justice was not
offender-and-punishment focused;
instead, the focus was on the victim’s family, the community,
and the offender’s responsibility to make restitution to the best
of his or her ability. In general, traditional tribal communities
were focused less on the crime itself and more on how to cor-
rect the ill effects of the crime. Writing about Crow Dog’s fam-
ily’s payment to the family of Spotted Tail, one commentator
noted that it was not “blood money,” but rather the payment
was “an offer of reconciliation and a symbolic commitment to
continuation of tribal social relations.”6 This is just one exam-
ple of the community-centered vision of crime, law, and resti-
tution within tribal communities, as the Brule were hardly the
only tribal nation with a deep and sophisticated appreciation
for jurisprudential reasoning.7
Yet, by the late nineteenth century, the federal government
was rethinking and reconfiguring its political relationship
with Native peoples, and began engaging in a concerted effort
to destroy tribalism in both the quest for tribal lands and in
the name of civilization. The period of time from the early
1870s to the early 1930s is often dubbed the “Allotment Era”
after the Allotment Act,8 or Dawes Act, the major piece of
congressional legislation that divested tribal nations of
approximately ninety million acres of land (roughly equiva-
lent to the state of Montana) and symbolized a new era of fed-
eral policy of forced assimilation toward Native peoples.9 The
general tenor of the times for the politicians, bureaucrats,
reformers of the era, and other “friends of the Indian” was
perhaps best summed up by one of the major figures of the
time and the man most responsible for the proliferation of
Indian boarding schools, Richard Henry Pratt. Succinctly
describing the second biggest goal of the Allotment Era
(behind acquiring additional tribal lands), Pratt claimed that
A brief example
of one tribal
adjudicative
process is 
illustrative . . .
of the purposes
and goals of
that system.
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10. Quoted in id. at 76.
11. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 646-47 (1984).
12. COHEN’S HANDBOOK § 4.04, at 266.
13. HARRING, supra note 2, at 186.
14. COHEN’S HANDBOOK § 4.04, at 266.
15. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 1, at 410.
16. RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A
TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 19 (2009).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 29.
19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 39.
21. Id. at 37.
22. Id. at 54.
he wanted to “[k]ill the Indian
and save the man.”10
True to the spirit of the
Allotment Era, the federal gov-
ernment sought to replace tra-
ditional tribal methods of adju-
dication with a Western model
under the guise of bringing
civilization to the supposedly
simple savages. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Indian agents on a
number of reservations established tribal courts based on an
American model. The earliest efforts to establish these courts
were spearheaded by Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller,
who saw them as a tool to disrupt the supposedly heathenish
ways of tribes and to diminish the influence of tribal leaders,
especially medicine men, who resisted the efforts of the federal
government.11 These early tribal courts, called the Court of
Indian Offenses or sometimes CFR courts (in reference to their
establishment through the Code of Federal Regulations12), were
staffed by either members of the Indian police—another
weapon wielded by Indian agents to destroy tribalism—or by
an influential member of the community who had gained
enough of the agent’s trust to be appointed with the task of
spreading civilization by punishing those who continued to
practice traditional ways or who otherwise caused disruption
within the tribal community. Put simply by one commentator,
“A major goal for these courts was the destruction of tribal
law.”13 A number of CFR courts continue to operate on reser-
vations today, although their purpose and scope have been
amended to benefit the administration of tribally generated law,
rather than to purposefully destroy it.14
In the wake of the Allotment Era, particularly at points
when Congress has been more supportive and receptive of
tribal governments, many tribal nations developed their own
Western-influenced court systems. Again, the diversity of
experiences among tribal nations makes it difficult to general-
ize about these courts. For instance, although some of these
tribal-court systems are relatively new, many are now decades
old with a growing body of caselaw to draw upon. And while
some were established through the acts of tribal legislatures
and exist as part of a tribal code, others are established as a sep-
arate branch of government guaranteed through a tribal con-
stitution. Today it is estimated that there are over three hun-
dred tribal courts currently operating in Indian Country.15
Perhaps the most sophisticated, well-rounded court system
in Indian Country belongs to the Navajo. The “modern”
Navajo court system began in 1892 with the establishment of
a CFR court on the reservation.16 Like any other Native com-
munity, the Navajo had a system for resolving disputes before
the influence of Western forces and were forced to adapt to
their circumstances when the CFR court was established.
Nonetheless, the Navajo rid themselves of the CFR court and
established a tribal court under their own authority in 1958,17
established an appellate court in 1978,18 and engaged in
reforms in 1985 that led to the current Navajo Supreme Court,
the highest court in the Navajo Nation.19
The reforms of the 1980s were responding both to a politi-
cal crisis within the Navajo Nation and to, as former Navajo
Supreme Court Associate Justice Raymond D. Austin has put
it, a “general consensus among Navajo judges that the Navajo
Nation needed an alternative to the Western form.”20 During
this period, the Navajo court system began a concerted and
deliberate effort to re-infuse the law of the nation—mostly
found in the tribal code and through the structures of tribal
government that mimicked an American model—with the pre-
cepts of Navajo common law, which were more suited to the
needs of the community.
By deciding that they were going to “empahsiz[e the] use of
Navajo normative precepts,”21 the Navajo courts did not reject,
dismantle, or discard the laws, procedures, or rules that
appeared to be “Western” or that had been established by the
duly elected tribal council. Rather, the court began reading
those rules in a manner in accordance with the foundational,
traditional law of the Navajo. A deep examination of Navajo
common law is beyond the scope of this article. (For those
who are interested, Associate Justice Austin’s book, Navajo
Courts and Navajo Common Law, offers an exceedingly clear
detailing.) However, it suffices to note that one of the primary
goals of the Navajo worldview is to achieve a place where all
things are at balance and working in harmony with one
another.22 Not unlike reading state and federal law against the
backdrop of the American constitution, Navajo courts have
steadily built a caselaw that reintroduces this foundational law
into contemporary cases and settings and reads “modern” law
in accordance with Navajo common law. Other tribal courts
have also followed this model and are reading their “modern”
law in accordance with their “traditional” law.
Another more modern rearticulation of tribal common law
has been what are generally called peacemaker courts. These
tribal courts generally operate in a different process whereby
the adversarial system is eschewed in favor of a more integra-
tive event where a community leader or mediator brings a vic-
tim, offender, and family and friends of the parties together to
discuss the offending behavior, to give all parties a chance to
speak, and to come to a consensual result in the dispute.
Meetings of peacemaker courts might be preceded with a meal
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and a prayer to emphasize both the communal and spiritual
aspects of the event that is about to take place.23 As part of its
reforms in the 1980s, the Navajo court system created peace-
maker courts,24 but they have hardly been the only tribal com-
munities to do so.25 Peacemaker courts not only more closely
align with more traditional tribal adjudicative systems (as was
employed in the Crow Dog/Spotted Tail incident), but they also
often generate a greater sense of involvement and engagement
for the offender, victim, and other interested parties that can be
missing in the more formal processes found in American courts.
The Navajo court system’s adoption of Navajo common law
and peacemaker courts are just two quick examples of the
means through which tribal courts are contributing ever more
to their nations and are becoming significant pillars of the
community. Tribal courts do still face a number of practical
challenges, including financial difficulties and a small pool of
legal talent. But they are beginning to meet those challenges in
new and necessary ways and are establishing themselves as
innovative forces for the greater good. By interjecting tribal
common law into modern settings and by creating processes
that fit the community, tribal courts are doing the practical
work of not only resolving disputes among the community but
keeping the traditions and spirit of the people alive.
AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF TRIBAL ADJUDICATION
Despite their increased importance, tribal courts continue to
face a number of obstacles not faced by other American
courts—some more surmountable than others. Perhaps the
biggest hurdle that tribal courts and other forms of tribal dis-
pute resolution have traditionally faced is a lack of faith in the
process, and often outright scorn, from non-Native peoples and
institutions. Tribal forms of dispute resolution, whether they be
the more contemporary tribal courts of today or older systems
employed by tribal nations in the past, have been routinely
derided as inadequate or otherwise inappropriate. Quite often,
the strongest criticism has come from Supreme Court justices,
both in the past and more contemporarily. The lack of faith that
American officials have shown tribal courts—not to mention
tribal societies, ways of thought, and world views—throughout
the years has been one of the biggest roadblocks to establishing
and maintaining the authority of tribal adjudication.
The federal government began seriously interjecting itself in
the tribal adjudicative process in the late nineteenth century
during the Allotment Era. Two cases from the 1880s that sur-
rounded another major piece of federal legislation perhaps best
exemplify the distrust the federal government and the general
American populace held for tribal adjudicative methods in the
Allotment Era, the legacy of which continues to influence non-
Native attitudes about tribal courts.
In 1883, the Supreme Court
handed down Ex Parte Crow
Dog,26 a case that, on the surface,
looked like a victory for tribal
interests, but that nonetheless
paved the way for further con-
gressional intrusions into Indian
Country. The facts of the case
have already been described in
this article, with the family of
Crow Dog offering restitution to
the family of Spotted Tail under
Brule Lakota law. The issue was
resolved peaceably within the
community.
The federal government read
the situation much differently,
and members of the Office of
Indian Affairs (the precursor to today’s Bureau of Indian Affairs)
saw the incident as an opportunity to extend their influence
over tribal life and further the mission of “civilizing” Native
peoples.27 Conceived as a test case, the Indian agent on the
Brule reservation had Crow Dog arrested even though the agent
was aware that the matter had been settled within the tribal
nation.28 In the spring of 1882, Crow Dog was tried and con-
victed in a federal court29 in a case that everyone anticipated
was headed to the Supreme Court.30
The High Court did hear the case and rendered a decision
in 1883.31 While the Court ruled in favor of tribal interests in
the case, stating that there was no federal statue or treaty pro-
vision that gave the federal government jurisdiction over
Indian-on-Indian crime in Indian Country, the opinion was as
friendly to the losing side as one could imagine. Justice Stanley
Matthews’ opinion either showed no knowledge of the Brule
system of justice that had already resolved the matter or no
regard for it in suggesting the unfairness of subjecting suppos-
edly simple savages such as Crow Dog to the legalities of a
higher civilization. Justice Matthews stated:  
“[Our system] tries them not by their peers, nor by the cus-
toms of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superi-
ors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception, and which is
opposed to the traditions of their history, to the habits of their
lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one
which measures the red man’s revenge by the maxims of the
white man’s morality.”32
Despite his seeming (and condescending) concern for the fate
of tribal peoples, Justice Matthews nonetheless characterized the
issue as one of jurisdiction, as opposed to morality, noting that
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federal jurisdiction, “in such a
case, requires the clear expres-
sion of Congress, and that we
have not been able to find.”33
Justice Matthews’ implication
was clear: were Congress to act,
then the Court was likely to
rule differently in the future.
Congress accepted Justice
Matthews’ invitation a year
later and passed the Major
Crimes Act34 in 1885. The law
extended federal jurisdiction to Indian Country over seven
“major” crimes (and remains good law today, with additional
crimes enumerated since its original passage). Armed with this
congressional blessing, federal prosecutors began trying Native
peoples for activities that originated on reservations, further
implicitly rejecting tribal methods for dispute adjudication.
One year later, in 1886, the Supreme Court was presented
with a constitutional challenge to the Major Crimes Act.
Although subsequent scholarship has revealed that the crime
did not actually take place on the reservation,35 two Native
men were nonetheless brought to trial for the murder of
another Native man under the Major Crimes Act. In an
astounding opinion that not only remains good law but is reg-
ularly cited for its central proposition, the Supreme Court
ruled against the tribal members and upheld the constitution-
ality of the law.36 Straining for constitutional authority for the
federal law, lawyers for the United States argued in their brief
before the Supreme Court that the Indian Commerce Clause37
authorized the legislation because if Native peoples were
allowed to kill one another, then there would be fewer with
whom to engage in commerce.38
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected this argument,
noting that “it would be a very strained construction”39 of the
Indian Commerce Clause. While this should have been the end
of the analysis, Justice Samuel Freeman Miller continued: 
“But these Indians are within the geographical limits
of the United States. The soil and the people within
these limits are under the political control of the gov-
ernment of the United States, or of the states of the
Union. There exists within the broad domain of sover-
eignty but these two.”40
Reflecting on the often contentious relationship between
the states and tribal nations, and declaring that states are often
the “deadliest enemies”41 of tribal nations, Miller concluded
that the authority to enact the Major Crimes Act “must exist in
[the federal] government, because it never has existed any-
where else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geo-
graphical limits of the United States; because it has never been
denied; and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the
tribes.”42 Still regularly cited, United States v. Kagama essen-
tially stands for the proposition that congressional authority
over Native peoples is unconstrained by the Constitution.
Although somewhat implicit, the opinion makes clear that
Justice Miller, as well as many others involved at various levels
of Indian affairs, had little to no regard for tribal methods and
systems of justice. Stating that the power to punish tribal crim-
inals must exist in the federal government “because it has never
existed anywhere else,” and that the United States “alone can
enforce its law on tribes,” evidenced a true indifference to the
practices of tribal peoples, the methodologies that they
employed, and the goals they sought to accomplish for their
communities through their various dispute-resolution systems.
When tribal nations began developing their own Western-
influenced courts during the twentieth century, Congress also
began to take a greater interest. Responding to the perceived
problem of tribal governmental abuses on reservations—at a
point in American history when civil rights were a topic of
considerable national discussion—Congress passed the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968.43 The Indian Civil Rights Act
imposed a number of guarantees from the Bill of Rights upon
tribal governments, while also seeking to balance those impo-
sitions with respect for tribal traditions and the severe eco-
nomic difficulties that were facing tribal nations. For example,
tribal nations are required to allow lawyers into their courts if
those under its jurisdiction so request, but they are not
required to provide counsel for indigent clients44 (although
many today do so45). The Indian Civil Rights Act also limited
the criminal punishments to which a tribal nation could sen-
tence a defendant. Originally set at six months in jail and a
$500 fine, the statute was amended in 1986 to increase the
penalties to one year and a $5,000 fine. Tribal reaction to the
Indian Civil Rights Act was mixed, with some arguing that it
was fine in principle but that it was unnecessary, others argu-
ing that it was an unwarranted intrusion into tribal sover-
eignty, and most arguing that the real threat to the civil rights
of individuals on reservations was not from tribal governments
but from the federal and state governments.46
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The Indian Civil Rights Act is undoubtedly a limitation on
tribal governmental authority, at the very least akin to the way
that the federal Constitution is a limitation on the authority of
the federal government. Nonetheless, the Indian Civil Rights
Act marked a divergence of paths between Congress and the
Supreme Court. Beginning in the 1970s Congress began offer-
ing greater support to tribal courts in what has become termed
the Self-Determination Era of federal policy.
Perhaps the greatest example of Congress’s commitment to
tribal courts and sovereignty over the last forty years has been
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.47 The federal legislation
allowed tribal courts to assume child-custody proceedings for
children who are tribal members or who are eligible to become
tribal members. Occasionally misunderstood in the media,48
the Indian Child Welfare Act does not automatically divest
non-Indian adoptive or foster parents of their children. Rather,
it simply gives tribal courts the authority to make the determi-
nations of the best interests of the child. Congress has also
passed other legislation in the furtherance of tribal courts and
justice in Indian Country49 as well as other significant pieces
of legislation to foster tribal self-governance in the Self-
Determination Era. This includes the recently passed Tribal
Law and Order Act.50 Signed into law in 2010, the Tribal Law
and Order Act extends the potential reach of tribal courts in a
number of significant ways, including better training for tribal
law enforcement, the capacity for stronger criminal sentencing
for tribal courts in compliance with certain standards, and
requirements for federal prosecutors to explain why they
declined to prosecute crimes in Indian Country. Although it is
too early to tell if the Tribal Law and Order Act is having its
intended effect, it nonetheless holds much promise and is
reflective of the general congressional policy toward tribal
nations and their courts.
Yet, while Congress has moved since the 1970s to
strengthen tribal courts and increase their jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has moved completely in the opposite direc-
tion. Beginning with Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe51 in
1978 and steadily continuing into the present day, the Supreme
Court has adopted the practice of defining and limiting the
scope of tribal-court jurisdiction, interjecting the judicial
branch into the federal government’s relationship with tribal
nations in an a previously unprecedented manner.
The Court in Oliphant decided that tribal nations did not
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives because it was
“inconsistent with their status.”52 This watershed case marked
the moment when the Supreme
Court began to make clear that it
would hold what has become an
ever-increasing role in defining
the “status” of tribal nations.
Certainly in contradistinction
to, and perhaps in response to,
Congress’s increasing support
for tribal nations and their
courts, the Supreme Court has
announced a number of cases
that have limited the scope of
tribal authority, particularly in
respect to tribal jurisdiction.53
The Supreme Court’s divergent path from Congress and its
increasing willingness to define the metes and bounds of tribal
jurisdiction according to the eminently pliable standard of the
“status” of tribal nations has, on principle, been deeply dis-
concerting to tribal nations and others concerned with tribal
sovereignty. And yet, the level of tribal trepidation has only
been compounded by the type of language that the justices
often employ to describe tribal courts, much of which is not
particularly discernible from the earlier nineteenth-century
precedents that first engaged with tribal adjudication. In some
cases, the Court has used the exact language of the cases from
the nineteenth century. For example, then-Associate Justice
William Rehnquist’s opinion in Oliphant quoted extensively
from Crow Dog—albeit carefully removing the more clearly
racist portions of the excerpt, some of which can be seen ear-
lier in this article—to essentially assert the proposition that
since it was unfair to subject Indians to the white man’s law
nearly a century previous, it was conversely unfair to subject
non-Indians to tribal law in the contemporary setting. One
scholar writing about Rehnquist’s opinion in Oliphant has
stated that it, “unembarrassedly perpetuates [the] overarching
principle of white racial supremacy”54 found in nineteenth-
century cases and that, “it does so through a particularly viru-
lent mode of rights-destroying, jurispathic transmission.”55
The same scholar also notes that Rehnquist’s opinion “cites,
quotes, and relies upon racist nineteenth century beliefs and
stereotypes to justify an expansive, rights-destroying, present-
day interpretation of [tribal rights].”56
Those without even a passing knowledge of Indian law
might be able to compartmentalize the opinion in Oliphant as
the likely last gasp of a dying attitude toward minorities during
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a period of social change. However, those with even a cursory
knowledge of Indian law (or of Rehnquist’s tremendous influ-
ence over the Court for that matter) know better. The Supreme
Court’s seeming wariness, if not outright hostility, toward tribal
courts has grown, and is little changed in terms of justifications
from those of the nineteenth-century courts. For example,
Associate Justice David Souter’s concurrence in Nevada v.
Hicks,57 a case decided in 2001 that again limited the authority
of tribal courts, was perhaps a little more telling than even he
fully understood when he noted, “Limiting tribal-court civil
jurisdiction . . . not only applies the animating principle behind
our precedents, but fits with historical assumptions about tribal
authority . . . .”58 (Emphasis added.) Souter also stated that it
was important to know the boundaries of tribal court jurisdic-
tion because tribal courts “differ from traditional American
courts in a number of significant respects.”59 Conceding that
many of the important guarantees in the Bill of Rights were
applied to tribal nations through the Indian Civil Rights Act,
Souter nonetheless noted, by quoting Oliphant, that tribal
courts were able to define for themselves how to apply concepts
such as due process and equal protection.60 Souter also showed
hesitance toward tribal common law, stating that “the resulting
law applicable in tribal courts is a complex mix of tribal codes,
and federal, state, and traditional law,” which he claimed,
“would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”61
The clear implication of the totality of Souter’s concurrence
is that tribal courts, which are “different” from American
courts, are unwilling or incapable of protecting the rights of
individuals simply because they are tribal courts. The underly-
ing presumption that tribal courts are incapable of being fair
(and more specifically that tribal conceptions of due process
and equal protection will inherently be lesser than their
American counterparts) is perhaps unlikely to withstand any
serious scrutiny and has already been called into serious ques-
tion with respect to at least one prominent tribal court.62
Maybe more importantly, it shows little discernable difference
from the assumptions made about tribal nations, peoples, and
adjudicatory systems from over a hundred years ago.
Unfortunately Justice Souter is not alone in his assumptions
about tribal courts, as seemingly every decision concerning
tribal-court jurisdiction since Oliphant evidences the type of
skepticism of tribal courts that was not uncommon in the deci-
sions of the Allotment Era over a hundred years ago.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not always been hostile to tribal
court interests,63 but it has generally only ruled in the favor of
tribal courts when their proceedings concerned tribal mem-
bers. Whenever non-Native interests have been at stake, the
Supreme Court has shown little, if any, respect toward tribal
courts. This disregard for tribal courts has changed little, if at
all, since the nineteenth century and has trickled down to the
lower American courts.
This disregard is quite possibly the greatest obstacle that
tribal courts have historically faced and face today. Constantly
challenged by their American counterparts, tribal courts face
the uphill battle of establishing their legitimacy. While there
has been some movement, particularly on the state level,64 to
give some effect to tribal-court decisions and orders, a general
hostility remains and is spearheaded by the Supreme Court.
Despite the innovation of tribal courts and their ability to serve
not only their own communities but the greater good as well,
they have been consistently curtailed by the Supreme Court
and state courts. While Congress has given greater sanction to
tribal courts and their jurisdiction, the American judiciary has
generally moved in the opposite direction. One of the driving
forces behind this resistance is the same perspective about
tribal nations and adjudicatory methods that existed in the
1880s.
The time has come for American judges to examine their
own attitudes about tribal courts. Perhaps unreflectively, many
American judges appear to assume the worst about tribal
courts and are fearful of what they imagine tribal courts to be
without truly examining them for what they are, perpetuating
notions about tribal nations, governance, and judicial proceed-
ings that are rooted in the nineteenth century. Like any human
institution, tribal courts are capable of mistakes and abuses
(not unlike the American political system itself). But the “on
the ground” activities of tribal courts strongly suggest that they
operate with at least the same level of fairness, thought, and
balance as other American courts and that they are succeeding
in the difficult task of functioning for those whose cases are
before them under the types of stresses no other court system
faces. By examining tribal courts and their decisions for what
they are, and not for what they have been imagined to be for
well over a hundred years, state and federal court judges could
go a long way in establishing the legitimacy of their tribal
brethren and solving the continuing problems of law enforce-
ment in Indian Country.
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When courts and poor communities interact, theysometimes seem to move on different planes andspeak different languages. The reality is that most
judges are alienated from poor communities. We don’t under-
stand their problems, their needs, and their aspirations,
because we don’t generally have a background in poverty,
whether personal or professional. But we are, after all, public
servants and, as such, we must transcend this alienation and
truly get to know the communities we serve. 
This, however, is not an easy task, because these communi-
ties are not all the same nor do they have the same problems,
characteristics, and ideals. In fact, the idea of the inclusive
community, the supposedly homogeneous society whose com-
mon good was the law’s goal and whose moral consensus was
the content of the law, has been shown for the myth it is and
always was. I think we have always known, but failed to
acknowledge, that we live in myriad groups, whose members
are united by common interests, sympathies, objectives, and,
very often, by common struggles. These groups may be based
on professional interests, and thus be more or less cohesive;
they may be temporary, for instance, groups of students at a
college or university; or they may respond to deep, life-condi-
tioning and historical reasons, such as race, ethnicity, culture,
sexual preference, or poverty. When these profound conditions
are present, the bonds are not temporary nor are they taken
lightly, and what we have is a true community. Society is, in
effect, a cluster of different communities.1
I. THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY
What really makes a “community”? Our social interactions
are often not as one-on-one as we think: each of us interacts
with the other from the perspective—and according to the par-
adigms—of a specific group. This is all complicated, of course,
by the fact that we go in and out of different groups through-
out our lives. For example, some of us live in big cities but
were born in small towns. We have all been students at one
time; maybe we’ve also practiced a different profession before
becoming lawyers—I have taught law students who were
architects, engineers, and medical doctors. However, not all
groups necessarily form communities. 
The bonds that form a community are nurtured by a sense
of collective commitment and a common identity.2
Communities, however diverse their members, are shaped by
their collective struggles to solve common challenges that
often threaten their spatial integrity and cultural traits.3 Poor
communities may be composed of different individuals with
distinct attitudes and lifestyles; varying in age, wealth, educa-
tion, and social concerns, they may be part of other groups,
but, as a cluster of human beings, they respond as a whole to
certain cultural, economic, and historical events. Poverty
implies social and economic inequality regarding, primarily,
the possession of property and the exercise of political influ-
ence. It includes the acceptance of a relationship of depen-
dence that is not necessarily an individual experience; instead,
inequality and economic dependence in poor communities is a
common condition experienced collectively.4
II. FACING COMMUNITIES’ ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
Throughout the years, we have slowly come to realize that
sectors of society that control economic development have his-
torically viewed poor communities as an obstacle to financial
growth. In Puerto Rico, the thrust toward continuous financial
and economic expansion is coupled with an incessant territor-
ial invasion that has gradually shaken and torn apart poor
communities. Gentrification has increased significantly in the
last two decades— ironically, at the same time that more peo-
ple, including poor people, dream of equal access to an eco-
nomic utopia.5
Today, hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans live under
conditions of poverty, without basic infrastructure, under dif-
ficult environmental conditions and with deficient housing.
We are also experiencing extremely high levels of domestic
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6. Statement of Motives, Special Communities Act (Ley para el
Desarrollo Integral de las Comunidades Especiales de Puerto
Rico), Law No. 1-2001 (amended), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 21, §§ 962-
973f (Supp. 2012). 
7. Colón Reyes, supra note 4, referring to the findings of a 2006
study called Puerto Rico Community Survey (Encuesta de la
Comunidad de Puerto Rico).  
8. U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov. See also CB Online, Census:
PR Poverty Up, Income Down, CARIBBEAN BUSINESS, September 23,
2012, http://caribbeanbusinesspr.com/news/census-pr-poverty-
up-income-down-76580.html. The Puerto Rico Center for the
New Economy (Centro para la Nueva Economía) has warned that
income inequality has increased: the poorest 20% of Puerto Ricans
received only 1.7% of the total income in 2011 while the richest
20% received the 55.3%. See http://grupocne.org (last visited Sept.
29, 2012).
9. A 1999 study on the poverty rate among Puerto Rican families
found that 46.3% had earnings of less than $15,000 dollars per
year. The study also showed that more than 50% of the families in
62.8% of the 78 municipalities had earnings of less than $15,000.
See also profiles of poor families in Puerto Rico prepared by Puerto
Rico Legal Services Office and Office for Economic Opportunity
of Puerto Rico: Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico, Perfil de las famil-
ias pobres de Puerto Rico (1980); Oficina de Oportunidad
Económica de Puerto Rico, Perfiles de la pobreza en Puerto Rico
(1976). 
10. Colón Reyes, supra note 4; LINDA COLÓN REYES, POBREZA EN PUERTO
RICO: RADIOGRAFÍA DEL PROYECTO AMERICANO (2006). 
11. Colón Reyes, supra note 4.
12. LILIANA COTTO MORALES, DESALAMBRAR: ORÍGENES DE LOS RESCATES
DE TERRENOS EN PUERTO RICO Y SU PERTINENCIA EN LOS MOVIMIENTOS
SOCIALES CONTEMPORÁNEOS 27 (2006).  
13. According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2010, the pop-
ulation of Puerto Rico was 3.725 million while the number of
Puerto Ricans living in the United States was 4.6 million, which
represented 9% of the Hispanic population. See U.S. Census
Bureau, 2010 Puerto Rico Results, http://2010.census.gov/news/
pdf/cb11cn120_pr_totalpop_2010map.pdf; The Hispanic
Population: 2010 Census Briefs 2, May 2011, http://www.cen
sus.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf. 
14. COTTO MORALES, supra note 12. They also contributed to the loss
of mangroves that began in the 19th century as a result of the
Spanish government’s policy of drying out mangroves. 
violence, teenage pregnancy, and drug abuse, as well as an
appalling crime rate, to which disadvantaged communities are
particularly vulnerable.6
In 2006, a research group found that, even though wages
had shown a slight improvement since the start of the decade,
almost 40% of Puerto Rican families had earnings of less than
$15,000 per year.7 Recently, the United States Census Bureau
published that in 2010, the average income of families that
receive wages in Puerto Rico was $19,730. At that time, 45% of
the population lived below the poverty level, according to fed-
eral standards. In 2011, the median income diminished to
$18,660 and the percentage of people living below the poverty
level in Puerto Rico rose to 45.6%.8 The current worldwide
economic recession has had a direct effect on our population,
leaving thousands homeless and without jobs.9 Yet even as this
economic crisis increases the percentage of families living
under conditions of poverty, their struggle is also strengthen-
ing their sense of community and solidarity.10
In our more marginalized communities, neighbors are not
just “individuals living in physical proximity.”11 In these com-
munities, people become indispensable to one another as small
links in a wide support network essential for daily life. On
many occasions, this social arrangement turns out to be as cru-
cial for people’s survival, or even more so, than the family.
Neighbors fulfill important roles as caretakers for children and
the elderly, assist in house chores, and provide food and other
important supplies during emergencies and natural disasters. 
Therefore, when economic expansion and particular inter-
ests have threatened to tear apart poor communities, to erase
their support networks, and to lessen their quality of life by
affecting the environment and their surroundings, the com-
munities have raised their voices, demanding equality and pro-
tection not just from the State but, more significantly, from the
law and the courts. 
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III. GOVERNMENT
STRATEGIES AND THE
COMMUNITY-RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 
A strong community-rights
movement is not a recent phe-
nomenon in Puerto Rico. During
the 1940s, government reforms
were focused on a weakened
agrarian economy that depended,
basically, on the sugar industry. This dependence on one crop
rendered the country vulnerable to changes in the market.
Thus, during this period and into the 1960s, the government
focused its attention not just on agricultural reform but on
attaining a higher level of industrialization. A key to this indus-
trialization program’s success was the migration to the United
States of agricultural workers whose jobs were being lost or
replaced. Some were truly migrant workers and returned peri-
odically to Puerto Rico.12 Others stayed and became the parents
and grandparents of most of the Puerto Ricans currently living
in the United States, who, according to the census data, out-
number the population of Puerto Rico today.13
In Puerto Rico, the immediate consequence of these govern-
ment programs of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s was an increase
in migration from rural to urban areas, where people settled in
shantytowns. To prevent further growth of this informal hous-
ing movement, the government did not allow citizens to repair
homes located in these areas. In spite of these restrictions, the
growing urban population took over wetlands near mangroves.
As a result, these communities were not only living on the
peripheries of planned urban development, but were also
unsanitary, lacking basic utilities such as water, electricity, and
drainage systems, and were susceptible to flooding.14
To deal with this situation, the government of Puerto Rico
developed a new strategy, a public urban-housing program
A strong 
community-
rights movement
is not a recent
phenomenon in
Puerto Rico.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. at 29.
17. See RAFAEL PICÓ, EL DESARROLLO DE LA COMUNIDAD: LA EXPERIENCIA
EN PUERTO RICO 4-17 (1966). 
18. Linda Colón Reyes, Neoliberalismo, globalización y pobreza en
Puerto Rico, in ENSAYOS SOBRE LA POBREZA EN PUERTO RICO 28
(Francisco Catalá & Francisco Martínez eds., 2002).
19. Id. at 29-33.
20. Our translation for the phrase “rescatadores de terrenos.” See Érika
Fontánez Torres, La presencia del Derecho en el movimiento de
rescates de terreno en Puerto Rico: rescatando entre leyes, tribunales
y el discurso legal, 68 REV. COL. ABOG. PR 351 (2007); COTTO
MORALES, supra note 12.
21. See COTTO MORALES, supra note 13, at 38-108. See also Érika
Fontánez Torres, La política jurídica de la propiedad en Puerto Rico:
un abordaje crítico feminista en busca de igualdad y equidad para las
mujeres, 79 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 915, 920-44 (2010).
22. Faulty or nonexistent urban planning has provoked catastrophes
like the Mameyes mudslide in October 1985, which destroyed
the Mameyes shantytown in the city of Ponce and killed more
than a hundred people. Another community was extinguished in
1985, when residents of Ciudad Cristiana, a housing develop-
ment established five years earlier in the municipality of
Humacao, had to be evacuated because of their proximity to a
canal that had been used to discharge industrial waste for thir-
teen years. Also, in 2009, the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation
(CAPECO) petroleum depot, located between the cities of
Cataño and Bayamón, exploded, affecting residential areas
nearby. Furthermore, the residents of the island of Vieques off the
east coast of Puerto Rico are still waiting for the lands near their
houses to be uncontaminated after decades of being used as a
bombing range by the United States’ Navy.
consisting of apartment build-
ings called caseríos, which were
similar to the public-housing
projects in the United States.
However, many residents of
poor communities refused to
move to these new apartment
complexes because they real-
ized that, by doing so, they
would lose their property rights
and would be made tenants of
the State.15 As a result, the government decided to change
strategies once again, removed previous restrictions on infor-
mal housing developments, and allowed home renovations,
with cement and more durable materials.16
The new economic strategy based on industrialization
resulted in a significant increase in the per capita income and
consuming capacity of the general population.17 But these
social benefits were not evenly distributed. Poverty and unem-
ployment were not eradicated by these programs, and the gov-
ernment’s strategy completely lost its effectiveness by the
1970s. During this decade, Puerto Rican workers started to
demand better salaries, and American manufacturing indus-
tries started to relocate in Taiwan and Singapore in search of
greater economic and tax incentives and a cheaper workforce.
This contributed significantly to high unemployment rates and
social unrest. In response to this economic upheaval, a new
phase of government assistance began in 1975, as massive
transfers of federal funds, by virtue of the Food Stamp
Program, were awarded to Puerto Rico. At the time, 60% of
Puerto Rican families qualified for assistance. The result was
an increased tendency toward economic and social depen-
dence.18 Also, in 1976, the United States Congress extended
section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code as a means of
encouraging economic activity on the Island. This tax exemp-
tion lasted until 1996. 
During the 1980s and well into the year 2000, both the
government and the private sector in Puerto Rico started an
aggressive housing-construction program. However, many
families could not afford to buy these new houses, and a new
wave of low-income families began taking over public and
privately owned vacant lands.19 There they created new com-
munities. This new movement generated intense social bat-
tles between the land-owning sectors and the emerging com-
munities. Marginalized groups began to organize and engage
in social activism; they took legal actions in the courts and
formed community organizations, with the assistance of
political parties, social workers, intellectuals, and religious
leaders.
Many citizens, as well as various political leaders, perceived
these families as squatters and these community actions as
“land invasions.” On the other hand, members of these com-
munities saw themselves as “land rescuers.”20 Eventually, pri-
vate-property owners and the government filed for eviction of
these newly formed communities, with some eviction proceed-
ings ending in chaos, violence, and even the deaths of those
who refused to leave.21
Today, as the population continues to grow, cities are
expanding beyond their traditional limits. Unplanned urban-
ization is straining the cities’ capacity for providing basic
necessities like potable water, waste and garbage disposal, elec-
tricity, roads, and bridges. Environmental conditions in many
communities are extremely difficult; some communities are in
danger of vanishing as the result of natural disasters, like
floods and landslides, or manmade disasters.22 Urban sprawl
presents another challenge for communities that were estab-
lished years ago in what were then rural areas surrounding the
urban centers. Eighty or ninety years later, these communities
are now surrounded by wealthy neighborhoods. Some of these
communities hold land titles to valuable real estate that is ripe
for development. We are on the eve of a new wave of gentrifi-
cation that will expose lower-income communities once again
to the threat of eviction or the exercise by the government of
its power of eminent domain. In this process, the citizens will
probably look for relief in the courts. Are we, as judges, ready
to assist them?
IV. DELIVERING JUSTICE TO THE COMMUNITIES: THE
ROLE OF THE COURTS
Disadvantaged communities are entitled to justice in their
living conditions, health, education, and job opportunities.
They are also entitled to respect and support of their identity
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23. Special Communities Act (Ley para el Desarrollo Integral de las
Comunidades Especiales de Puerto Rico), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 21,
§§ 962-973f (Supp. 2012). Although this law has not suffered
important amendments, the project has experienced a dramatic
reduction of funds and loss of resources. 
24. Law No. 232-2004, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 21, § 963(e) (Supp. 2012).
25. Statement of Motives, Act for the Integral Development of the
Martín Peña Canal District (Ley para el Desarrollo Integral del
Distrito de Planificación Especial del Caño de Martín Peña), Law
No. 489-2004 (amended), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, §§ 5031-5065
(Supp. 2012).
26. After ten years of fighting, the G-8 group has gained some victo-
ries but is still waiting for the dredging of the Martín Peña Canal
to improve living conditions and development. See Libni Sanjurjo,
Prisioneros de aguas sucias, PRIMERA HORA, September 6, 2012, at
38-39; Michelle Estrada, El Caño celebra 10 años de autogestión, EL
NUEVO DÍA, October 27, 2012, at 20. 
27. Law No. 32-2009, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 5045 (Supp. 2012).
The amendment responded to a change of policy when the admin-
istration changed after the 2008 elections.  
28. Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Caño Martín Peña v. Fortuño et al.,
670 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.P.R. 2009).
29. Fideicomiso de la Tierra del Caño Martín Peña v. Fortuño et al.,
604 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2008), available at http://www.ca1.
uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/09-2569P-01A.pdf. The court stated
that: 
Law 32, by its terms, revokes the transfer of public agen-
cies’ lands to the Fideicomiso and returns the lands to pub-
lic ownership through agencies of the Commonwealth and
the Municipality. This transfer to public ownership reflects
the Commonwealth’s judgment that the goals of rehabilitat-
ing and revitalizing the canal will be better served, and will
be consistent with other missions of its public agencies, if
these agencies, rather than the Fideicomiso and the [Martín
Peña ENLACE Project] Corporation, again hold and admin-
ister the lands in the canal area they once owned. There can
be no doubt that Law 32’s transfer to public ownership is
for “public use” under the Takings Clause. Id. at 18-19.
The ENLACE Project Corporation was created by Law
489 to help the residents in the rehabilitation of the area
and establish community development programs. It works
together with the G-8 group.  
30. Law No. 70-2011, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 5045 (Supp. 2012).
This amendment also established limits to the possibility of resale
by requiring the new owners to pay certain sums if the properties
are sold within a period of 10 years after the transfer.
as communities. How can the courts contribute toward this
end? Perhaps our first question should be what conditions
have to be in place before the courts can play a significant part
in the solution of these problems. The first condition, as I see
it, is required by the limits imposed by law and tradition on the
role of the courts in our society, which frowns on the formula-
tion of public policy by courts. I would state this condition
more as something that is to be desired but is not always in
place: a clearly legislated policy concerning the rights of these
communities. 
The Special Communities Act of Puerto Rico, approved in
2001, is one such statement.23 Dubbing communities that are
underprivileged in terms of poverty and other criteria as “spe-
cial,” this act adopts a policy of empowerment for their resi-
dents. The Act was amended in 2004 to require, among other
safeguards, the consent of 75% of the members of a “special
community” before the government can exercise its power of
eminent domain.24
Another important act, approved in 2004, created a land
trust in San Juan modeled after the Dudley Street Initiative in
Boston: the Martín Peña Canal Land Trust (Fideicomiso de la
Tierra del Caño Martín Peña).25 To fend-off land speculation
and assure the permanence of the people living on the lands
along the Martín Peña Canal, the titles to government lands
in that area were transmitted to the trust, which was also
authorized to receive title to private lands along the canal
that were voluntarily transferred by the owners. The Act was
adopted in response to the requests of eight communities
organized as the G-8 group since 2002 to represent the inter-
ests of 26,000 persons who lived on both sides of a canal that
joins the San Juan and San José Bays in Puerto Rico’s capital
city. These tracts of land were created by decades of sinking
dirt, garbage, and debris into swampland until they were firm
enough to support modest houses.26
A clear and firm legislative
statement of public policy,
unfortunately, is not always
enough. Political changes
often introduce contradictory
visions. This happened to the
Martín Peña Canal Act, which
was amended in 2009 to
revert property titles back to
the original owners, the
Puerto Rican Government
and the City of San Juan.27
The land trust sued on the
basis of illegal taking of prop-
erty and illegal encroachment
on private contractual rights. The United States Court for the
District of Puerto Rico abstained under the Pullman
Abstention doctrine and dismissed the case.28 The land trust
appealed. At first, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Boston stayed the implementation of the 2009 amend-
ment, but then, in April 2010, it dismissed with prejudice all
the federal claims while dismissing without prejudice the
claims under Puerto Rican law.29
The Martín Peña Canal Act was amended again in 2011, to
authorize the government to confer individual property titles
to these lands.30 This, of course, weakened the original pur-
pose of the land-trust act, which was to forestall speculation
and maintain these properties for residential use by the G-8
families and their descendants. Nevertheless, another change
of administration as a result of the 2012 elections is expected
to bring back the original public policy. The newly elected
mayor of San Juan has declared that, within her first 100 hours
in office, she will take legal action to stop the granting of indi-
vidual property titles in the eight communities and promote
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the amendment of Law 489 to
reinforce the Martín Peña Canal
Land Trust.31
So our first condition for the
role of courts in protecting
communities—a clearly legis-
lated policy—is not always met.
The question of the role of the
courts is then best posed in
terms of “access to justice.” In
other words, are poor commu-
nities really able to make their
case in our courts? Access to
justice has been defined as the
set of conditions that facilitate
or hinder the equal use of estab-
lished procedural mechanisms
to prevent the violation of rights, to secure legal remedies, and
to resolve controversies.32 Many circumstances, external to the
courts, can limit access to justice—among them, the type of
legal education provided by law schools and the commercial-
ization of the legal profession.
LEGAL EDUCATION 
In general, our law schools teach positive law: the law that
is, not necessarily the law that should be. And the analytical
skills typical of lawyering are developed mostly to understand
and apply the law as it is and not necessarily as it could or
should be. Most professors do not include sociological discus-
sions of the law in their analysis. Duncan Kennedy said it best:
“[T]he trouble with the legal system is that it fails to put the
state behind the rights of the oppressed, or that the system fails
to enforce the rights formally recognized. If one thinks about
law this way, one is inescapably dependent on the very tech-
niques of legal reasoning that are being marshaled in defense
of the status quo.”33 In his words, the conservative approach
taught in law schools is “willfully blind to substantive inequal-
ity.”34 This willful blindness allows or justifies the eagerness of
legal practitioners to defend those who can afford legal repre-
sentation and ignores the communities’ need for legal assis-
tance. In that sense, justice has a price: the cost of legal repre-
sentation.35
THE COST OF LEGAL SERVICES
The high cost of legal representation is a significant hin-
drance to justice. According to Deborah L. Rhode, millions of
Americans lack access to justice, let alone equal access. In civil
proceedings, most low- and middle-income citizens do not
have any affordable access to legal services, while in the crim-
inal justice system, government-funded services for the indi-
gent accused are evidently inadequate. Rhode states that about
“four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and two to
three-fifths of the needs of the middle-income individuals,
remain unmet.”36 As she indicates, “Only one lawyer is avail-
able to serve approximately 9,000 low-income persons, com-
pared with one for every 240 middle- and upper-income
Americans.”37
In Puerto Rico, several organizations provide legal repre-
sentation to the indigent, both in criminal and civil cases, and
law-school students can participate in legal clinics that repre-
sent low-income clients.38 Nevertheless, as professor Russell G.
Pearce states, these initiatives by themselves have a very lim-
ited impact in advancing equal justice since they address “only
a small portion of the inequality within the legal system and do
not recognize that our society cannot provide the vast
resources necessary to equalize the access to justice for low-
income people.”39
QUALITY OF LEGAL SERVICES
Costs have implications not only on the availability but on
the quality of legal representation for poor communities.40 The
American judiciary system, within which Puerto Rico operates,
is based on an adversary system that assumes that the parties’
pursuit of their individual interests results in an outcome that
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(Corporación de Acción Civil y Educación), which provided legal
assistance in civil cases to people in prisons since 1996, had to
cease operations in July 2011 due to lack of funding. See Rama
Judicial de Puerto Rico, Servicios Legales Gratuitos,
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have to provide the same quality of legal assistance when they
work pro bono, many pro bono cases do not receive adequate rep-
resentation, often resulting in their dismissal. 
41. Pearce, supra note 36, at 971, citing JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS
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Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380 (1982); Abram
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1283 (1976). 
42. Pearce, supra note 36, at 970.
43. “[T]hese forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near
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is fair, for them and for society as a whole. As a result, the par-
ties control the major aspects of a case, such as determining
the issues to be solved and the evidence to be presented. In
such a system, the quality of the lawyers’ work “undoubtedly
has a major influence on the outcome.”41
Unfortunately, there is an undeniable correlation between
the cost and the quality of available legal services. For this rea-
son, it has been said that “our legal system largely distributes
legal services through the market and justice through an
adversary system where the quality of legal services has a
major influence. As a result, to a significant degree, justice is
bought and sold and the inevitable result is unequal justice
under the law.”42
COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES  
The complexities of legal controversies involving poor com-
munities make it even harder for them to receive adequate legal
representation. Many communities are socially diverse in terms
of things like race, jobs or unemployment, level of education,
health, age, and family structure. This means that their mem-
bers, while united with respect to certain issues, are not neces-
sarily so with respect to many others. Also, sustaining a com-
munity effort requires participation, and not all of the members
participate in meetings and working groups. It is often very dif-
ficult to achieve consensus among community members regard-
ing legal actions; communication between lawyers and their
multiple clients can be difficult, and many members of the com-
munity may grow tired of waiting for a case to end and may
refuse to support the community action. Numerous community
litigations involve intricate issues and require extensive discov-
ery, expert reports and testimony, and on-site inspections, all of
which are expensive and complicated. 
Even if the community obtains the necessary funds to start
a legal action, in many cases the long process drains its limited
economic capacity, thus forcing a settlement or a withdrawal
without achieving the desired result. Likewise, a restricted
budget can limit access to complete and crucial information
regarding the judicial system and alternatives available to
assert civil rights. Community members often do not under-
stand the judicial process or have inadequate access to infor-
mation, and this affects their willingness to participate. 
V. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE JUDGES
What does all this mean to the individual judge in whose
courtroom this real-life drama
is often played? Acquiring a
law degree and fulfilling the
minimum requirements for
serving as a judge does not
guarantee that the person
seated at the bench fully com-
prehends the needs of our
impoverished communities
and his or her responsibility
toward the members of these
communities. The scenario I
have very broadly described
forces us to do our utmost as
judges to understand these
communities and redefine our
role in the daily process of
delivering justice. Along the way, we must reject abstract neu-
trality and acquire a different kind of objectivity, assume our
role as guardians of procedural fairness, and learn to value the
feelings and ideas of others, even those who seem most differ-
ent from ourselves. 
THE QUEST FOR REASONABLE OBJECTIVITY 
Under the Constitution, the primary function of a judge is
to guarantee the fundamental constitutional rights of every
person. This duty is based on the conviction that judges, as cit-
izens who are aware of the value of these rights in a democra-
tic society, choose their profession knowingly, and they will-
ingly assume responsibility for protecting those rights. They
are committed to this end, and part of this commitment is to
be aware of the great adversities faced by communities that
have limited access to the courts, whose members hope to find
a helping hand among legal professionals and many times are
forced to go to court without legal assistance, in a desperate
effort to be heard.   
The traditional ideal of the “objective judge” does not help
us in this process. Complete objectivity and neutrality have
been shown to be unattainable ends. Judges, as human beings,
are the sum of their own diverse experiences, ideas, situa-
tions, expectations, and realities. Therefore, when a judge
neglects to recognize her own subjectivity, her judgments will
be inevitably biased. We must become aware of our own sub-
jectivities, ideologies, and paradigms.43 By doing so, we may
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GUARDIANS OF PROCEDURAL
FAIRNESS
Judges must go beyond the idea
that they are umpires in a contest
between equal parties. They must be
involved in the process to prevent
the abusive use of procedures, especially in those cases where
one party clearly possesses more resources than the other to
pay for legal expenses. In this type of case, lawyers represent-
ing high-income parties can bog down the process with
motions and petitions, while the lawyers representing poor
communities most often cannot afford adequate discovery,
expert advice, or the time and human resources needed to con-
front these strategies. In these situations, judges must inter-
vene to guarantee that both parties enjoy equal opportunities
to ensure a just outcome.      
The responsibility of presiding over a fair proceeding entails
not only being aware of what occurs during the trial but also
the outcomes produced by settlements, which are the most
common results of lawsuits brought by or against disadvan-
taged communities.44 As for self-represented or pro se parties,
judges should be responsible for ensuring that they have the
greatest possible opportunity to be heard.45 Professor Russell
Engler suggests that in those cases, judges should be responsi-
ble for developing a full and fair record, as well as providing
assistance to the unrepresented litigants on matters of proce-
dure, evidence, and questions of law.46 This may include
explaining the proceedings at every step and assuring that the
parties understand these instructions and explanations. Judges
may also refer a self-represented party to a self-help center or
other similar services for advice.47
An important study done by the American Judges
Association, called Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, establishes that “[j]udges can alleviate much
of the public dissatisfaction with the Judicial Branch by paying
critical attention to the key elements of procedural fairness:
voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and engendering trust in
authorities. Judges must be aware of the dissonance that exists
between how they view the legal process and how the public
before them views it.”48 This means that judges should not only
try to create fair outcomes, “they should also tailor their
actions, language, and responses to the public’s expectations of
procedural fairness.”49 Procedural fairness is essential, but the
perception of procedural fairness is equally important. For this
reason, a fair process often requires a judge who can explain the
trial, in understandable language, to litigants, witnesses, and
jurors. Judges need to accept that it is their responsibility to
ensure that people comprehend the legal process, the court’s
orders, and generally what is happening in their cases.50
EMPATHY: VALUING THE OTHER’S FEELINGS AND
IDEAS     
Empathy was once a strange word, at least in traditional
legal venues. Lawyers, and particularly judges, aren’t supposed
to empathize; our tool is the rule of law, and that is as abstract
and impersonal as it gets. If we are to transcend this neutrality-
abstraction ideal that is force-fed to us in law school, judges
must get to know the communities that seek redress in the
courts. It is important to acquire a balanced perspective that
provides hope of justice to the communities and deepens trust
between the communities and the judiciary. An essential aspect
of this process is learning to be better listeners.51 Really listen-
ing will help us identify those things that color our impartial-
ity, and it will help us recognize our subjectivities, improve our
patience, and strengthen our judicial temperament.
To ensure equal access to justice, we must democratize our
perception of the way our society really is. We’ve come a long
way from adhering to the formal notion of equality developed
when the idea of “being free and equal under the law” had at
its center a certain type of individual: masculine, white, het-
erosexual, belonging to the middle or high socioeconomic
class. We know the detrimental effects that these concepts of
equality have on marginalized groups. In the end, justice
depends on our capacity to see and feel with the silently
excluded and the socially invisible.  
VI. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: JUDICIAL BRANCH INITIATIVES
JUDICIAL EDUCATION 
Continuing education and professional development is
essential in this process. The Judicial Academy of Puerto Rico,
created in 2003, has developed some innovative judicial-edu-
cation opportunities to help judges meet this challenge. Some
are aimed at new judges and are mandatory. Others are
optional opportunities for personal and professional growth in
the adjudication of community problems.
Relevant topics for new judges, both at the lower and appel-
late levels, include management of sexual harassment, domes-
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tic violence, environmental law, and employment-discrimina-
tion cases. Other entry-level topics are: Communication in the
Courtroom; Control of the Courtroom; Judicial Temperament;
Dealing with Stress; and Effective Decision-Making. All of these
are aimed at fostering an attitude of sensitivity to the situations
judges must deal with in the courtroom daily. Also available to
judges at our Judicial Academy are a course on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, a multidisciplinary look at the history and soci-
ology—as well as legal aspects—of Puerto Rican prisons, and a
course on immigration in Puerto Rico. Most importantly, there
is a multi-course curriculum focused on access to justice,
which discusses topics such as Growing Old in Puerto Rico, Law
and Poverty, and Discrimination Against Vulnerable Groups.52
Additionally, every semester our Judicial Academy offers our
judges the opportunity to develop empathy and understanding
by listening to what the more vulnerable groups of society have
to say. For instance, in a course titled Law and Poverty, judges
have met with members of the Coalition of Community Leaders
and with lawyers who provide assistance to the communities, as
well as law and sociology professors and heads of several gov-
ernment programs. They have also met with homeless people
and community organizations that work with them. 
Community leaders have spoken quite frankly about their
perception of justice and the judicial system; they have
explained why they perceive judges, lawyers, and some court
personnel as distant, arrogant, and uncaring about the plight of
the communities. They have addressed the need for judges to
understand about collective or group rights, such as the right
to the integral development of a community and the right of a
community to manage its own development, under the Special
Communities Act of 2001. They have spoken about the lack of
knowledge, and even disdain, that some judges show toward
the culture and lifestyles of marginalized communities, and
they have discussed why community members do not feel wel-
comed in the spaces inhabited by judges. These are eye-open-
ing conversations which consistently receive the highest eval-
uations from participating judges.
JUDICIAL BRANCH INITIATIVES 
Of course, there is more to the administration of justice than
what goes on in the courtroom. The Judicial Branch as a whole
faces great challenges in the years ahead. A study submitted to
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in 2000 recognized that in
the future, courts will face increased litigation, a more diverse
clientele, and new issues relating to economic development, as
well as intensified awareness of environmental issues. The
courts will have to deal with the implications of technological
advances and demographic changes in our society, caused not
only by the continuing move-
ment of the rural population
to the cities but also by
increased immigration into
Puerto Rico, particularly from
the Dominican Republic. This
will result in a more diverse
Puerto Rican society where
racial and ethnic differences,
a topic which has still not
been dealt with too clearly in
Puerto Rico, will become more pertinent. An aging population,
coupled with worrying numbers of young professionals settling
in the United States, will bring new issues to the courts not only
concerning age and gender discrimination but also health and
welfare services and the right to die with dignity. Unfortunately,
the study also foresees that the gap between the rich and the
poor will continue to grow. Moreover, people will turn more
and more to the judicial system to solve their problems, increas-
ing the need for alternative methods of dispute resolution and
problem-solving courts.53
The Strategic Plan of the Judicial Branch of Puerto Rico
took these facts into account and incorporated data and other
input from a Judicial Conference on Access to Justice held in
2002.54 As a result, community relations have been given high
priority, a pro se program was instituted, and problem-solving
courts, such as drug courts, domestic-violence courts, and uni-
fied family and juvenile courts, have been established. Court
improvement programs are also in place. 
Another important initiative is the creation of special pro-
cedures and guidelines for cases involving homeless people.
The approval of these guidelines illustrates what can happen
when we truly listen and empathize with people we otherwise
would not know. There were no procedures in place regarding
the homeless when a newspaper article reported that a home-
less citizen appeared in court and asked to be put in jail. He
admitted to using drugs and asked the court for help but, since
he had not committed a crime, the judge believed there was
nothing he could do and sent him back to the streets.
Eventually, police officers found him and placed him in an
institution so he could receive the help he needed. The special
procedures, adopted after this situation was known, recognize
that attention must be given to the homeless who go the courts
looking for help; that a person does not have to break the law
in order to be noticed by the court; and that we bear some
responsibility even if what is needed is not necessarily within
the scope of the judicial system’s traditional mandate.55
52. See Puerto Rico Judicial Branch, Judicial Academy of Puerto Rico,
http://www.ramajudicial.pr/academia/index.htm.
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Judicial Branch, Strategic Plan 2007-2011, Obra de justicia (2007);
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VII. CONCLUSION
Judges are human beings; we all have opinions and fears,
and we are not immune to prejudices. As individuals, we must
recognize these weaknesses and overcome them to pass judg-
ment over others. In the case of disadvantaged and vulnerable
communities, the only way we can solve their claims objec-
tively and fairly is by recognizing that these communities are
composed of citizens who, like us, struggle with numerous
problems daily and whose only agenda is to exercise their right
to live in a dignified manner. Our commitment to justice
should give us the introspection necessary to neutralize the
prejudices that limit our capacity to listen to and to understand
their claims. As judges, our objective should be to understand
and comprehend each community’s reality and the obstacles
they each face to obtain justice. True access to justice can only
be achieved when a judge uses the law, not as an end in itself,
but as a tool for justice.
If society is to be more than a space for competition and sur-
vival of the fittest, it is not enough to have faith in justice; we
must seek it out, nurture it, harvest it, and be willing to share
it with others. A former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of Puerto Rico, Carlos Irizarry Yunqué, referring to the fact that
justice is always shown blindfolded, said it best: “[N]ever for-
get that under the blindfold there must be eyes that can be
opened to detect the injustice of human inequality. Remember,
that though blindfolded in order not to see, Lady Justice must
have very sensitive ears to listen . . . to the clamor of the hum-
ble who cannot always be heard.”56
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In the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state enacted legislativechanges that eased the process of treating juveniles asadults. Scholars seeking to understand the consequences of
these changes have found evidence of an increase in the num-
ber of juveniles transferred to criminal court and sentenced as
adults. As part of this increase, the number of juveniles receiv-
ing sentences of life without the opportunity for parole
(LWOP) rose substantially. In fact, a large majority of the
approximately 2,600 individuals serving LWOP sentences for
crimes committed as juveniles (under age 18) were sentenced
over the last several decades. LWOP sentences for juveniles,
which preclude the possibility of release at any point except
through clemency or a pardon, have drawn a considerable
amount of criticism and have been the focus of a great deal of
litigation and policy-reform efforts. Responding to this criti-
cism, the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions
over the last few years limiting the extent to which juveniles
can receive LWOP sentences, Graham v. Florida1 and Miller v.
Alabama.2 Despite these decisions, numerous questions remain
regarding the appropriate and allowable levels of punishment
for young offenders that courts and legislatures will continue
to grapple with for the foreseeable future. 
This article explores these questions through an examina-
tion of the legal and legislative landscape of LWOP sentences
for juveniles in light of these decisions. Part I begins with a dis-
cussion of the broader context of legislative changes that eased
the process of treating juveniles as adults and the conse-
quences of the changes. Part II shifts to a discussion of
Supreme Court decisions on the death penalty for juveniles
that provide the foundation for the Graham and Miller deci-
sions, with a specific focus on the Court’s decision in Roper v.
Simmons.3 Part III discusses the Graham decision and the sig-
nificance of the Court’s decision to extend its analysis in Roper
outside of the death-penalty context. Part IV then turns to the
Miller decision, providing an analysis of the decision and a dis-
cussion of several issues that courts and legislatures are grap-
pling with following Graham and Miller. In particular, we will
discuss how courts have treated the question of virtual LWOP,
term-of-year sentences that are the functional equivalent of life
without parole for juveniles. In addition, in Part V, we will
focus on the response of courts and legislatures specifically to
Miller in light of its ban on mandatory LWOP sentences. This
part will focus on Pennsylvania, the state with the most indi-
viduals serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as juve-
niles. In the immediate aftermath of Miller, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court heard two cases regarding the implementation
of Miller, and the Pennsylvania General Assembly has passed
legislation to bring the state in line with Miller. The article will
conclude by highlighting key issues that need to be addressed
by courts and legislatures going forward.       
I. THE SHIFTING BOUNDARY BETWEEN JUVENILE AND
CRIMINAL COURTS
Although transfer provisions vary considerably across states,
during the 1980s and 1990s, every state changed their transfer
laws to facilitate the process of treating juveniles as adults.4
These changes have generally served to lower or eliminate the
minimum age of eligibility to be treated as an adult, to expand
the offenses eligible for adult treatment, to move waiver criteria
toward offense-based characteristics, to shift discretion from
judges to prosecutors, and to create additional avenues to han-
dle juvenile offenders in the justice systems.5 The result of these
changes has been a transformation of the boundary between
juvenile and criminal courts, and, as a result, an increase in the
number of juveniles being treated as adults.6
Given these developments, researchers have sought to iden-
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tify the effects of these changes on both youth and society.
Despite the rhetoric of the legislative changes of the 1980s and
1990s, it is clear from the evidence that the vast majority of
young people sentenced in criminal court do not receive sen-
tences that extend far into their adulthood.7 In fact, there is
significant evidence that large percentages of young people
convicted in the criminal court are placed on probation, sen-
tenced to a term of months in local jails, or receive prison sen-
tences that are not much longer than the punishments avail-
able in the juvenile justice system.8 This is problematic
because youth in the criminal justice system are less likely to
receive programs and services, are subject to higher rates of
victimization, and experience worse mental-health outcomes.9
Thus, it is clear that, when treated as adults, many juveniles are
essentially receiving the same sentence that they could other-
wise receive in the juvenile system without sufficient programs
and services. In addition, being convicted in an adult criminal
court means that a youth is likely to have a felony record, a
result that has a detrimental effect on his or her life opportu-
nities; other studies have found that incarceration during ado-
lescence and early adulthood has negative consequences for
the transition to adulthood.10 For example, numerous studies
have also found that transferred juveniles are more likely to
recidivate than youth retained in the juvenile justice system,
calling into question the public-safety consequences of sen-
tencing juveniles as adults.11
LIFE WITHOUT THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR
PAROLE FOR JUVENILES
In light of the findings dis-
cussed above, some states are
reconsidering their transfer
policies, and a number have
enacted new policies regarding
the transfer of young people to,
and the treatment of young peo-
ple in, the criminal justice sys-
tem.12 One area that has
received a great deal of attention is the issue of LWOP sen-
tences for juveniles. As discussed previously, the vast majority
of young people convicted in criminal court do not receive
long sentences.13 This is, in large part, a reflection of the real-
ity that transfer to criminal court is not limited to juveniles
who commit the most violent and serious offenses, and that
the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s broadened the
population of youth subject to transfer to criminal court.14 At
the same time, a common thread of these legislative changes
was a trend to remove discretion from judges for deciding
whether youth charged with specific offenses, often violent
crimes, should be transferred to criminal court.15 The impetus
behind these changes was, in most respects, the desire to
increase the number of these youth who were transferred to
Court Review - Volume 49 25
[T]he vast 
majority of
young people
convicted in 
criminal court 
do not receive
long sentences.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See SECOND CHANCES 4 YOUTH, BASIC DECENCY: PROTECTING THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2012), for a discussion of trends in
the sentencing of juveniles to LWOP. See ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S.
KING, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT (2009), for a discussion of the increasing
use of LWOP sentences in the United States; see also EQUAL
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: SENTENCING
13- AND 14-YEAR OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON (2007); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REST OF THEIR
LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2005); and MICHIGAN ACLU, SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES
SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS (2004), for
more context on LWOP sentences for juveniles.     
19. See Jeffrey J. Shook, Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without the
Opportunity for Parole, in HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY (Elena L. Grigorenko ed., 2012).
20. Id. This means that juveniles in these states were sentenced to
LWOP without consideration of factors such as developmental
status, family circumstances, and a variety of other factors that
could mitigate against LWOP. In many states, the combination of
mandatory transfer and mandatory sentencing provisions
removed judicial discretion entirely from the decision-making
process.
21. Id. See also petitioner’s brief in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
Hobbes for a discussion of differences between mandatory and dis-
cretionary states.
22. See Linda E. Frost Clausel & Richard J. Bonnie, Juvenile Justice on
Appeal, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER
OF ADOLESCENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000).
23. Id.
24. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
25. Id. The decision was 5-3, and the majority opinion was written by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment. 
26. Id. at 830.
27. Id. at 832.
28. Id. at 836-837.
29. Id.
and sentenced in criminal
court.16
A review of the evidence
on transfer and sentencing
reveals that this intent was
realized.17 With regard to
LWOP, the number of juve-
niles receiving these sen-
tences began to rise in the
mid-1980s and rose substan-
tially until peaking and
beginning to decline in the
late 1990s and into the 2000s.18 One reason for this increase
was the nature of criminal-court sentencing policy. Because
most state sentencing provisions do not distinguish between
juveniles and adults in criminal court, juveniles are subject to
the same sentences as adults.19 In the majority of states that
allow juveniles to receive life without the opportunity for
parole sentences, LWOP is mandatory upon conviction of spe-
cific offenses.20 While LWOP sentences for juveniles increased
both in states with discretionary and with mandatory sentenc-
ing provisions, the rate of LWOP sentences differed substan-
tially, as states with mandatory sentencing provisions sen-
tenced juveniles to LWOP at significantly higher rates than
states with discretionary sentencing provisions.21 Thus, it is
apparent that the combination of changing laws and manda-
tory transfer and sentencing structures account for a large pro-
portion of juveniles sentenced to LWOP.   
II. THE ROAD TO MILLER: THE DEATH PENALTY
Based on the evidence, there is strong support for the con-
clusion that the legislative changes of the 1980s and 1990s
have had a range of negative and harmful consequences for
both young people and society. Despite this conclusion and the
reality that those legislative changes reflected a fairly dramatic
departure in juvenile justice policy and practice, courts gener-
ally did not strike down provisions allowing juveniles to be
punished similarly to adults.22 The limited legal intervention,
in large part, is rooted in a state’s general authority to establish
and regulate its juvenile justice system, especially with regard
to determining who is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
justice system.23
In the late 1980s, however, the United States Supreme
Court did decide two cases pertaining to the punishment of
juvenile offenders. These cases considered the question of
whether it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishment to execute individuals
convicted of crimes that occurred before their 18th birthday. In
the first case, Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that it was
unconstitutional to execute someone who was less than 16
years old at the time of his or her offense.24 The case involved
a 15-year-old named William Thompson who was convicted of
murder in Oklahoma. 
In reaching its decision, the majority applied the “evolving-
standards-of-decency test” and determined that there was a
national consensus against executing individuals under the age
of 16 at the time of their offense.25 In particular, the Court
found that 18 states that allowed the death penalty, in addition
to the 14 states that did not, prohibited it for individuals under
the age of 16 to support the “conclusion that it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less
than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense.”26 The Court
also determined that the rarity in which the penalty was
applied to individuals under 16 evidenced that this penalty
was “abhorrent to conscience of the community.”27 In addi-
tion, the Court asserted that because of a juvenile’s “lesser cul-
pability, as well as the teenager’s capacity for growth and soci-
ety’s fiduciary obligations to its children, the retributive pur-
pose underlying the death penalty is simply inapplicable to the
execution of a 15-year-old offender.”28 Similarly, the Court rea-
soned that a youth’s status reduced the deterrent justification
for the death penalty.29
A year later, the Supreme Court decided a second case
regarding the execution of juveniles involving a 16-year-old
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30. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
31. Id. The majority decision was written by Justice Scalia and joined
by Chief Justice Renhquist and Justices White and Kennedy.
Justice O’Connor concurred that there was not a national consen-
sus against executing 16- and 17-year-olds.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
35. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
36. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
37. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
38. See State ex. rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
39. Id. 
40. Id. In particular, the majority decision cited an article by Elizabeth
Scott and Laurence Steinberg examining whether evidence from
research on adolescent development mitigated against the death
penalty for juveniles. The majority also relied on amicus briefs sub-
mitted by the American Psychological Association, the American
Medical Association, and other organizations to draw its conclu-
sions regarding differences between juveniles and adults.
41. Id. at 569-570.
42. Id. The Court considered whether the execution of minors was
supported by four penological interests: deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Based on its conclusions
regarding differences between juveniles and adults, the majority
determined that penological interests underlying the use of the
death penalty did not support the execution of juveniles.   
43. Id. at 573. In rejecting this approach, the majority argued that “dif-
ferences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the
death penalty despite insufficient culpability.” The majority
expressed concern that “an unacceptable likelihood exists that the
brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of
course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence
less severe than death.” It also questioned the ability of psycholo-
gists to “differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile
offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 
44. Id. at 575.
convicted of murder. In the decision, Stanford v. Kentucky, the
majority opinion held that it was permissible under the Eighth
Amendment to execute an individual who was 16 or 17 years
old at the time of his or her offense.30 Unlike in Thompson, the
majority found that there was not a national consensus against
executing 16- and 17-year-olds.31 Further, the majority
rejected the argument relied upon in Thompson that the reluc-
tance of juries to impose the death penalty on 16- and 17-year-
olds was evidence of a consensus against the punishment.32
The majority opinion also rejected arguments regarding the
reduced culpability for young people as a basis for finding the
death penalty for 16- and 17-year-olds unconstitutional.33
Thus, although the Court was willing to prohibit the death
penalty for those under the age of 16, it was not willing to draw
a line prohibiting the death penalty for all juveniles.
ROPER V. SIMMONS
The Supreme Court revisited this issue less than two
decades later when it decided the case of Roper v. Simmons.34
The decision to hear Roper came soon after the Court decided
another case regarding the death penalty. This case, Atkins v.
Virginia, addressed whether it was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to execute someone who was mentally retarded.35
Similar to the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme Court had
found that it was constitutional to do so in a case decided in
1989.36 In Atkins, however, a majority of the Court found that
there was evidence of a societal consensus against executing
the mentally retarded and raised the potential of another chal-
lenge to the juvenile death penalty.37
Roper, decided just three years after Atkins, involved 17-
year-old Christopher Simmons who was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death in Missouri. Simmons
appealed his sentence, and the Missouri Supreme Court ruled
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.38 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the case in
March 2005. The majority decision relied on the fact that since
Stanford, 5 states had abolished the death penalty for juve-
niles—joining the 30 states that
did not allow for the execution
of juveniles—in finding that
there was a societal consensus
against executing juveniles.39 In
addition to this analysis, the
majority opinion assessed other
evidence to support its deci-
sion, extending its reasoning in
Thompson regarding the
reduced culpability of juveniles
and their capacity to change.40 Specifically, the majority used
this evidence to draw three conclusions regarding differences
between juveniles and adults: (1) juveniles possessed “‘[a] lack
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’”
that often leads to “‘impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions’”; (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure”; and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as an adult.”41
These conclusions led the Court to reason that juveniles
were not as culpable or blameworthy as adults, and it therefore
determined that they could not reliably be classified among the
worst offenders and that executing juveniles was not supported
by penological interests.42 Thus, the majority enacted a cate-
gorical rule prohibiting the execution of someone for a crime he
or she committed under the age of 18. Although the dissents
argued that the individualized approach used by courts in
death-penalty decisions was adequate to account for differences
between juveniles and adults, the majority rejected this
approach.43 The majority also noted the contradictions that
exist in denying juveniles the rights of citizenship (e.g., right to
vote, sit on juries, etc.) but subjecting them to the most severe
penalties administered by the state.44 Finally, it used interna-
tional law to justify its decision by noting the “stark reality that
the United States is the only country in the world that contin-
ues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty” and
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46. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Sullivan v. Florida was
a companion case that was not decided because of procedural
issues and because Joe Sullivan was subject to relief under
Graham.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61.
50. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024.
51. Id. at 2026.
52. Id. at 2027.
53. Id. at 2030 (“. . . penological theory is not adequate to justify life
without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders”). The major-
ity also used international law as part of its analysis and con-
cluded that the U.S. was the only country to sentence juveniles to
LWOP. It did so based on the rationale that it “has treated the laws
and practices of other nations and international agreements as rel-
evant to the Eighth Amendment not because those norms are
binding or controlling but because the judgment of the world’s
nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with
basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale
has respected reasoning to support it.” Id.
54. See id. at 2036 (“I agree with the Court that Terrance Graham’s
sentence of life without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ Unlike the
majority, however, I see no need to invent a new constitutional
rule of dubious provenance in reaching that conclusion. Instead,
my analysis is based on an application of this Court’s precedents,
in particular (1) our cases requiring ‘narrow proportionality’
review of noncapital sentences and (2) our conclusion in Roper v.
Simmons [citation omitted] that juvenile offenders are generally
less culpable than adults who commit the same crimes.”).
55. Id.
56. Id.
the fact that the juvenile death
penalty is prohibited in inter-
national treaties and conven-
tions.45
In declaring that juveniles
are “categorically less culpa-
ble than adults,” the Roper
decision presented a strong
rationale for treating juve-
niles differently and, at least
symbolically, called into ques-
tion sentencing schemes that
treated juveniles similarly to
adults. Yet Supreme Court jurisprudence has traditionally
treated the death penalty differently, meaning that death-
penalty decisions generally did not apply outside of that con-
text. Thus, questions remained regarding whether and how
Roper would be applied to other sentences for young people.
III. NEXT STEP ON THE ROAD: BANNING LWOP FOR
NONHOMICIDE OFFENSES
Following Roper, many individuals serving LWOP or other
long sentences for crimes committed as juveniles challenged
their convictions. Most of these challenges, however, were
denied because courts determined that Roper did not apply
outside of the death-penalty context. The Supreme Court,
however, granted certiorari in two cases in 2009: Graham v.
Florida46 and Sullivan v. Florida. The issue considered by the
Court in Graham and Sullivan was whether, pursuant to an
Eighth Amendment analysis, it was cruel and unusual punish-
ment to sentence a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide
offense to LWOP.47 Building upon its analysis in Roper, the
majority decision enacted a categorical rule prohibiting LWOP
sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses
based on its determination that such a sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.48 In reaching this decision, the
majority used the evolving-standards-of-decency analysis49
and concluded that there was a societal consensus against the
punishment because despite the fact that LWOP sentences
were available in 37 states (plus the District of Columbia and
federal government), only 11 states had sentenced a juvenile to
LWOP for a nonhomicide offense and only 123 juveniles had
ever been sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.50
Similar to Roper, the Graham decision was based on a
review of existing research regarding adolescent development.
Based on its review of the research, the majority asserted: 
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the
Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juve-
niles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show funda-
mental differences between juvenile and adult minds.
For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior
control continue to mature through late adolescence.51
Based on the reduced culpability of juveniles and a long
recognition that those “who do not kill, intend to kill, or fore-
see that life will be taken are less deserving of the most serious
forms of punishment than are murderers,” the majority rea-
soned that, “[i]t follows that, when compared to an adult mur-
derer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has
a twice diminished moral culpability.”52
Given the severity of the sentence—life in prison without
the possibility of release—the Court considered whether it met
penological goals and concluded that because juveniles are less
culpable than adults and have more potential for change, sen-
tencing juveniles to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses could not
be justified through these goals.53 Interestingly, Chief Justice
Roberts concurred in the decision in Graham. In a separate
opinion, he argued that while he did not agree with the cate-
gorical rule advanced by the majority, he did believe that the
LWOP sentence was not proportional in the case of Terrance
Graham.54 He proposed a case-by-case “narrow proportional-
ity” analysis, accounting for an “offender’s juvenile status,” to
determine whether the punishment is proportional to the
crime. In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice Roberts
asserted, “Roper’s conclusion that juveniles are typically less
culpable than adults has pertinence beyond capital cases, and
rightly informs the case-specific inquiry I believe to be appro-
priate here.”55 As noted, the majority rejected this approach
and adopted a categorical rule in large part because of the dif-
ficulty in making this determination while an individual was
still a juvenile.56
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Like Roper, Graham was a momentous decision. Not only
did it confirm and extend the findings from Roper regarding
differences between juveniles and adults, it also extended this
rationale to create a categorical rule banning a punishment
outside of the death-penalty context. The question, then, was
how Graham would be implemented and whether it would be
extended to other categories of cases or punishments. 
IV. WHERE WE ARE TODAY: MILLER V. ALABAMA AND
JACKSON V. HOBBS
On June 25, 2012, the Court announced its decision in
Miller v. Alabama and its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs,
thereby fundamentally altering the landscape of juvenile sen-
tencing law in the United States. Finding that “imposition of a
State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot pro-
ceed as though they were not children,”57 the Court built on its
Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence in
Thompson, Roper, and Graham by finding mandatory LWOP
sentences unconstitutional for youth under the age of 18. The
following section provides a brief analysis of the Miller deci-
sion and, using Pennsylvania as a case study, discusses how
one state has sought to bring itself into compliance with Miller. 
THE CASES 
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson, both 14 years old when
they were convicted of murder, suffered traumatic life experi-
ences before they were sentenced to mandatory terms of life in
prison without the possibility of parole. In Miller’s case, he was
charged and convicted of first-degree murder and arson. In
Jackson’s case, he was charged and convicted of felony murder
for his role as a lookout and non-triggerman in an armed rob-
bery gone awry.
KUNTRELL JACKSON
Kuntrell Jackson was raised in an abusive and impoverished
Arkansas household with significant exposure to gun violence.
“Kuntrell’s mother was sent to prison for shooting and injuring
a neighbor when Kuntrell was about six years old. When
Kuntrell was about thirteen years old, his older brother [] was
also imprisoned for shooting someone. Not long after this,
[Kuntrell’s abusive father figure] left the family; two of
Kuntrell’s teenage sisters became pregnant; and several other
relatives were incarcerated.”58 In 1999, Jackson and two other
boys decided to rob a video store. Upon learning that one of
the other boys was carrying a sawed-off shotgun, Jackson
decided to stay outside when the other boys entered the store.
There was a struggle with the
storekeeper, Jackson entered
the store, and when the store-
keeper threatened to call the
police, one of the other boys
shot and killed her. The three
boys fled empty-handed.59
The prosecutor in Jackson’s
case exercised his authority to
charge Jackson as an adult,60
and Jackson was charged with
capital felony murder and
aggravated robbery. The trial
court denied his motion to
transfer the case to juvenile
court, and an appellate court
affirmed.61 A jury then convicted Jackson of both crimes, and
the judge sentenced Jackson to LWOP, the only statutorily avail-
able sentence.62 Jackson did not challenge the sentence on
appeal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tions. Two years later, Jackson filed a state petition for habeas
corpus, challenging his sentence under Roper v. Simmons and
then under Graham v. Florida. The Arkansas Supreme Court
affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Jackson’s petition, find-
ing that “Roper and Graham were ‘narrowly tailored’ to their
contexts: ‘death-penalty cases involving a juvenile and life-
imprisonment-without-parole cases for nonhomicide offenses
involving a juvenile.’”63
EVAN MILLER
Evan Miller grew up “in and out of foster care because his
mother suffered from alcoholism and drug addiction and his
stepfather abused him. Miller, too, regularly used drugs and
alcohol; and he had attempted suicide four times, the first
when he was six years old.”64 In Miller’s case, the crime
occurred one evening, after the victim, Cole Cannon, came to
Miller’s home to make a drug deal with Miller’s mother. Miller
and a friend followed Cannon back to his trailer and spent the
rest of the night smoking marijuana and playing drinking
games. When Cannon passed out, Miller and his friend took
money from his wallet. When Miller tried to put the wallet
back into Cannon’s pocket, Cannon awoke, and a fight
ensued, during which Miller struck Cannon repeatedly with a
baseball bat. In an attempt to cover up their crime, the two
boys set fire to Cannon’s trailer, and Cannon eventually died
from his injuries and from smoke inhalation.65 As the Court
57. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012).
58. Jackson’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2011 WL 5322575, at 4-
5, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10–9647) (internal citations omit-
ted). 
59. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
60. Justice Kagan notes, “Arkansas law gives prosecutors discretion to
charge 14-year-olds as adults when they are alleged to have com-
mitted certain serious offenses.” Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
27-318(c)(2) (1998)). 
61. Id. (citing Jackson v. State, No. 02-535, 2003 WL 193413 at 1
(Ark. App., 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-27-318(d), (e)).
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) (1997) (“A defendant convicted
of capital murder or treason shall be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment without parole.”). Because Jackson was ineligible
for the death penalty under Thompson, 485 U.S. 815, the only
available sentencing option was life imprisonment without parole.
63. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461 (citing Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49,
____S.W. 3____, at 5 (2012)).
64. Id. at 2462 (citing E.J.M. v. State, 928 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2004) (Cobb, J., concurring in result)); App. in No.
10-9646, pp. 26-28).
65. Id.
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66. Id. at 2462-63.
67. Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor. Justice Breyer wrote a concurring opinion focused
on the felony-murder rule, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.
Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Thomas and Alito, filed
dissenting opinions in which Justice Scalia joined.
68. Id. at 2463.
69. Id. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011;
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding imposition of
death penalty for nonhomicide offenses unconstitutional); Atkins,
536 U.S. 304 (finding Eighth Amendment violation in the impo-
sition of death penalty on mentally retarded defendants).
70. Id. at 2464 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
71. Id. See also id. at 2465, n. 5 (“The evidence presented to us in
these cases indicates that the science and social science support-
ing Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even
stronger.”). 
72. Id. at 2465.
73. See, e.g., id. at 2464-65 (Noting the unique juvenile capacity for
rehabilitation: “[Scientific] findings—of transient rashness, pro-
clivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both less-
ened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that
as the years go by and neurological development occurs, his ‘“defi-
ciencies will be reformed.”’” (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
2027).
74. Id. at 2466.
75. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death sentence for
first-degree murder on Eighth Amendment grounds).
76. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
74-76 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-112
(1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597-609).
77. Id. at 2467-68.
noted in the Miller decision, 
Alabama law required
that Miller initially be
charged as a juvenile, but
allowed the District
Attorney to seek removal
of the case to adult court.
[ ] The D.A. did so, and
the juvenile court agreed
to transfer after a hearing.
. . . The State accordingly charged Miller as an adult with
murder in the course of arson. That crime (like capital
murder in Arkansas) carries a mandatory minimum
punishment of life without parole. [Citations omitted.]
Relying in significant part on testimony from [Miller’s
friend], who had pleaded to a lesser offense, a jury found
Miller guilty. . . . The Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed . . . [and the] Alabama Supreme Court
denied review.66
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases—Miller
on direct appeal and Jackson on collateral review.
THE DECISION 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice
Elena Kagan, declared Miller and Jackson’s mandatory LWOP
sentences unconstitutional.67 Justice Kagan’s analysis in the
Miller decision is rooted in the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and rests on the convergence of “two strands of
precedent reflecting [the Court’s] concern with proportionate
punishment.”68 The first line relates to “categorical bans on
sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpa-
bility of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty.”69 The
second line stems from cases prohibiting the mandatory impo-
sition of capital punishment, “requiring that sentencing
authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the
details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”70
The Court focuses on the fundamental developmental dif-
ferences between youth and adults to establish the dispropor-
tionality of mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles and the
corresponding need for individualized sentencing of youth
convicted of murder. In setting forth the key aspect of the
opinion, Kagan builds on the premise established by the Roper
and Graham decisions—that, based on continuously evolving
science and social-science research, “children are constitution-
ally different than adults for purposes of sentencing.”71
As in Roper and Graham, the Miller decision underscores
the lack of any penological justification for “imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they com-
mit terrible crimes.”72 To reach this conclusion, the Court
reviewed its previous analyses of retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation in the juvenile-sentencing context and found
that none of the traditional penological rationales support the
existence of mandatory LWOP sentences for juveniles.73
The Court further relied on its line of reasoning in Graham
by likening LWOP sentences for juveniles to the death penalty
itself.74 Looking to Woodson v. North Carolina75 and its progeny,
which call for individualized sentencing and the ability to con-
sider mitigating factors in capital cases,76 the Miller Court
argues that the same rationale should be extended to juveniles
facing the state’s harshest available penalty. In extending
Woodson’s rationale to the juvenile-sentencing context, Miller
mandates sentencing processes tailored to account for the dis-
tinct attributes of youth:
In light of Graham’s reasoning, these [death-penalty]
decisions too show the flaws of imposing mandatory life-
without-parole sentences on juvenile homicide offend-
ers. Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude
a sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and
the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant
to it. Under these schemes, every juvenile will receive the
same sentence as every other—the 17-year-old and the
14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child
from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and
abusive one. . . . So Graham and Roper and our individu-
alized sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a
State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if
he treats every child as an adult.77
Accordingly, to comply with Miller, states must implement
processes and procedures reflective of the substantive change to
sentencing law. By extending traditional death-penalty sentenc-
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78. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-
Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences,
A.B.A. J., Aug 8, 2012, available at http://www.abajournal.com/
n e w s / a r t i c l e / c h e m e r i n s k y _ j u v e n i l e _ l i f e - w i t h o u t -
parole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/ (noting that the
inability to mandatorily impose life without parole sentences on
juveniles “will necessitate a penalty phase after conviction to
make [the sentencing] decision. After the Supreme Court held
that there cannot be a mandatory death sentence in homicide
cases, the practice of the penalty phase developed for a determi-
nation of whether capital punishment is warranted based on the
facts in each case. The same type of penalty phase will be required
when life without parole is sought for a homicide crime commit-
ted by a juvenile”).
79. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
80. Id. at 2469.
81. Marsha Levick, From a Trilogy to a Quadrilogy: Miller v. Alabama
Makes It Four in a Row For U.S. Supreme Court Cases That Support
Differential Treatment of Youth, 91 CRIM. L. REP. 748 (2012).
82. Chemerinsky, supra note 78.
83. Another question involves the current status of cases where juve-
niles were sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses. Because
Graham found the sentences of juveniles serving LWOP for non-
homicide offenses unconstitutional, those individuals needed to
be resentenced. Most courts determined that Graham did apply
retroactively to juveniles already serving LWOP for nonhomicide
offenses. While individuals were sentenced to LWOP for non-
homicide offenses in 12 states, the vast majority were serving their
sentences in Florida and Louisiana. Drawing conclusions about
the outcomes of resentencing hearings is difficult because there is
no comprehensive analysis of the outcomes available and many
cases have still not been resentenced. 
84. People v. Caballero, 55 Cal. 4th 262 (Cal. 2012).
85. Id. at 273 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). 
ing procedures to the juvenile-sentencing context, the Miller
decision creates a requirement of individualized sentencing
hearings and review of mitigating circumstances whenever
juveniles charged as adults are facing LWOP sentences.78 To aid
the lower courts’ review of such mitigating factors, as applied to
juveniles, the Court outlined the factors a sentencer must con-
sider, including: (1) the youth’s “chronological age” and related
“immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”; (2) the youth’s “family and home environment
that surrounds him”; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide
offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct
and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him;”
(4) “the incompetencies associated with youth—for example,
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (includ-
ing on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own
attorneys;” and (5) “the possibility of rehabilitation.”79
Despite its sometimes-sweeping language, Miller leaves us
with a relatively constricted holding: “the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison with-
out possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”80 Yet the nar-
row holding results in broad implications for juvenile sentenc-
ing going forward, as Marsha Levick notes in the Criminal Law
Reporter: 
A close reading of Kagan’s opinion suggests that the
whole may be greater than the sum of its parts. From the
outset of her opinion, Kagan made clear that the social
science and other scientific research that had informed
the court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. dic-
tated a similar outcome in Miller. Consequently, while
affording narrow specific relief, Miller still provides a
broad framework for rethinking our treatment of juvenile
offenders.81
Further, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky writes, Miller
stands apart from its juvenile sentencing counterparts in terms
of its future implications: 
At first glance, the decision seems to follow from
other recent Supreme Court decisions that have limited
the punishments imposed on juvenile offenders. But in a
key respect this case is different: previous cases prohib-
ited the imposition of certain
punishments under any circum-
stances, whereas Miller holds
only that there cannot be a
mandatory sentence. This dis-
tinction is going to matter enor-
mously and raise important
issues that are sure to be liti-
gated.82
V. POST-MILLER
IMPLEMENATION: NEXT
STEPS ON THE ROAD?
As is evident, the Supreme Court has been unequivocal in
its conclusions that young people are different than adults and
should be subject to different punishments. This conclusion is
especially important in light of the trend over the last few
decades to punish them similarly to adults. Numerous ques-
tions remain, however, regarding how courts and legislatures
will implement both the letter and spirit of these decisions.
While an exhaustive examination of these issues is beyond the
scope of this article, below we discuss several specific issues
that courts and legislatures are grappling with in response to
these decisions—“virtual LWOP” and decisions regarding the
sentencing options available for courts in light of Miller.83
“VIRTUAL LWOP”
In addition to those serving LWOP for crimes committed as
juveniles, many individuals are serving long sentences for non-
homicide crimes committed as juveniles and challenges have
been brought to some of these sentences in both state and fed-
eral courts under Graham. In People v. Caballero, the California
Supreme Court considered the question of whether a “110-year-
to-life sentence [for attempted murder] contravenes Graham’s
mandate against cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.”84 In concluding that it did, the California
Supreme Court drew from Graham’s assertion that the Eighth
Amendment requires a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”85
The Caballero court rejected the state’s contention that
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86. Id. The Court also rejected the argument that “each of defendant’s
sentences was permissible individually because each included the
possibility of parole within his lifetime.” The Court disagreed with
the state’s reading of Lockyer v. Andrade “that a juvenile offender
may receive consecutive mandatory terms exceeding his or her life
expectancy without implicating the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment,” finding instead that “the high court noted
that it has never provided specific guidance ‘in determining
whether a particular sentence for a term of years can violate the
Eighth Amendment,’ observing that it had ‘not established a clear
or consistent path for courts to follow.’” Id. at n. 3 (citing Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003)).
87. Id. at 273 (citing Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 2469).
88. Id.
89. See id. (“Because every case will be different, we will not provide
trial courts with a precise time frame for setting these future
parole hearings in a nonhomicide case. However, the sentence
must not violate the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights and
must provide him or her a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ under
Graham’s mandate.”).
90. Id.
91. 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 5,
2012) (No. 12-558).
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006) (“(d) An application for a writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-
ings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a deci-
sion that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court.”). 
93. Id. at 547.
94. Id. at 551.
95. Id. at 552.
96. It is worth noting that Caballero, 55 Cal. 4th 262, was decided
after Bunch, providing further support for the proposition that
Graham is applicable to virtual juvenile LWOP sentences.
97. Citing, e.g., People v. J.I.A., 196 Cal. App. 4th 393, 127 Cal. Rptr.
3d 141, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Nuñez, 195 Cal. App.
4th 414, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
“Graham’s ban on life without
parole sentences does not
apply to juvenile offenders
who commit attempted mur-
der, with its requisite intent
to kill,” as well as the state’s
view “that a cumulative sen-
tence for distinct crimes does
not present a cognizable
Eighth Amendment claim 
. . . .”86 The Court relied on
the clarification of the
Graham decision provided by the United States Supreme Court
in Miller to hold that “Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on life without parole
sentences applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile
offenders, including [a] term-of-years sentence that amounts
to the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence 
. . . .”87
Unlike Graham, the Caballero decision does not categorically
prohibit the possibility of incarcerating juveniles for the rest of
their lives. Instead, drawing from the language of Graham and
Miller, the decision recognizes that “the state may not deprive
[juveniles] at sentencing of a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to reenter society in
the future.”88 With regard to procedure, the California Court
declined to implement specific sentencing guidelines for those
wishing to challenge their LWOP or de facto life sentences
going forward.89 Rather, the court ordered that juvenile lifers
“may file petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court
in order to allow the court to weigh the mitigating evidence in
determining the extent of incarceration required before parole
hearings.”90 It will then be up to the parole board to determine
if and when the juvenile will be released from prison.
Similar challenges to virtual or de facto LWOP sentences
have cropped up across the country, with different procedural
postures and with varying outcomes. In Bunch v. Smith, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case involving a
16-year-old who was convicted of robbing, kidnapping, and
raping a young woman and was sentenced to consecutive,
fixed terms totaling 89 years’ imprisonment.91
Operating under a very different standard of review from its
state-court counterparts, the Bunch court’s analysis was guided
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
which permits federal courts to grant relief on a habeas peti-
tion only where the state court has ruled in a way that is either
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished federal law.92 Here, the Bunch court held that the Ohio
Supreme Court was not unreasonable in finding Graham to be
inapplicable on the facts. Specifically, the Bunch court held that
Graham “does not clearly establish that consecutive, fixed-
term sentences for juveniles who have committed multiple
nonhomicide offenses are unconstitutional when they amount
to the practical equivalent of life without parole.”93 The court
employed a narrow reading of the Graham decision, arguing
that although “Bunch’s 89-year aggregate sentence may end up
being the functional equivalent of life without parole,”94
Graham is inapplicable because “[the Graham] Court did not 
. . . consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone
clearly establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.”95 Notably, the
Bunch court concluded its opinion by noting that this is not an
established area of law:96
[C]ourts across the country are split over whether
Graham bars a court from sentencing a juvenile non-
homicide offender to consecutive, fixed terms resulting
in an aggregate sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life
expectancy. Some courts have held that such a sentence
is a de facto life without parole sentence and therefore
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Graham.97 Other
courts, however, have rejected the de facto life sentence
argument, holding that Graham only applies to juvenile
nonhomicide offenders expressly sentenced to ‘life with-
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98. See, e.g., Henry v. State, 82 So.3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012);
State v. Kasic, 228 Ariz. 228, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2011).
99. Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552.
100. Associated Press, “US Supreme Court Sets Aside Wyoming Teen’s
Sentence,” Oct. 26, 2012, available at http://billingsgazette.com/
news/state-and-regional/wyoming/us-supreme-court-sets-aside-
wyoming-teen-s-sentence/article_127c206e-d7c9-5d67-8280-
17ec288174a0.html#ixzz2AkYpdo00.
101. Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, P84 (Wyo. 2012).
102. See Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 184 L. Ed. 2d 5 (U.S. 2012) (“On
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment vacated, and
case remanded to the Supreme Court of Wyoming for further
consideration in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, [132 S.
Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407] (2012)”).
103. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 570 (2005)).
104. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471, n. 9 (“26 States and the Federal
Government make life without parole the mandatory (or manda-
tory minimum) punishment for some form of murder, and
would apply the relevant provision to 14-year-olds (with many
applying it to even younger defendants). In addition, life without
parole is mandatory for older juveniles in Louisiana (age 15 and
up) and Texas (age 17). See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN., Arts. 857(A),
(B) (West Supp. 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30(C),
14:30.1(B) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§
51.02(2)(A), 54.02(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2011); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.31(a) (West 2011). In many of these jurisdic-
tions, life without parole is the mandatory punishment only for
aggravated forms of murder.”). 
105. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1102(b) (mandating life sentence
for second-degree conviction); 61 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. §6137
(removing parole eligibility from murder statute).
106. See 42  Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6302 (omitting the “crime of mur-
der” from the definition of delinquent acts that are handled in
juvenile court).
107. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9545(b)(2).
108. Docket No. 79 MAP 2009.
109. Docket No. 38 EAP 2012.
out parole.’98 This split demonstrates that Bunch’s expan-
sive reading of Graham is not clearly established.99
In light of the split regarding Graham’s applicability to de
facto LWOP sentences, the United States Supreme Court’s
treatment of similar cases on petitions for certiorari may pro-
vide insight on the proper reading of Graham. Consider the
recent case from Wyoming of Wyatt Bear Cloud, a 16-year-old
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in
prison with the possibility of parole. In challenging his case on
both Graham and Miller grounds, Bear Cloud argued that
“although [he] wasn’t sentenced to serve life without parole 
. . . that was the practical effect of his sentence because his only
chance for release was commutation by a state governor.”100
The Wyoming Supreme Court found that “Bear Cloud is
afforded the possibility of parole. Rehabilitation and even
release are still possible. Accordingly, his sentence does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment in contravention of
Wyoming’s constitution.”101 But the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Miller.102
Caballero provides a strong example of state courts embrac-
ing and reaffirming both the letter and spirit of the Graham
decision by acknowledging the unique attributes of youth and
the necessary consideration of these attributes when it comes to
sentencing children as adults. Unlike Caballero, cases like
Bunch provide only a narrow reading of the precedent and
refuse to fully adopt Graham’s mandate that children “are more
capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less
likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than
are the actions of adults.”103 Although not yet concluded, the
current posture of Bear Cloud gives some indication that merely
providing a choice between “life with” or “life without” parole
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders fails to comply with the
directives of both the Graham and Miller decisions. 
MILLER IMPLEMENTATION
IN PENNSYLVANIA:
RESPONSES BY THE
COURTS AND
LEGISLATURE
At the time Miller was
decided, 26 states had sentenc-
ing provisions mandating juve-
nile LWOP sentences for certain
categories of offenses, and mak-
ing such sentences applicable to
14 year-olds.104 Of those 26
states, Pennsylvania has the
highest number of people serv-
ing the sentence, with nearly 500 men and women who were
incarcerated throughout the state as children. Prior to Miller,
Pennsylvania held the distinction of mandating life imprison-
ment sentences for all first- and second-degree murder convic-
tions,105 regardless of the age of the defendant.106 Finally,
Pennsylvania is unique in that it has an extraordinarily short
time frame—60 days—for filing a petition for post-conviction
relief based on a new rule of constitutional law.107 This means
that Pennsylvania courts are among the first in the country to
consider Miller implementation. For all of these reasons,
Pennsylvania serves as a battleground for determining how
state-based implementation of the Miller decision will look.
Using Pennsylvania as a case study in this context will help to
forecast the challenges other states may face in implementing
Miller, as well as the avenues they may wish to avoid or pursue. 
After Miller was decided, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has heard arguments in two juvenile LWOP cases. At the time
of this writing, the cases remain undecided. In the first case,
Commonwealth v. Batts,108 the Court (on direct appeal) is
tasked with deciding the appropriate sentence for a 16-year-old
convicted of first-degree murder, in light of the Miller decision
and the mandatory nature of the state’s sentencing scheme. In
Commonwealth v. Cunningham,109 a second-degree murder case
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110. Specifically, the Pennsylvania high court ordered briefing on the
following questions: “(1) What is, as a general matter, the appro-
priate remedy on direct appeal in Pennsylvania for a defendant
who was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for a murder committed when
the defendant was under the age of eighteen?; (2) To what relief,
if any, is appellant entitled from the mandatory term of life
imprisonment without parole for the murder he committed
when he was fourteen years old?” Docket No. 79 MAP 2009.
111. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 7-8, Batts, Docket No. 79
MAP 2009.
112. See id. at 8 (“juvenile offenders convicted of first degree murder
should be resentenced in accordance with the sentencing scheme
for the lesser-included offense of third degree murder, which car-
ries a maximum term of 40 years.”) (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1102). See also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292,
305-307 (1996) (finding that where a greater offense must be
reversed, courts may enter judgment on the lesser included
offense); Commonwealth v. Story, 497 Pa. 273, 275 (1981)
(imposing life imprisonment, the next most severe punishment
under Pennsylvania law, upon invalidation of mandatory death-
penalty statute as unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Bradley,
449 Pa. 19, 23-24 (1972) (vacating death sentence and imposing
life imprisonment as next most severe constitutionally available
sentence); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 488 Pa. 139, 141 (1979)
(same).
113. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant, supra note 109, at 12.
114. See Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 7, Batts, Docket No. 79
MAP 2009 (“A sentence of life in prison without parole simply
requires a discretionary decision based on individualized consid-
eration.”).
115. Id. at 8.
116. Id. at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 522 A.2d 1058,
1063 (Pa. 1987)).
117. See Supplemental Response Brief of District Attorney at 4,
Cunningham, Docket No. 38 EAP 2012.
on collateral review, the Court
must squarely confront the
issue of retroactivity, deter-
mining whether Miller’s man-
date applies to all of the men
and women in the state who
were sentenced as juveniles
and are currently serving life
sentences without the possi-
bility of parole. 
COMMONWEALTH V. BATTS
Qu’eed Batts was convicted of first-degree murder,
attempted murder, and aggravated assault for his role in a
gang-related shooting of two individuals in Easton,
Pennsylvania. Batts’s appeal was argued before the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the winter of 2010 and then held in
abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court’s grant of
certiorari in the Miller and Jackson cases. Once Miller was
decided in the summer of 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ordered supplemental briefing on the decision’s poten-
tial impact on the pending case.110 Both sides agreed that
because the Miller decision invalidated Pennsylvania’s statu-
tory sentencing scheme (mandating LWOP for any juvenile
convicted of first- or second-degree murder), Batts was entitled
to a resentencing hearing. Therefore, the question at issue is
what the new constitutional sentence should be. 
Batts argued that the Court must look to existing statutes to
determine what constitutional sentence may be imposed on
juveniles convicted of homicide.111 Batts further argued that
with Miller’s invalidation of the existing sentencing scheme,
the only constitutionally available sentence in Pennsylvania is
the sentence for the lesser-included offense of third-degree
murder, carrying a maximum term of 40 years.112 Accordingly,
in the absence of alternate legislation to be applied retroac-
tively, Batts seeks to be resentenced pursuant to the
Commonwealth’s third-degree murder statute.113
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argued that the only
relief afforded to Batts by the Miller decision is a resentenc-
ing hearing, at which he can still be sentenced to life in
prison without parole.114 Specifically, the Commonwealth
argued that “[t]he trial court has discretion as to whether to
impose a sentence to life in prison without parole, or a sen-
tence of life in prison with the possibility of parole.”115
Underlying the Commonwealth’s argument is the notion that
juveniles do not deserve special treatment; rather, murder
should be treated “as a special category of violence that can-
not be categorically excused or mitigated by youthful
impetuosity.”116
COMMONWEALTH V. CUNNINGHAM 
Ian Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder
for the role he played in an armed-robbery-turned-murder.
Once convicted, Cunningham sought collateral relief on the
basis of the changes in law as announced in Roper. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court denied relief, holding that Roper
had no bearing on life sentences.117 Soon after the Superior
Court denied relief, Cunningham filed a petition for allowance
of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Court
reserved the petition pending the disposition of Batts. As in
Batts, following the United States Supreme Court’s announce-
ment of its decision in Miller, the Pennsylvania court issued a
limited allowance of appeal to address the extent to which
Miller applies on collateral review. The court heard oral argu-
ment on this issue in September 2012. 
Cunningham puts forward a number of arguments in sup-
port of his petition for relief. First, Cunningham challenges the
applicability of a felony-murder charge to a juvenile offender.
Relying on research regarding adolescent brain development,
Cunningham argues that it is not possible to infer intent for
felony-murder purposes when dealing with a teenage defen-
dant. Second, Cunningham argues that prisoners convicted of
first- or second-degree murder before the Miller/Jackson deci-
sions are eligible for relief even after they have exhausted their
direct-appeal rights, relying in large part on the fact that the
Miller decision was held to apply to Jackson on collateral
review. Cunningham goes on to argue that if Miller/Jackson
relief is applied retroactively, courts at resentencing must look
to the statutes in existence at the time of the offense to deter-
mine what constitutional sentence may be imposed. In
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118. See Brief of Appellee at 2, Cunningham, Docket No. 38 EAP 2012.
119. 489 U.S. 288.
120. See id. at 12-13 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. 288) (“[U]nder the first
Teague exception, new rules do not apply on collateral review
unless they are ‘substantive’” and the second Teague exception
only applies to “‘watershed rules’ of criminal procedure ‘impli-
cating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pro-
ceeding.’”).
121. Id. at 14.
122. See id. at 5 (“That one of the appellants in Miller, Jackson, was
on collateral review is additionally irrelevant because Miller did
not apply its new rule to Jackson (or even to Miller), but only
remanded for further proceedings—in which the state could
raise a valid Teague objection.”).
123. Id.
124. See Chemerinsky, supra note 78 (“In fact, the Supreme Court
held that Ring [v. Arizona] did not apply retroactively. In 2004’s
Schriro v. Summerlin, the court concluded that Ring was a proce-
dural change and not a ‘watershed’ rule of criminal procedure
that warranted retroactive application”). For cases finding that
Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review, see Craig
v. Cain, 2013 WL 69128, at *2, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 431, at *4-
*5 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (unpublished opinion) (“Miller does
not satisfy the test for retroactivity because it does not categori-
cally bar all sentences of life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller
bars only those sentences made mandatory by a sentencing
scheme.”); People v. Carp, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2012 WL 5846553,
2012 Mich. App. Lexis 2270 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012)
(“Miller does not comprise a substantive new rule and, therefore,
is not subject to retroactive application for cases on collateral
review . . . .”); Geter v. State, ___ So.3d ___, 2012 WL 4448860,
2012 Fla. App. Lexis 16051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
125. Chemerinsky, supra note 78.
126. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 2012 Ill. App. (1st) 111145, 2012
WL 6206407, 2012 Ill. App. Lexis 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(“The Miller case held under the Eighth Amendment that it is
cruel and unusual punishment to impose a mandatory life sen-
tence without parole to a special class—juveniles. It woiuld also
be cruel and unusual to apply that principle only to new cases.
We therefore hold that the Court’s holding in Miller should be
Pennsylvania, courts at resentencing should only consider
lesser-included offenses, which, in the case of felony murder,
includes only the underlying felonies.
The Commonwealth argues that Miller states a new rule and
is therefore “not a basis for relief on collateral review.”118 The
Commonwealth further argues that Miller does not meet the
exceptions required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague
v. Lane,119 to be given retroactive application. Specifically, the
rule announced by Miller does not meet the exception of being
either a “substantive” rule or “watershed rule” of criminal pro-
cedure,120 but, according to the Commonwealth, only
“impos[es] a process, [and] is restricted to the manner in
which the penalty is determined and has no bearing on the
accuracy of the conviction.”121 The Commonwealth rejects
Cunningham’s argument that Miller applies retroactively on
collateral review merely because the decision was held to apply
to Jackson.122 Finally, the Commonwealth rebuffs
Cunningham’s argument that juvenile defendants convicted of
second-degree murder should be resentenced pursuant to the
sentences available for the underlying felonies. Instead, the
Commonwealth argues, “On remand in such a case a sentenc-
ing court would have the power to allow or not allow parole,
and to define a minimum term that would initiate parole eligi-
bility.”123
BATTS AND CUNNINGHAM: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The opposing arguments presented by the petitioners and
Commonwealth in Batts and Cunningham largely portray the
range of outcomes available to state courts as they work to
implement Miller’s mandate. Speculation as to the relative mer-
its of the arguments presented in the two cases serves a limited
purpose. Instead, by combining the arguments presented by
Batts and Cunningham with additional analysis on the issue of
retroactivity and the role of sentencing legislation, the founda-
tion is laid for a comprehensive understanding of the myriad
issues to consider in developing a thoughtful post-Miller
analysis.
THE QUESTION OF
RETROACTIVITY
There is currently no defin-
itive authority that specifically
addresses whether or not
Miller applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. In
Pennsylvania, Cunningham
will likely serve this purpose.
The competing sides of the
argument are well summarized
by Professor Chemerinsky: 
There is a strong argu-
ment that Miller should
apply retroactively: It says
that it is beyond the authority of the criminal law to
impose a mandatory sentence of life without parole. It
also would be terribly unfair to have individuals impris-
oned for life without any chance of parole based on the
accident of the timing of the trial. On the other hand, if
Miller is seen as just requiring a new procedure—a
penalty phase before a sentence of life without parole is
imposed for a crime committed by a juvenile—then it is
unlikely to be applied retroactively. Procedural changes
rarely apply retroactively.124
However, he concludes, “the Miller court did more than
change procedures; it held that the government cannot consti-
tutionally impose a punishment. As a substantive change in
the law which puts matters outside the scope of the govern-
ment’s power, the holding should apply retroactively.”125
Chemerinsky’s apt conclusion has considerable support.126 The
new rule announced by the Miller decision was held to apply
to both Evan Miller on direct appeal and Kuntrell Jackson on
collateral review. Presumably, if Miller did not apply retroac-
tively to cases on collateral review, Jackson would have been
barred from the relief he was granted. 
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retroactively applied.”); People v. Morfin, 2012 Ill. App. (1st)
103568, 2012 WL 6028634, 2012 Ill. App. Lexis 977 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012) (“Miller creates a new rule of law that was not required
by either the precedents on what penalties a minor constitution-
ally cannot receive (Roper and Graham) or by the cases cited in
Miller requiring sentencing discretion for the death penalty.”);
State v. Simmons, 99 So.3d 28 (La. 2012) (finding Miller to apply
retroactively to a case where crime was committed in 1995); see
also People v. Hoffman, 2012 WL 3066392, 2012 Cal. App.
Unpub. Lexis 5574 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2012) (unpublished
opinion); Iowa v. Lockheart, 2012 WL 2814378 (Iowa Ct. App.
2012) (unpublished opinion) (remainding for resentencing in
accord with Miller without employing the Teague analysis).
Support for Miller’s retroactivity also exists in light of the retroac-
tive application of Graham, which has been treated differently in
state courts across the country. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
spoken on the matter. For cases finding Graham to apply retroac-
tively, see, e.g., Louisiana v. Skipper, 2011 WL 2448013 (La.
App.); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W. 2d. 697 (Iowa 2010). For the
opposing viewpoint, see, e.g., Selectman v. Zavaras, 2011 WL
1597678 (D. Colo. 2011); Trimble v. Triani, 2011 WL 3426207
(D. Colo. 2011). At the time of this writing, only one federal cir-
cuit court had addressed the issue. See In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258
(5th Cir. 2011) (finding Graham to apply retroactively).
127. 533 U.S. 656, 663 (2001) (“The new rule becomes retroactive,
not by the decisions of the lower court, or by the combined
action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by
the actions of the Supreme Court”). See also Teague, 489 U.S. at
300 (“[O]nce a new rule is applied to a defendant in the case
announcing the new rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be
applied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”).
128. See note 126, supra (considering the retroactive application of
the Graham decision). In In re Sparks, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found, “By the combined effect of the holding of
Graham itself and the first Teague exception, Graham was there-
fore made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court
as a matter of logical necessity under Tyler.” Sparks, 657 F.3d at
260 (citing Tyler, 533 U.S. 656, n. 31). 
129. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the exe-
cution of mentally retarded offenders); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (out-
lawing the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (banning LWOP sentences for
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses).
130. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Lockett v. Ohio, 483 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 436
U.S. 921 (1978), and Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
131. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2480 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
132. The hearing, convened by Senator Stewart Greenleaf on July 12,
2012, allowed for testimony from stakeholders on all sides of the
issue. See Matt Stroud and Liliana Segura, The Uncertain Fate of
Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Lifers, THE NATION, Aug. 7, 2012,
http://www.thenation.com/article/169268/uncertain-fate-
pennsylvanias-juvenile-lifers# (“The hearing featured testimony
from twenty-six people—none of them prisoners—who advocate
for organizations, litigate juvenile cases or are otherwise
involved in the juvenile lifer debate”).
133. See Pennsylvania General Assembly, “Bill Information, Regular
Session 2011-2012, Senate Bill 850,” available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/BillInfo.cfm?syear=2
011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=850.
Under the Court’s prior
ruling in Tyler v. Cain,127 and
because the Miller Court
reversed Jackson’s sentence,
a strong argument can be
made that the ban on
mandatory LWOP is retroac-
tive. Specifically, in Miller,
the majority relies on two
lines of precedent that have
largely been held to apply
retroactively themselves.128
As discussed above in the
explication of the Miller decision, the first line of cases relied
on by the Court adopted categorical bans on sentencing
schemes where the severity of the punishment far outweighed
the blameworthiness of a class of offenders.129 The second line
of cases consists of those requiring individualized sentencing
hearings with consideration of mitigating factors before a sen-
tence of death may be imposed.130 Because cases under both
lines of precedent have been applied retroactively on collateral
and direct review, it follows that Miller should receive the
same retroactive application. Finally, the Miller dissent specif-
ically bemoans the majority’s invalidation of over 2,000
cases.131 The dissent would not have raised such a concern if
the Court’s new ruling did not apply retroactively.
LEGISLATIVE FIXES—THE PENNSYLVANIA STORY
In the wake of the Miller decision, state courts were left with
little guidance on implementation. In states like Pennsylvania,
the decision invalidated an entire statutory sentencing provi-
sion, leaving no sentence on the books for youth under 18 con-
victed of first- or second-degree murder. Pennsylvania is
primed to serve as a case study not only in the litigation con-
text, as described above, but also in terms of its legislative reac-
tion to Miller.
Responding to uncertainty among the lower courts, the
Pennsylvania legislature acted hastily. The chair of the senate
judiciary committee convened a hearing approximately three
weeks after the Miller decision was issued.132 The legislature
then convened a truncated three-week-long session in
September 2012, during which a number of legislative amend-
ments were introduced. One of these amendments, to Senate
Bill 850, sought to overhaul the first- and second-degree mur-
der sentencing schemes for juveniles, in direct response to
Miller. The amended bill provides for the following revised sen-
tencing scheme: 
For first degree murder, either: life without the
opportunity for parole; or 35 years to life for individuals
who were 15 to 17 years old at the time of the offense or
25 years to life for those who were 14 or younger at the
time of the offense. For second degree murder: 30 years
to life for youth who were 15 to 17 years old at the time
of the offense and 20 years to life for youth who were 14
or under at the time of the offense. Parole hearings are
only guaranteed to occur every five years following com-
pletion of the minimum term of years.133
Because cases
under both lines of
precedent have
been applied
retroactively . . . , it
follows that Miller
should receive the
same retroactive
application.
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134. See, e.g., Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, Press
Release: District Attorneys Praise PA Legislature for End of Session
Criminal Justice Focus, 19 Oct. 2012,  available at
http://www.pdaa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=arti
cle&id=154:district-attorneys-praise-pa-legislature-for-end-of-
session-criminal-justice-focus&catid=48:press-pdaa&Itemid=64
(“The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA)
praised the Pennsylvania State Senate and House of
Representatives for using their final session days to focus on
criminal justice and public safety matters . . . . The new laws
provide appropriate sentences for juveniles convicted of murder.
. . .”).
135. See, e.g., Antonio Ginatta, US/Pennsylvania: Don’t Codify
Excessive Sentences for Children Letter to Pennsylvania Governor
Tom Corbett, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 19, 2012,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/19/uspennsylvania-dont-
codify-excessive-sentences-children (“There is no doubt that
thoughtful, informed sentencing reform is needed in
Pennsylvania. Senate Bill 850 is neither thoughtful nor suffi-
ciently informed.”).
136. See Pennsylvania General Assembly, Floor Roll Call, Bill
Information, Regular Session 2011-2012, Senate Bill 850, available
at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_votes.cfm?
syear=2011&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=850.
137. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Corbett Signs Juvenile Murder Sentence
Legislation, Oct. 26, 2012, available at http://www.philly.com/
philly/news/pennsylvania/175897601.html.
138. See Senate Bill 635/S.L. 2012-148, “Minors/Sentencing for First
Degree Murder.”
139. See Juvenile Justice Blog, States Respond to Supreme Court JLWOP
Decision, July 19, 2012, http://juvenilejusticeblog.web.unc.edu/
2012/07/17/states-respond-to-supreme-court-jlwop-decision/. 
140. The mitigating factors to be considered by the sentencing court
include: age at the time of the offense, immaturity, ability to
appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct, intellec-
tual capacity, prior record, mental health, familial or peer pres-
sure exerted upon the defendant, and likelihood that the defen-
dant would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement. See note
138, supra.
141. CA Senate Bill 9, available at http://legiscan.com/gaits/
text/665299.
142. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Jerry Brown OKs Appeal for Minors
Sentenced to Life Without Parole, LA TIMES, Sept. 30, 2012,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/09/gov-
jerry-brown-approves-appeal-for-minors-sentenced-to-life-with-
out-parole.html.
The amendments garnered support among prosecutors and
victims’ advocates.134 While child advocates and families and
supporters of juvenile lifers applauded the removal of LWOP as
a sentencing option for those convicted of second-degree mur-
der, they strongly criticized the legislature for failing to take a
measured and thoughtful approach to one of the most sub-
stantive changes to this area of the sentencing statute in nearly
a century. Opponents disagreed with leaving LWOP on the
table for first-degree murder and argued the mandatory mini-
mums were at odds with the directives of Miller, which calls
for an individualized approach to juvenile sentencing, taking
into account the transitory nature of youth.135 With little time
for opponents to mount an organized campaign against the
proposed legislation, the Bill passed on concurrence by a vote
of 37 to 12. Notably, the vote was not split across party or geo-
graphic lines. Representatives on both sides of the aisle voiced
discontent with the way the legislation was pushed through
the process.136 The Bill was signed into law by Governor
Corbett on October 25, 2012.137
The interplay between the legislature’s actions and the
pending Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Batts and
Cunningham is complex on a number of levels. First, the legis-
lature failed to address the issue of Miller’s retroactivity and
what is to become of the nearly 500 men and women who are
currently serving illegal sentences, leaving the issue for the
state’s highest court to address in Cunningham. Second, the leg-
islature can enact future laws to circumvent the high court’s
pending rulings in Batts and Cunningham. Third, advocates
may mount constitutional challenges to the form and sub-
stance of the current legislation, thereby sending the issues
back to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for consideration. 
OTHER APPROACHES—NORTH CAROLINA,
CALIFORNIA, AND IOWA
To date, only a handful of other states have taken on the
task of amending their laws in
accordance with Miller. In
North Carolina, outgoing
Governor Bev Perdue signed
into law an amendment to the
state sentencing laws on first-
degree murder to comply with
Miller.138 Under the new law,
“life with parole” means that
defendants will be eligible for
parole at 25 years imprison-
ment and that parole will be a
term of 5 years.139 Further, juveniles convicted under the
felony-murder doctrine are afforded a life-with-parole sen-
tence. The law also outlines the hearing procedure to deter-
mine whether the juvenile’s sentence should be life with or
without parole, and specifies the mitigating factors to be con-
sidered by the court at such a hearing.140
California’s approach reflects a progressive view on juvenile
sentencing. Following a legislative campaign that was put into
place well before the Miller decision was announced, the gov-
ernor recently signed into law SB9,141 which grants juvenile
offenders sentenced to life in prison without parole that have
served at least 15 years the chance to petition for a new sen-
tence. The courts would then have the ability to lower their
sentence to 25 years to life if the juvenile offenders demon-
strate remorse and work toward rehabilitation.142
Iowa, on the other hand, provides an example of a conserv-
ative non-participatory approach. Instead of allowing the leg-
islative process to take its course, the governor of Iowa used
his executive privilege to commute life sentences for 38 pris-
oners sentenced to juvenile LWOP to mandatory 60-year sen-
tences, acquiring a good deal of national attention and derision
as a result. While the Iowa Code seems to give the governor
this power without limitation, an open question will be
To date, only a
handful of other
states have 
taken on the 
task of amending
their laws in 
accordance 
with Miller.
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143. Doug Berman, Iowa Gov Uses Clemency Power to Devise (Astute?
Sinister?) Response to Miller for Juvenile LWOPers, SENTENCING
LAW AND POLICY BLOG, July 16, 2012, http://sentencing.type-
pad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2012/07/iowa-gov-uses-
clemency-power-to-devise-astute-sinister-response-to-miller-for-
juve-lwopers.html.
whether 60-year sentences are functionally “life” sentences,
given that these prisoners were at least 13 or 14 at the time of
the offense.143
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has laid out a clear
rationale for punishing juveniles differently than adults and
has used this framework, in large part, to ban specific punish-
ments for young people. These decisions are not only sup-
ported by prior precedent and common-sense judgment, but
also by substantial research from the social and medical sci-
ences as well as the overwhelming consensus of the world
community. Courts and legislatures will continue to grapple
with these decisions as they seek to directly implement the
Graham and Miller holdings and consider how these decisions
might apply to other sentences for juveniles.
Discussions regarding the appropriate implementation of
these decisions will dominate the dialogue on juvenile justice
for years to come. In these discussions, it is essential that advo-
cates and lawmakers be loyal to the true letter and spirit of the
Miller decision. State actors must develop and implement com-
prehensive reforms to their statutory sentencing schemes,
rather than surface solutions merely removing the word
“mandatory” from otherwise harsh options not in line with
Miller’s directive. Enacting sentencing schemes that require
sentences of 60, or even 35 years before a young person is eli-
gible for parole are examples of the type of reaction that might
technically comply with the letter but not the spirit of the
Graham and Miller decisions. 
Comprehensive reform must also focus not merely on juve-
niles serving long sentences. As discussed previously, the vast
majority of young people in the criminal justice system do not
receive long sentences, and the evidence indicates that the
policies that have facilitated the increased transfer of young
people have failed. This means that legislatures and courts
must revisit the purpose of transferring juveniles to the crimi-
nal court and determine whether mechanisms that do so are
actually distinguishing between those who should be trans-
ferred and those who should not. Consideration of this ques-
tion must move beyond charged rhetoric concerning the dan-
gerousness of young people and focus on the framework laid
out by the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller. Doing so will
not only benefit young people, but will also serve public safety
and ensure that we are utilizing financial and other resources
appropriately.     
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MINORITY PARTICIPANTS IN DRUG COURTS, available at
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/NADCP%20Board
%20Resolution%20-%20The%20Equivalent%20Treatment%20
of%20Racial%20and%20Ethnic%20Minority%20Participants%20
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MINORITY RESOLUTION].
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 2-3.
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Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and
Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY
357, 381 (2010) (concluding incarceration had little effect on
likelihood of re-arrest for drug offenders); Cassia Spohn & David
Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony
Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 346
(2002) (finding incarcerated drug offenders were more likely to
recidivate than those sentenced to probation); Jonathan P.
Caulkens & Sara Chandler, Long-Run Trends in Incarceration in the
United States, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 619, 630 (2006) (finding incar-
ceration does not dramatically reduce drug use and is not cost-
effective). 
5. See PEW CTR. ON STATES, HIGH COST, LOW RETURN: DESPITE THE
MASSIVE INCREASE IN THE SIZE AND COST OF AMERICA’S CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEM, THE NATIONAL RECIDIVISM RATE REMAINS STUBBORNLY HIGH,
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedimages/PCS_
Assets/Graphics/PSPP_infographic.png [hereinafter HIGH COST,
LOW RETURN] (finding 1 in 14 state general fund dollars spent on
corrections, totaling $52 billion in 2011).
6. See generally E. L. Jensen et al., Social Consequences of the War on
Drugs: The Legacy of Failed Policy, 15 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 100
(2004) (reviewing harmful impacts of War on Drugs on minori-
ties and minority communities); Martin Y. Iguchi et al., How
Criminal System Racial Disparities May Translate into Health
Disparities, 16 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 48 (2005)
(linking disproportionate confinement of minorities for drug
offenses to severe health and mental-health impairments). 
7. HIGH COST, LOW RETURN, supra note 5, at 1 (finding 1 in 104
American adults was behind bars in 2011); PEW CTR. ON STATES,
ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008) [hereinafter ONE
IN 100] (finding 1 in 100 American adults behind bars in 2008).
8. ONE IN 100, supra note 7, at 6.
9. See generally NAT’L ASS’N DRUG CT. PROF., DEFINING DRUG COURTS:
THE KEY COMPONENTS (1997) (describing the core ingredients of
and services delivered in drug courts).
In June 2010, the Board of Directors of the NationalAssociation of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) passed aunanimous resolution directing drug courts to examine
whether unfair disparities exist in their programs for racial or
ethnic minority participants, and if so, to take reasonable cor-
rective measures to eliminate such disparities.1 The resolution
places an affirmative obligation on drug courts to continuously
monitor whether minority participants have equal access to
the programs, receive substantially equivalent services in the
programs, and successfully complete the programs at equiva-
lent rates to non-minorities.2 The resolution further directs
drug courts to adopt evidence-based assessment tools and clin-
ical interventions that are scientifically proven to be valid and
effective for minority participants, and to instruct staff mem-
bers to attend up-to-date training events on the provision of
culturally sensitive and culturally proficient services.3
As a professional membership and training organization,
the NADCP has no enforcement authority over drug courts,
which are typically governed by the administrative office of the
courts, Supreme Court, or attorney disciplinary board in each
state or territory. However, the NADCP is widely regarded as a
leading national organization on best practices and evidence-
based practices in drug courts, and its word carries consider-
able weight in the field. When the NADCP speaks definitively
on an issue such as this, practitioners, policymakers, and fund-
ing agencies may come to view the recommendations as
indicative of appropriate standards of practice for drug courts. 
This article provides a backdrop to the NADCP Board
Resolution and reviews what is currently known, and not yet
known, about racial-and-ethnic-minority impacts in drug
courts. After briefly describing what drug courts are and why
they came to be, research is presented on minority access to drug
courts, the services received by minorities in drug courts, and
the outcomes produced. Virtually all of the empirical research to
date has focused on African-American participants and those of
Hispanic and Latino/Latina ethnicity. This is largely due to the
fact that these groups have been represented in sufficient num-
bers in many studies for evaluators to conduct separate analyses
on their behalf. Additional efforts are needed to examine drug-
court impacts on other racial and ethnic minority groups.
I. DRUG COURTS
The “War on Drugs” of the 1980s emphasized incarceration
as a principal response to drug-related crime. It is now evident
that this policy had a minimal effect on criminal recidivism,4
was prohibitively costly,5 and disproportionately harmed racial
and ethnic minorities and the poor.6 Nearly one out of every
100 adult citizens is now behind bars in the United States,7 and
the rates are substantially higher for minorities: approximately
one out of every 15 African-American adult males and one out
of every 36 Hispanic adult males are behind bars.8
Drug courts emerged as one alternative to the War on Drugs
that emphasizes community-based treatment and rehabilita-
tion in lieu of prosecution or incarceration.9 The drug-court
judge leads a multidisciplinary team of professionals that com-
monly includes representatives from the prosecutor’s office,
40 Court Review - Volume 49 
Achieving Racial and Ethnic
Fairness in Drug Courts
Douglas B. Marlowe
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(concluding drug courts reduced crime by an average of 12%);
David B. Wilson et al., A Systematic Review of Drug Court Effects on
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average of 8%); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., ADULT DRUG
COURTS: STUDIES SHOW COURTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM, BUT DOJ COULD
ENHANCE FUTURE PERFORMANCE MEASURE REVISION EFFORTS 19
(2011) (concluding drug courts significantly reduced crime by 6
to 26 percentage points).
12. See generally Michael Rempel et al., The Impact of Adult Drug
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Quasi-Experimental Design, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY, avail-
able at DOI: 10.1007/s11292-012-9143-2 (finding probability of
re-offending reduced by almost one quarter in national study of 23
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13. See generally AVINASH S. BHATI ET AL., URBAN INST., TO TREAT OR NOT
TO TREAT: EVIDENCE ON THE PROSPECTS OF EXPANDING TREATMENT TO
DRUG-INVOLVED OFFENDERS 56 (2008) (finding drug courts
returned an average of $2.21 for every $1 invested, for net benefit
to society of $624 million in 2006). 
14. See generally WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L
DRUG CT. INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT
ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN
THE UNITED STATES (2011) (defining and tallying the number of
various types of problem-solving courts in the U.S. and interna-
tionally). 
15. See generally Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Drug Courts and
Other Problem-Solving Courts, 2 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 53 (2011)
(reviewing research on various types of problem-solving courts).
16. See Michael Wright, Reversing the Prison Landscape: The Role of
Drug Courts in Reducing Minority Incarceration, 8 RUTGERS RACE &
L. REV. 79, 81 (2006) (stating drug courts have the “potential, not
only to reduce minority incarceration, but also to heal minority
communities”); MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJ., THE CHANGING
RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 2, 14 (2009) (concluding
drug courts, especially those in urban communities, are likely to
be disproportionately benefiting African-Americans by diverting
them from prison). 
17. See NAT’L ASSOC. CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE
FOR REFORM 42 (2009) [hereafter NACDL REPORT] (concluding
racial prejudice pervades the criminal justice system, and drug
courts are no exception); JUST. POL’Y INST., ADDICTED TO COURTS:
HOW A GROWING DEPENDENCE ON DRUG COURTS IMPACTS PEOPLE AND
COMMUNITIES 23 (2011) (concluding people of color are more
likely to be kicked out of drug courts); Michael M. O’Hear,
Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial
Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 479-480 (2009) (conclud-
ing drug courts exacerbate racial disparities).
18. See Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT’L
BLACK L. J. 27, 44 (2009) (noting “dearth of data” on race and drug
courts; rather than answers, researchers have only questions).
19. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
defense bar, treatment agencies, case-management agency, and
probation department. The team members meet frequently to
review participants’ progress and offer recommendations to the
judge about suitable consequences to impose. The conse-
quences may include desired rewards such as verbal praise,
reduced supervision requirements, or token gifts; punitive
sanctions such as verbal reprimands, community service, or
brief intervals of jail detention; or adjustments to participants’
treatment regimens. The consequences are typically adminis-
tered during regularly scheduled status hearings in which the
judge discusses the matter with the participant in open court.
In pre-adjudication drug courts, the ultimate incentive is to
have the criminal charge(s) dropped or withdrawn, and in
post-adjudication drug courts the ultimate incentive is to avoid
incarceration or reduce the length or conditions of probation.10
Several scientific meta-analyses11 and a large-scale national
study12 have concluded that drug courts significantly reduce
crime and return an average of more than $2 in direct financial
benefits to the criminal justice system for every $1 invested.13
The success of adult drug courts has spawned a wide variety of
other types of problem-solving courts, including juvenile drug
courts, family drug courts, driving-while-impaired (DWI)
courts, mental-health courts, and prisoner-reentry courts.14
Although research has not advanced nearly as much for these
newer programs as it has for
adult drug courts, evidence is
promising to support the
effectiveness of several of the
newer models.15
Almost from their incep-
tion, controversy has sur-
rounded the question of what
impacts, if any, drug courts
might have on preexisting
racial or ethnic disparities in
the criminal justice system.
Researchers and commenta-
tors have variably concluded
that drug courts reduce disparities,16 exacerbate disparities,17
or that insufficient evidence exists to know what effects they
may have.18 This confusion stems from at least two sources.
First, many researchers have sorely neglected the issue. Most
evaluations have not reported outcomes separately by race or
ethnicity; and among those that have, few evaluators per-
formed the type of detailed inquiry and analyses that are
required to validly interpret the findings. For example, as will
be discussed,19 when racial or ethnic differences have been
detected, evaluators rarely sought to determine whether those
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20. See NACDL REPORT, supra note 17, at 20-21 (advocating for the
decriminalization of all controlled substances in lieu of support-
ing drug courts); DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, DRUG COURTS ARE NOT THE
ANSWER: TOWARD A HEALTH-CENTERED APPROACH TO DRUG USE 19
(2011) (advocating for the removal of all criminal penalties for
drug use in lieu of providing diversion opportunities within the
criminal justice system, as in drug courts); JUST. POL’Y INST., supra
note 17, at 26 (advocating for voluntary community-based treat-
ment in lieu of drug courts).
21. See O’Hear, supra note 17, at 125-136 (advocating for a restorative
justice model in lieu of drug courts). 
22. See, e.g., NACDL REPORT, supra note 17, at 42-43 (asserting drug
courts were developed for middle-class teens and minorities are
rarely accepted); JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 17, at 21 (asserting
people of color are more likely to have prior felony convictions
making them ineligible for drug court).
23. See, e.g., DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, supra note 20, at 8 (asserting drug
courts may increase the number of people of color brought into
the criminal justice system).
24. See, e.g., NACDL REPORT, supra note 17, at 42-43 (quoting one
public defender’s anecdotal experiences in one Utah drug court as
evidence that drug courts discriminate).
25. Id. at 42 (acknowledging the extent of the problem cannot be ade-
quately analyzed because relevant data “simply does not exist”);
Wolf, supra note 18, at 30 (noting “virtually nothing” written
about specialized courts has addressed the issues of race and bias).
26. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 14, at 28-29. These figures
represent best estimates because the data were collected at the
state level and the quality of statewide statistics on minority
impacts was variable.  
27. Id. at 28-29, Tables 4, 5.
28. The sources for the comparison data were: FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FBI CRIME REPORTING DATA, 2008; BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 (NCJ #221945);
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2008 (NCJ #228230); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2008 (NCJ #228417).
differences might have been
influenced by extraneous fac-
tors, such as participants’
socioeconomic status (SES) or
drug of choice—which may
have been coincidentally corre-
lated with race and truly
responsible for the differential
effects. 
Second, some advocacy
groups have seized upon the
possibility of disparate racial
impacts as a wedge issue to
wield against drug courts and
in favor of their alternative pol-
icy proposals, such as drug decriminalization20 or a restorative-
justice philosophy.21 Putting aside for the moment the correct-
ness of their alternative proposals, some of these advocates
have marshaled weak and contradictory “evidence” against
drug courts, including unverifiable anecdotes, biased correla-
tions, and mischaracterizations of what researchers have
reported in their publications. Given the potential for this hot-
button issue to inflame passions on all sides of the conversa-
tion, it is imperative for serious-minded and duly trained sci-
entists to carefully examine what is confidently known about
minority impacts in drug courts and what matters require fur-
ther exploration and deliberation.
II. MINORITY ACCESS TO DRUG COURTS
Drug courts have been alternately accused of unfairly
excluding minority citizens from participation in the pro-
grams22 and over-targeting minorities—thus drawing them
deeper into the criminal justice system—a phenomenon
known as net-widening.23 Virtually all of these assertions have
been anecdotal24 because representative data are sparse and
very difficult to come by.25
A 2008 survey of all state and territorial drug-court coordi-
nators in the U.S. estimated that African-Americans comprised
approximately 21% of drug-court participants nationally, and
Hispanic and Latino/Latina citizens comprised approximately
10% of drug-court participants (see Table 1).26 There was wide
variability around these averages, with some drug courts
reporting less than 1% minority participants in their programs
and others reporting more than 95% minorities.27
As points of reference, these figures were contrasted against
those derived from national studies of arrestees, probationers
and parolees, prison inmates, and jail inmates.28
Representation of African-Americans was estimated to be
approximately 7 percentage points lower in drug courts than in
the arrestee and probation-and-parole populations (21% vs.
28% and 28%), and approximately 20 percentage points lower
than in jails and prisons (21% vs. 39% and 44%).
Representation of Hispanic and Latino/Latina citizens was esti-
mated to be nearly equivalent to the probation-and-parole pop-
ulation (10% vs. 13%), and approximately 6 to 10 percentage
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TABLE 1: MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN DRUG COURTS COMPARED WITH OTHER CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS IN 2008
African-American
% Difference in 
Drug Courts
Hispanic and 
Latino or Latina
% Difference in 
Drug Courts
Drug Courts 21% 10%
Arrestees 28% -7% Not Reported
Probationers & Parolees 28% -7% 13% -3%
Jail Inmates 39% -18% 16% -6%
Prison Inmates 44% -23% 20% -10%
Source: West Huddleston & Douglas B. Marlowe, Painting the Current Picture: A National Report on Drug Courts and Other Problem-Solving Court Programs
in the United States, at 30, Table 6 (Nat’l Drug Ct. Inst., 2011). Adapted with permission.
29. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
30. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 14, at 30, Table6.
31. See generally MAUER, supra note 16.
32. Id. at 14 (concluding “it is likely that at least in some jurisdictions
there are people charged with a drug offense who are diverted
from a prison term due to drug court programming”). 
33. Cf. Wolf, supra note 18, at 46-47 (noting studies show minorities
express more support than Caucasians for alternatives to incar-
ceration, such as problem-solving courts). 
34. See supra note 23 and infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. 
35. See NADCP MINORITY RESOLUTION, supra note 1, at 2.
36. Id. 
37. Although an unintended discriminatory impact may not always be
constitutionally objectionable, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239-242 (1976), it is inconsistent with best practices for drug
courts. 
38. See, e.g., Mary P. Brewster, An Evaluation of the Chester County (PA)
Drug Court Program, J. DRUG ISSUES 177, 194 (2001) (finding
African-American participants were less likely to graduate from a
drug court than Caucasians); Roger E. Hartley & Randy C.
Phillips, Who Graduates from Drug Courts?: Correlates of Client
Success, 26 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 107, 113 (2001) (finding minorities
significantly less likely to graduate from drug court than non-
minorities); KATHARINA L. WIEST ET AL., NPC RESEARCH,
VANDERBURGH COUNTY DAY REPORTING DRUG COURT EVALUATION:
FINAL REPORT 32 (2007), available at http://www.npcresearch.com/
Files/Vanderburgh_Adult_Eval_Final.pdf (finding Caucasians
graduated from drug court 1.74 times more often than non-
Caucasians); M. Schiff & C. Terry, Predicting Graduation From
Broward County’s Dedicated Drug Treatment Court, 19 JUST. SYS. J.
291 (1997) (finding minorities significantly less likely to graduate
from drug court than non-minorities); Dale K. Sechrest & David
Shicor, Determinants of Graduation from a Day Treatment Drug
Court in California: A Preliminary Study, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 129, 139
(2001) (finding African-American and Hispanic participants less
likely to graduate from drug court than Caucasians); Christine A.
Saum & Matthew L. Hiller, Should Violent Offenders Be Excluded
from Drug Court Participation?, 33 CRIM. J. REV. 291, 300 (2008)
(finding Caucasian participants in drug court less likely to recidi-
vate than non-Caucasians); SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST.
JUST., THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE IMPACT
OF DRUG COURTS 75 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/237112.pdf (finding in a national study of 23
adult drug courts that African-Americans were less likely to show
reductions in recidivism than Caucasians); David M. Stein et al.,
Predicting Success and Failure in Juvenile Drug Treatment Court: A
Meta-Analytic Review, J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsat.2012.07.002 (finding non-
Caucasian participants had lower graduation rates and higher
recidivism rates than Caucasians in juvenile drug courts).
39. See, e.g., STEVEN BELENKO, NAT’L CTR. ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE
ABUSE, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW, 2001
UPDATE 26 (2001) (reviewing studies reporting lower graduation
rates for minorities in drug courts of approximately 30 to 40 per-
points lower than in jails and prisons (10% vs. 16% and 20%). 
Taken together, these national statistics suggest that drug
courts may be under serving racial and ethnic minority citi-
zens, but the magnitude of the problem appears to be far
smaller than that asserted by some critics. Based on these find-
ings, a reasonable benchmark for improvement in drug courts
would be to increase minority representation by approximately
7 percentage points so as to be equivalent with the arrestee and
probationer populations. 
A much greater concern relates to the disproportionate con-
finement of minorities, particularly African-Americans, in jails
and prisons.29 As can be seen from the above table, African-
Americans were considerably less likely to be on community
supervision than in jail or prison (28% vs. 39% or 44%). In
contrast, Caucasians were more likely to be on community
supervision than in jail or prison (56% vs. 43% or 34%).30
Fortunately, a national study recently found that the num-
ber of African-Americans in state prisons for drug-related
crimes has declined by nearly 22% since the advent of drug
courts and similar treatment-oriented diversion programs.31
After ruling out several alternative explanations for this devel-
opment, such as changing drug-use rates among minorities,
the report credited the rapid expansion of drug courts as one
likely contributor to the precipitous decline.32 Drug courts
offer an evidence-based alternative to incarceration that
defense attorneys can propose and judges and prosecutors can
take into consideration during the plea bargaining and sen-
tencing processes. If drug courts were to disappear, minority
representation in jails and prisons would be expected to rise
as opposed to decline,33 contrary to what some policy advo-
cates have asserted.34
Nevertheless, drug courts cannot and do not accept dispro-
portionate minority represen-
tation in their programs, no
matter how small the magni-
tude. Therefore, drug courts
have set for themselves an
obligation to make all reason-
able efforts to bring minority
representation in line with the
applicable arrestee population
in their respective jurisdic-
tions.35 Examples of reason-
able steps to be taken include ensuring that all assessment
tools used for determining eligibility are equally valid and pre-
dictive for minorities as for non-minorities.36 In addition, drug
courts should ensure that their eligibility and exclusion crite-
ria are objective and race-neutral both in intent and effect. If an
eligibility requirement has the unintended consequence of dif-
ferentially restricting access for minorities, then extra assur-
ances should be required that it is a necessary prerequisite for
the program to achieve effective outcomes and protect public
safety.37 Where less restrictive adjustments can be made to a
drug court’s eligibility criteria to increase minority representa-
tion without jeopardizing safety or efficacy, it should be
incumbent upon the program to implement such adjustments. 
III. MINORITY OUTCOMES IN DRUG COURTS
Numerous studies have reported that a considerably smaller
percentage of minority participants graduated successfully
from drug courts as compared to non-Hispanic Caucasians.38
In several of the studies, the magnitudes of the differences
were quite large—as high as 25 to 40 percentage points.39 This
problem may be particularly pronounced among African-
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centage points); WIEST ET AL., supra note 38, at 32 (reporting
lower graduation rate for non-Caucasians of 25 percentage
points); Sechrest & Shicor, supra note 38, at 139 (reporting lower
graduation rates of approximately 37 percentage points for
African-Americans and 27 percentage points for Hispanics).
40. See, e.g., INST. APPLIED RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF THE YOUNG
PERSON TRACK OF THE ST. LOUIS CITY ADULT FELONY DRUG COURT 5
(2003) (finding in a drug court that 94.9% of terminated partici-
pants between 17 and 20 years of age were African-American).
41. See generally Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Amenability to Treatment
of Drug Offenders, 67 FED. PROBATION 40 (2003) (reviewing risk
factors for failure in correctional rehabilitation programs, includ-
ing drug courts).
42. See Gennaro F. Vito & Richard A. Tewksbury, The Impact of
Treatment: The Jefferson County (Kentucky) Drug Court Program, 62
FED. PROBATION 46, 49, Table 1 (1998) (finding approximately
42% graduation rate for African-American drug-court partici-
pants, compared to only 22% for Caucasians with a high school
diploma or G.E.D. and 7% for Caucasians without a high school
diploma or G.E.D.); Randal Brown, Drug Court Effectiveness: A
Matched Cohort Study in the Dane County Drug Treatment Court, 50
J. OFFENDER REHAB. 191, 197 (2011) (finding better outcomes in a
drug court for African-Americans and other minorities than for
non-minorities); Andrew Fulkerson, Drug Treatment Court Versus
Probation: An Examination of Comparative Recidivism Rates, 8 SW. J.
CRIM. JUST. 30, 35 (2012) (finding greater reductions in recidivism
in a drug court for African-Americans than Caucasians); Christine
A. Saum et al., Violent Offenders in Drug Court, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES
107, 121 (2001) (finding race had no apparent effect on drug-
court graduation); JULIAN M. SOMERS ET AL., MEDIATORS OF DRUG
TREATMENT COURT OUTCOMES IN VANCOUVER CANADA (Simon Fraser
Univ., 2012) (finding better outcomes for aboriginal natives in a
Canadian drug court).
43. Cf. Michael W. Finigan, Understanding Racial Disparities in Drug
Courts, 6 DRUG CT. REV. 135 (2009).
44. See BELENKO, supra note 39, at 26 (noting lower graduation rates
among minorities might have been influenced by greater likelihood
of abusing cocaine or heroin); Wolf, supra note 18, at 45 (noting
researchers have consistently reported poorer retention and gradu-
ation rates in drug courts for participants who were unemployed,
low-wage earners, or less educated, regardless of race or ethnicity);
Hartley & Phillips, supra note 38, at 114, Table 1 (finding partici-
pants more likely to graduate from drug court if they entered the
program employed, obtained work during the program, finished
high school, or abused drugs other than cocaine). 
45. See generally J. Mitchell Miller & J. Eagle Shutt, Considering the
Need for Empirically Grounded Drug Court Screening Mechanisms,
31 J. DRUG ISSUES 91 (2001) (finding graduation rate for African-
American drug-court participants not significantly lower than for
Caucasians after accounting for crack cocaine as drug of choice
and lower social stability).
46. Anne Dannerbeck et al., Understanding and Responding to Racial
Differences in Drug Court Outcomes, 5 J. ETHNICITY IN SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 1 (2006).
47. Id. at 11, Table 1.
48. Id. at 11-13, Table 1.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. at 14, Table 3. 
American males between the
ages of 18 and 25 years.40 Being
young and male are well-docu-
mented risk factors for failure
in drug courts and other cor-
rectional rehabilitation pro-
grams,41 and it appears that
combining these two risk fac-
tors with racial-minority status
may multiply the likelihood of
failure.
These findings are by no
means universal, however, as a
smaller but growing number of
evaluations has found no racial
differences in outcomes or
superior outcomes for minori-
ties as compared to Caucasians, including for those between
the ages of 18 and 25 years.42 Nevertheless, there does appear
to be a plurality trend that African-Americans are less likely to
succeed in many drug courts as compared to their non-racial-
minority peers.43
A critical unanswered question is whether this disparity is a
function of race per se or whether it might reflect the influence
of other factors that are correlated with race. Many studies
have found that participants’ drug of choice (particularly
cocaine or heroin), employment status, and criminal history
also predicted poorer outcomes in drug courts, and racial
groups differed significantly on these variables.44 For example,
in some communities African-Americans were more likely
than Caucasians to be abusing crack cocaine, and it is possible
that the severely addictive and destructive nature of this par-
ticular drug could have been largely responsible for their
poorer outcomes.45 This possibility requires evaluators to sta-
tistically take into account the influence of variables that are
correlated with race, such as participants’ drug of choice, and
then determine whether race continues to predict poorer out-
comes after such extraneous variables have been factored out.
Only then might it be justified to conclude there are disparate
racial impacts in drug courts.
In fact, a statewide study of ten drug courts in Missouri sug-
gested that other factors might be responsible for some of the
apparent racial differences in outcomes.46 In that study, 55% of
Caucasian participants graduated from the drug courts as com-
pared to only 28% of African-Americans.47 However, greater
proportions of the African-American participants were also
unemployed (56% vs. 39%), unmarried (91% vs. 83%), living
with unrelated individuals (51% vs. 37%), childless (69% vs.
56%), abusing cocaine as their primary drug of choice (45% vs.
13%), experiencing low levels of family support (38% vs.
29%), and of a lower SES.48 After taking these variables into
account, race was no longer predictive of outcomes.49 The top
three factors predicting graduation from the drug courts were
participants’ employment status at entry, SES, and cocaine as
the primary drug of abuse.50
The results of this study suggest that racial disparities in
drug-court-graduation rates (at least in Missouri) might be
explained by broader societal burdens, which may be borne
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disproportionately by minorities, such as lesser educational or
employment opportunities or a greater infiltration of crack
cocaine into some minority communities. If this finding holds
true in further research, it would point to obvious and concrete
measures that drug courts could take to increase minority
completion rates. For example, drug courts might enhance
vocational rehabilitation or educational services in their pro-
grams to offset any related disadvantages experienced by
minority participants.51 They might also focus on delivering
interventions that are proven to be successful for treating
cocaine and other stimulant addictions.52
IV. TREATMENT SERVICES FOR MINORITIES IN DRUG
COURTS
There is ample evidence that racial-and-ethnic-minority cit-
izens may receive lesser-quality treatment in the criminal jus-
tice system than non-minorities.53 A commonly cited example
of this phenomenon relates to California’s Proposition 36,54 a
statewide diversion initiative for nonviolent drug-possession
offenders. A several-year study of Proposition 36 by
researchers at UCLA found that Hispanic participants were sig-
nificantly less likely than Caucasians to be placed in residen-
tial treatment for similar patterns of drug abuse, and African-
Americans were less likely to receive medically assisted treat-
ment for addiction.55 Not surprisingly, treatment outcomes
were also significantly poorer for these minority groups.56
No quantitative data have yet been reported on whether
such disparities exist within drug courts.57 Qualitative inter-
views with minority participants in drug courts do not suggest
they perceived themselves as
receiving lesser-quality treat-
ment. To the contrary, in at least
one study, minority participants
were seemingly exasperated by
receiving the same services as
non-minorities and expressed a
preference for a more individu-
alized and less one-size-fits-all
approach.58 Some minority par-
ticipants in that study were par-
ticularly resentful about being
required to attend 12-step meet-
ings, such as Narcotics Anonymous (NA) or Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA). They reported feeling uncomfortable shar-
ing their feelings in groups and being encouraged to accept the
label of “addict.”59 Instead, they expressed a predilection for
receiving employment and educational services.60
Given how little research has addressed this question, it is
not possible to conclude at this juncture whether treatment
services in drug courts are or are not appropriately suited to
the needs of minority participants.61 Future studies must
empirically examine this issue in a more objective manner.
Until such direct evidence is garnered, drug courts should,
at a minimum, apply generic principles of evidence-based
treatment in their programs. For example, several studies have
demonstrated improved outcomes, including for minority par-
ticipants, when drug courts administered manualized, struc-
tured, cognitive-behavioral curricula.62 Cognitive-behavioral
51. See Laura S. Cresswell & Elizabeth P. Deschenes, Minority and
Non-Minority Perceptions of Drug Court Program Severity and
Effectiveness, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 259, 277 (2001) (concluding
minority and non-minority participants viewed drug court as sim-
ilarly helpful, but minorities were more appreciative of employ-
ment assistance, and non-minorities were more appreciative of
substance-abuse treatment); John R. Gallagher, Evaluating Drug
Court Effectiveness and Exploring Racial Disparities in Drug
Court Outcomes: A Mixed Methods Study 94 (2012) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Texas at Arlington) (on file with
author) (finding African-American drug-court participants pre-
ferred employment assistance to treatment interventions); see also
Carl Leukefeld et al., Employment and Work Among Drug Court
Clients: 12-Month Outcomes, 42 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 1109
(2007) (finding better outcomes in drug court when participants
received augmented vocational services).
52. See generally Patricia Marinelli-Casey et al., Drug Court Treatment
for Methamphetamine Dependence: Treatment Response and
Posttreatment Outcomes, 34 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 242
(2008) (reporting superior outcomes for drug courts utilizing the
“MATRIX Model” curriculum for stimulant dependence); Richard
A. Rawson et al., A Multi-Site Comparison of Psychosocial
Approaches for the Treatment of Methamphetamine Dependence, 99
ADDICTION 708 (2004) (same).
53. See generally William B. Lawson & Anthony Lawson, Disparities
in Mental Health Diagnosis and Treatment Among African
Americans: Implications for the Correctional Systems, in CRIME, HIV
& HEALTH: INTERSECTIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
CONCERNS (B. Sanders et al. eds., forthcoming 2013), available at
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-8921-2_4 (reviewing disparities in sub-
stance-abuse and mental-health diagnoses, treatment access, and
treatment outcomes for minorities); Anne Dannerbeck-Janku &
Jiahui Yan, Exploring Patterns of Court-Ordered Mental Health
Services for Juvenile Offenders: Is There Evidence of Systematic
Bias?, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 402, 414 (2009) (finding African-
American juvenile offenders were less likely than Caucasians to be
referred for needed mental-health services); Steven R. Lopez et al.,
From Documenting to Eliminating Disparities in Mental Health Care
for Latinos, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511 (2012); Lonnie R. Snowden,
Health and Mental Health Policies’ Role in Better Understanding and
Closing African American-White American Disparities in Treatment
Access and Quality of Care, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 524 (2012).
54. California Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210 et seq. (West 2000) [hereafter
Proposition 36]. 
55. UNIV. CAL. LOS ANGELES, INTEGRATED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROG.,
EVALUATION OF THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT:
FINAL REPORT 5 & 82 (2007) .
56. Id. at 4 (finding treatment completion in Proposition 36 was lower
for Hispanics and African-Americans).
57. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 18, at 48 (concluding much of what is
known about problem-solving courts and race is “speculative”).
58. Gallagher, supra note 51, at 87, 94.
59. Id. at 90-91.
60. Id. at 88.
61. Cf. Wolf, supra note 18, at 52 (concluding more research needs to
be done on race and drug courts). 
62. See generally Cary E. Heck, MRT: Critical Component of a Local
Drug Court Program, 17 COGNITIVE BEHAV. TREATMENT REV. 1, 2
(Correctional Counseling 2008) (finding addition of “Moral
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interventions focus less on the
expression of feelings and
instead take a more active,
problem-solving approach to
managing drug-related prob-
lems.63 Several resources are
available to help clinicians in
drug courts select manualized
cognitive-behavioral curricula
that are proven to produce
positive benefits for minority
participants.64
In addition, there is some evidence that providing culturally
proficient or culturally sensitive interventions may improve
results for minorities in drug courts. At least one drug-court
program run by an experienced African-American clinician
and utilizing culturally tailored interventions demonstrated
superior effects for young male African-American participants
over Caucasian participants.65 Efforts are underway to examine
the intervention used in that study—presently named
Habilitation, Empowerment & Accountability Therapy
(H.E.A.T.)—in a controlled experimental study. 
V. SANCTIONS AND INCENTIVES FOR MINORITIES IN
DRUG COURTS
A commonly expressed concern about drug courts is that
minority participants might be sanctioned more severely than
non-minorities for comparable infractions. Anecdotal observa-
tions have typically been proffered to support this allegation,66
and minority participants in at least one focus group did report
feeling more likely than other participants to be ridiculed or
laughed at during court sessions in response to violations.67
No empirical study, however, has borne out the assertion. To
the contrary, what little research has been conducted suggests
that problem-solving courts, including drug courts, appear to
administer sanctions in a racially and ethnically even-handed
manner.68 Considerably more research is required, however, to
study this important issue in a more systematic manner and in
a representative range of drug-court programs. 
A related concern is that minority participants might be
sentenced more harshly than non-minorities for failing out of
drug court.69 This is a particularly important matter because,
as previously discussed, minorities may be more likely to be
terminated from drug court than non-minorities.70 Although
this issue is far from settled,71 there is some evidence that par-
ticipants who were terminated from a few drug courts did
Reconation Therapy” [MRT] to drug-court curriculum produced
better outcomes); Robert A. Kirchner & Ellen Goodman,
Effectiveness and Impact of Thurston County, Washington Drug Court
Program, 16 COGNITIVE BEHAV. TREATMENT REV. 1, 4 (Correctional
Counseling 2007) (finding the completion of each additional step
of MRT in a drug court was associated with an 8% further reduc-
tion in recidivism); Marinelli-Casey et al., supra note 52 (report-
ing superior outcomes for drug courts utilizing the MATRIX
Model for stimulant dependence); Scott W. Henggeler et al.,
Juvenile Drug Court: Enhancing Outcomes by Integrating Evidence-
Based Treatments, 74 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 42, 51
(2006) (finding addition of “Multi-Systemic Therapy” [MST] and
“contingency management” [CM] improved outcomes in a juve-
nile drug court).
63. See generally AARON T. BECK ET AL., COGNITIVE THERAPY OF
SUBSTANCE ABUSE (1993) (describing cognitive-behavioral treat-
ments for addiction); ALBERT ELLIS ET AL., RATIONAL-EMOTIVE
THERAPY WITH ALCOHOLICS AND SUBSTANCE ABUSERS (1988) (same);
G. ALAN MARLATT & JUDITH R. GORDON, RELAPSE PREVENTION:
MAINTENANCE STRATEGIES IN THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTIVE
BEHAVIORS (1985).
64. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) maintains an internet directory of evidence-based
treatments called the National Registry of Evidence-Based
Programs and Practices (NREPP). The NREPP website may be
searched specifically for interventions that have been evaluated
among substantial numbers of racial and ethnic minority partici-
pants, at http://www.nrepp.samhsa.gov/AdvancedSearch.aspx
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012). See also Stanley J. Huey & Antonio J.
Polo, Evidence-Based Psychosocial Treatments for Ethnic Minority
Youth, 37 J. CLIN. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 262 (2008)
(reviewing effective treatments for Hispanic and Latino/Latina
youths). 
65. See Vito & Tewksbury, supra note 42, at 49 (reporting better out-
comes for young, male African-American participants when drug
court provided culturally proficient services delivered by an
African-American clinician). 
66. See, e.g., NACDL REPORT, supra note 17, at 43 (citing personal
observation of one lawyer that Caucasian participants are given
more chances before a violation than minorities in a drug court).
67. Gallagher, supra note 51, at 93 (reporting the perceptions of three
African-American drug-court participants that the judge, staff,
and/or observers laughed at them or were disrespectful during
sanction hearings). 
68. See generally Wendy P. Guastaferro & Leah E. Daigle, Linking
Noncompliant Behaviors and Programmatic Responses: The Use of
Graduated Sanctions in a Felony-Level Drug Court, 42 J. DRUG
ISSUES 396, 410, Table 5 (2012) (finding race was not related to the
imposition of sanctions in a felony drug court); Patricia L. Arabia
et al., Sanctioning Practices in an Adult Felony Drug Court, 6 DRUG
CT. REV. 1 (2008) (finding a felony drug court serving 62%
African-American participants and 25% Hispanic participants
administered sanctions in a gradually escalating manner consis-
tent with effective principles of behavior modification); Lisa
Callahan et al., A Multi-Site Study of the Use of Sanctions and
Incentives in Mental Health Courts, LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 1, 4
(2012), available at DOI: 10.1037/h0093989 (finding no demo-
graphic characteristics, including race, predicted the imposition
of jail sanctions in several mental-health courts); M. SOMJEN
FRAZER, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY
COURT MODEL ON DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS 18, Table 3
(2006) (finding race was not related to participants’ perceptions of
procedural fairness when sanctions and incentives were imposed
in a community court).
69. See, e.g., O’Hear, supra note 17, at 480 (suggesting failure in drug
court may lead to harsher sentences for minorities than not par-
ticipating in drug court); NACDL REPORT, supra note 17, at 43
(same); JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 17, at 24.
70. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of
graduation rates among minorities and non-minorities in drug
courts.
71. See JUST. POL’Y INST., supra note 17, at 24 (acknowledging very few
studies have compared dispositions for participants who failed
drug court to those traditionally adjudicated). 
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appear to receive relatively harsher sentences than traditionally
adjudicated defendants charged with comparable offenses.72
There is no evidence, however, to suggest whether this practice
differentially impacts minorities as compared to non-minori-
ties. Moreover, no information is available on whether there
might have been a rational basis for the judges in those cases
to augment the sentences as they did.
How and when augmented sentences are imposed in drug
courts is among the most important questions that need to be
carefully studied by researchers. Currently, there appears to be
no clear consensus about whether, or under what circum-
stances, it is appropriate to increase a presumptive sentence for
one who fails a diversion opportunity, such as drug court; how-
ever, participants must be informed of the possibility of an aug-
mented sentence when they execute waivers to enter the pro-
gram.73
Ideally, defense attorneys and potential participants should
be armed with more than just the mere knowledge that an aug-
mented sentence could be imposed. Where possible, they
should be armed with data about how likely this is to occur
and what factors the judge is apt to take into account when
rendering such a decision. Researchers need to enlighten the
drug-court field about how these important matters are deter-
mined and, most important, whether these decisions may
unfairly or disproportionately impact racial-or-ethnic-minority
participants. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Much of the discourse surrounding racial- and ethnic-
minority experiences in drug courts has shed more heat on the
matter than light. Anecdotal impressions have been miscast as
scientific data, simple correlations have been misinterpreted as
proof of causality, and simplistic, even nihilistic solutions have
been proffered to address complex problems of crime and drug
policy. 
Here is what is known:
• African-Americans appear to be underrepresented in adult
drug courts by an average of a few percentage points.
• African-American participants, and to a lesser extent
Hispanic and Latino/Latina participants, are considerably
less likely than Caucasians to graduate from a plurality of
drug courts, but not all drug courts. This difference does not
appear to be a function of race or ethnicity per se, but rather
a function of other socio-demographic characteristics which
may be correlated with race or ethnicity. 
• Evidence suggests graduation rates for African-American
and Hispanic participants may be substantially increased by: 
• providing vocational services and assistance;
• administering structured, cognitive-behavioral treatment
curricula;
• administering treatments that are focused on the preva-
lent drugs of choice in minority communities (e.g.,
cocaine and heroin); 
• better preparing minority participants for what to expect
before referring them to 12-step meetings; and 
• administering culturally tailored interventions for young
African-American males. 
• Empirical evidence does not support the assertion that
minority participants receive different sanctions for compa-
rable infractions in drug courts; however, insufficient
research has addressed this question.
• No valid research has investigated whether minority partici-
pants are sentenced more harshly than non-minorities for
failing drug court.
Clearly, the drug-court field is left with more questions than
answers. More research is needed to determine what services
minority participants typically receive in drug courts, how to
enhance minority outcomes in drug courts, and what conse-
quences typically ensue from program failure. Moreover, little
is known about the impacts of drug courts on minority groups
other than African-Americans and Hispanics. Researchers need
to make extra efforts to recruit a diverse range of citizens into
their studies and validly assess disparate impacts across the full
spectrum of racial and ethnic subgroups that are enrolled in
drug-court programs or charged with drug-related offenses.  
Drug courts are, first and foremost, courts, and the most
fundamental principles of due process and equal protection
continue to apply to their operations.74 Drug courts came into
being to solve some of our most dire social ills, and it would be
a tragedy if programs designed to help people exacerbated
their problems. Moreover, drug courts were created to correct
certain social injustices emanating from the War on Drugs, and
they must not turn a blind eye to the faintest possibility that
they might be exacerbating some of those self-same injustices.
It is incumbent upon drug courts to take a fearless inventory
of their actions, admit their shortcomings where applicable,
and continue striving to perform their vital work ever more
effectively and humanely.75
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72. See Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV.
783, 792 (2008) (concluding sentences for participants who were
terminated from drug courts in New York were two to five times
longer than for conventionally adjudicated defendants).
73. See generally William G. Meyer, Constitutional and Legal Issues in
Drug Courts, in NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL
BENCHBOOK 159, 164 (Douglas B. Marlowe & William G. Meyer
eds., 2011) (noting waiver of trial rights in drug courts must be
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent). 
74. See, e.g., id. at 163 (noting drug courts must safeguard the due-
process rights of participants).
75. Some readers might recognize these principles as stemming from
the precepts of AA and NA. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD
SERVICES, TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS 6-8 (1981).
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Cutting-edge neuroscientific studies provide new insightsinto the inner workings of the human brain. At thesame time, innovations in justice-system data collection
have allowed researchers to gather and analyze vast quantities
of statistical data in criminal-sentencing patterns. The combi-
nation of the two genres of study provides us with the first sci-
entifically based demonstration that well-meaning egalitarian
judges may have strong neurophysiologic reactions to defen-
dants, victims, experts, and attorneys. These reactions help us
explore whether or not race affects judicial decision making.
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, caselaw, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutions of every state
prohibit judges from using race as a factor in sentencing.1
However, traditional notions of race bias are based on the idea
that disparate outcomes are a simpleminded application of
racial bias perpetrated by a select few judges who are not
aligned with the values of the justice system.2 The overwhelm-
ing majority of judges are committed to fairness and impartiality.
The overwhelming majority of judges would also agree that
racial bias is abhorrent and that it has no place in our justice
system. However, the emerging neuroscience compels the
thoughtful analyst to inquire about the role of the brain’s auto-
matic reactions in decision making. 
Neuroscientists explore the brain’s processes, but the justice
system must be provided with an analysis of how the law shapes
the ways that a judge’s brain may react. The rigorous analysis
required in the application of the four principles of criminal sen-
tencing (i.e., retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapac-
itation)3 may allow or even facilitate problematic neurophysio-
logic reactions in a judge’s brain and may result in disparate sen-
tencing patterns. Yet the sentencing disparities are not explored,
and the proof that racial bias is the cause is not fully accepted.4
This is partially because the ways in which racial bias may man-
ifest in a judge’s brain are not easily understood.5
Footnotes 
1. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits bias in judicial deci-
sion making. This section of the Code is mimicked by many states
and the federal courts. Section 2.3 of the Model Code states:
Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment 
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, includ-
ing administrative duties, without bias or prejudice. 
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in
harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice,
or harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials,
or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to
do so. 
(C) A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the
court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including
but not limited to race, sex, gender, religion, national ori-
gin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation,
against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or others. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 2.3 (2007).
2. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2386-2387 (2011) (not men-
tioning race but explicitly recognizing that disparities in sentencing
“imposed on similarly situated defendants” were so significant that
the Legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1984) states in part:
(a) Factors to Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner.
See also Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (stating that factors 2(A) through
(D) of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1984) are the “four considerations—ret-
ribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation— [that]
are the four purposes of sentencing generally, and a court must
fashion a sentence “to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the extent
that they are applicable” in a given case. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3551(a) (1984)). 
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Even while Chief Justice Burger concludes in his dissent that the
death penalty was not cruel and unusual and that the evidence
submitted did not demonstrate sufficient racial disparities, he
clearly acknowledged that [i]f a statute that authorizes the discre-
tionary imposition of a particular penalty for a particular crime is
used primarily against defendants of a certain race, and if the pat-
tern of use can be fairly explained only by reference to the race of
the defendants, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids continued enforcement of that statute in its
existing form. Furman, 408 U.S. at 389, n. 12. 
5. Courts have recognized that implicit or unconscious racial bias
exists and that it may affect decision making in other contexts. See
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-991
(1988) (recognizing in the Title VII context that “subconscious
stereotypes and prejudice” are “a lingering form” of the discrimi-
nation and that these unconscious biases have “precisely the same
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional dis-
crimination”).
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The Court’s Brain:
Neuroscience and Judicial Decision Making in Criminal Sentencing
Kimberly Papillon
If a judge has a million minute, consecutive neurophysio-
logic reactions during a moment in a trial, and if some of those
minute reactions are quantitatively or qualitatively different
based on whether the defendant is African-American, Latino,
Native American, Asian-American, Pacific Islander or
Caucasian, then the ultimate outcome of the judge’s decision-
making process—the sentence itself—will likely differ as well.
Some defendants will receive more time in prison than others
for the same crime, and race will be a determinative component. 
The methodologies for these studies have advanced over
time, but they have been grounded in a reductionist approach.
To understand the reactions, researchers first sought to iden-
tify the neural substrates that activate in reaction to different
stimuli (i.e., faces, questions, images, or sounds). Next they
sought to create ever more elegant evaluations of the ways to
manipulate the stimuli to activate the very same neural sub-
strates. They wanted to know what parts of our brains activate
during different cognitive tasks, and then whether biases have
an effect on these tasks. The initial research on bias and its
origins was an attempt to understand how we think. Its prog-
eny is a quest to understand how or whether we can alter our
thought process, presumably for the good of society. 
The acceptance of the research is complicated by the fact
that the scientific nomenclature and dense calculus-laden
findings are often set outside of the realm of understanding of
those who could make the most of the conclusions—those
who are in a position to create systemic change, such as
powerbrokers in business, policymakers in the political arena,
and the decision makers within the justice system.6 However,
if judges are given access to the studies demonstrating the per-
vasive nature of these brain reactions, and the affect of each
differential step on the decision-making process, they may
begin to advocate for systemic change.7
This article treats the neurophysiologic reactions and the
ways that they interact with the four principles of criminal
sentencing in four parts. Part I shows that there are precise
areas of the brain that activate unconsciously in a racially
biased manner, and those are the same parts used to deter-
6. JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2009), available
at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and
%20Racial%20Fairness/kangIBprimer.ashx.
7. The Model Code Comment to Section 2.3 seems to recognize the
possibility that racially biased templates or “stereotypes” may
manifest in judicial decision making. It states in part:
[1] A judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding
impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judi-
ciary into disrepute. 
[2] Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include
but are not limited to epithets; slurs; demeaning nick-
names; negative stereotyping; attempted humor based
upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile
acts; suggestions of connections between race, ethnicity,
or nationality and crime; and irrelevant references to per-
sonal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body
language can convey to parties and lawyers in the pro-
ceeding, jurors, the media, and others an appearance of
bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.
[Emphasis added.] MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, §
2.3, Comment (2007).
8. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 542, 548. (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (“Frankel’s cen-
tral concern was that discretionary actors such as judges and
parole officials followed no rhyme or reason beyond their own
personal instincts. Punishment decisions, more important than
much of the other routine business of the courts, were deserving
of at least a comparable degree of care.”)
9. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal
Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749 (2006). See also Joshua Dressler,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 13-18 (3d ed. 2001), for further dis-
cussion:
A deterrence-based punishment seeks to convince the
general community (and, in some formulations, the
offender himself or herself) not to commit (or repeat the
commission of) the crime for which the offender is being
sentenced. An incapacitation-based punishment relies on
confinement and supervision in order to prevent future
crimes by offenders who are believed to represent particu-
mine the basis for the appro-
priate length of incapacita-
tion in prison. Part II shows
that biological measures for
pain, empathy, and aggres-
sion may affect a judge’s abil-
ity to equitably determine
the appropriate amount of
retribution required for a
crime. Part III demonstrates
that judges may uncon-
sciously presume that more
punishment is necessary to effectively deter criminal behavior
in certain racial groups due to a judge’s failure to properly
encode those groups in the judge’s prefrontal cortex. Part IV
demonstrates that automatic associations between crime,
threat, and certain racial groups may affect a judge’s ability to
accurately assess the potential for rehabilitation. 
I. SENTENCING THEORY
In criminal courts, judges are expected to execute their
duties in a way that ensures they evenly and equally apply the
factors set forth in the law to all defendants, regardless of
race. They are further expected to remove inappropriate
biases from their decision-making process so that the biases
will not influence those decisions. However, it is precisely the
inquiry required by the principles of sentencing that calls upon
judges to activate the parts of their neuro-anatomy that use
biases.8
When sentencing in criminal court, a judge is required to
apply a wide range of factors to determine the appropriate
length of the sentence. While there is much diversity between
the criminal sentencing laws from state to state, and between
state sentencing laws and federal sentencing laws, the four
basic purposes for punishment in criminal sentencing appear
to be universal.
Historically, retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, and inca-
pacitation have been the four corners of sentencing law.9 Over
[I]f judges are given
access to studies
demonstrating . . .
these brain 
reactions, . . . they
may begin to 
advocate for 
systemic change.
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larly important recidivism threats. A rehabilitative sen-
tence will involve some form of therapy, treatment, or
training to help address the underlying causes of criminal
behavior. Just deserts, a form of retributive punishment, is
often contrasted with the foregoing utilitarian purposes of
punishment; desert does not seek future crime prevention
per se, but rather demands punishment as a moral imper-
ative in its own right, often seen as necessary to affirm the
status of victims or show respect for the personhood of
defendants.
10. Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386-87. Tapia doesn’t mention race but
explicitly recognizes that disparities in sentencing were so signif-
icant that the legislature enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984. It further recognizes that Congress was also motivated to
pass the Act based on the belief that that rehabilitation was not
possible in most cases:
“For almost a century, the Federal Government
employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sen-
tencing.” [quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U. S. 361,
363.] . . .  But this model of indeterminate sentencing even-
tually fell into disfavor. One concern was that it produced
“[s]erious disparities in [the] sentences imposed on simi-
larly situated defendants [citation omitted].” Tapia, 131 S.
Ct. at 2368-87.
11. Sergi G. Costafreda, Michael J. Brammer, Anthony S. David, &
Cynthia H.Y. Fu, Predictors of Amygdala Activation During the
Processing of Emotional Stimuli: A Meta-Analysis of 385 PET and
fMRI Studies, 58 BRAIN RES. REV. 57 (2008); Frank Van Overwalle,
Social Cognition and the Brain: A Meta-Analysis, 30 HUM. BRAIN
MAPPING 829 (2009).
12. Additionally fear becomes a learned response on a molecular level:
It is generally believed that long-term retention of the
effects of learning involve intracellular cascades that are
triggered by the influx of calcium during postsynaptic
depolarization [citations omitted]. The rise in calcium then
triggers several kinases and transcription factors . . . .
These act, possibly in concert, to induce genes and initiate
synthesis of new proteins. Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional
Brain, Fear, and the Amygdala, 23 CELLULAR & MOLECULAR
NEUROBIOLOGY 727, 731 (2003). 
13. David M. Amodio, Eddie Harmon-Jones, Patricia G. Devine, John
J. Curtin, Sigan L. Hartley, & Alison E. Covert, Neural Signals for
the Detection of Unintentional Race Bias, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 88
(2004).
14. Elizabeth A. Phelps, Kevin J. O’Connor, William A. Cunningham,
E. Sumie Funayma, J. Christopher Gatenby, John C. Gore, &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Performance on Indirect Measures of Race
Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activity, 12 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2000). 
the years, the popularity of
each principle has waxed and
waned. While one emerges as
the vogue until its time in
favor dissipates, another is
declared repugnant by factions
of society. At times, concurrent
warring views may be held by
influential groups. For exam-
ple, in the early 1970s and
1980s, the Model Penal Code
emphasized retribution in sen-
tencing; however, more recent
amendments to the code have placed greater emphasis on reha-
bilitation as a goal. Conversely, in 1984, federal lawmakers
rewrote the penal code to reflect their conclusion that rehabili-
tation was no longer a realistic goal.10
The four principles of sentencing law are based in large
part on determination of the choices available to the actor, the
motivation to act, and the level of injury suffered by the vic-
tim. Early classical theorists provided insight into the process
of rational choice. It is assumed that each actor is concerned
with his own suffering, which is a potential penalty for engag-
ing in a criminal act, and that this concern prevents many
people from engaging in criminal behavior. It is further
assumed that many people choose not to engage in criminal
behavior because it is not in alignment with their value sys-
tem. Determining how to apply the four purposes for punish-
ment is based in part on a judge’s conclusions about a con-
victed individual’s inherent dangerousness or proclivity for
engaging in criminal behavior, the judge’s sympathetic
response to the victim and the defendant, and the judge’s
belief in the ability of the defendant to change his behavior. 
INCAPACITATION
Incapacitation, or removing an individual from society and
from his capacity to continue to engage in criminal behavior,
is necessary for longer periods of time if the convicted person
is more dangerous. A judge must increase the length of sen-
tences for those who cannot change and who pose a signifi-
cant threat. Thus the analysis for determining the need for
incapacitation requires the judge to assess the perceived level
of threat. However, the neurophysiologic and cognitive
process of threat assessment is perhaps the most compelling
demonstration of bias available in the scientific literature
today. 
Validated studies have consistently shown that specific
areas of the amygdalae, small subcortical nodes in the brain,
activate when subjects feel fear, threat, anxiety, and distrust.11
The progeny of these studies has explored the various stimuli
that activate this region and the layers of subtleties that
demonstrate the complexities of the reactions.12 Individuals
with diagnosed phobias, specifically arachnophobia (fear of
spiders) and ophidiophobia (fear of snakes), demonstrate a
significantly higher level of amygdala activation when they
view pictures of spiders and snakes in comparison to when
they view pictures of other predatory, threatening, or fero-
cious creatures, such as tigers.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies
have shown there is increased neural responsitivity in the
amygdalae to African-American faces.13 One of the pioneering
studies in this area showed a measurable increase in left-supe-
rior amygdala activation when subjects viewed African-
American male faces verses Caucasian male faces.14 All of the
study participants were Caucasian. 
However, to ensure a thorough analysis of the intersection
between neuroscience, cognition, and criminal sentencing, we
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15. Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice:
Social-Cognitive Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation,
16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 56 (2005). Caucasian subjects viewed African-
American and Caucasian faces and showed increased amygdala
activation for the Caucasian faces, particularly when required to
categorize the pictures based on the age of the person pictured. 
16. The study’s authors noted that while the differential activation was
unimpressive, the level of amygdala activation correlated with the
level of unconscious or implicit racial bias shown on a well-
known psychological test called the Implicit Association Test
(IAT). The IAT is a computerized test that is validated with an
overwhelmingly statistically significant sample. People have com-
pleted over 4.5 million IAT’s online and had their data recorded by
Project Implicit, the center that administers the IAT website.
Project Implicit, General Information, http://www.projectimp
licit.net/generalinfo.php.
The IAT measures mistakes made in matching words to specific
categories, and it measures, in milliseconds, the time that it takes
the subject to make these matches. The amount of delay and the
number of mistakes are assessed, and the result demonstrates the
strength of the implicit association between the words and the cat-
egories. The Race IAT (also known as the Black/White IAT) has
four segments, and in one of the segments, it presents two cate-
gories: 1) “black and good”; and 2) “white and bad.” Damian
Stanley, Elizabeth A. Phelps, & Mahzarin Banaji, The Neural Basis
of Implicit Attitudes, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 164
(2008). The subject is asked to match words to each category that
relates to bad (i.e., agony, horrible, etc.) and words that relate to
good (i.e., joy, happy, etc.), as well as photographs of faces of
African-American and Caucasian people. In a separate segment,
the subjects are required to match the same words (i.e., agony,
horrible, joy, happy, etc.) and the same photographs of black and
white faces to new compound categories: 1) “black and bad”; and
2) “white and good.”
The level of amygdala activation in the study correlated directly
with the level of bias demonstrated on the Race IAT. The study par-
ticipants whose fMRI’s showed greater amygdala activation when
viewing the African-American male faces had correspondingly
greater difficulty, slower response time, and more errors when they
tried to match the words and pictures with the compound cate-
gories “black and good” and “white and bad” than when they had
the categories “white and good” and “black and bad.” Jennifer A.
Richeson, Abigail A. Baird, Heather L. Gordon, Todd F. Heatherton,
Carrie L. Wyland, Sophie Trawalter, & J. Nicole Shelton, An fMRI
Examination of the Impact of Interracial Contact on Executive
Function, 6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1323 (2003) (This examination
shows that as implicit racial bias increases and garners resources to
fit the level of amygdala and insula reaction, other cognitive skills
such as executive functioning are substantially impaired. An fMRI
study measured impairment to executive functioning in the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when Caucasians interacted with
African-Americans). 
17. Brian A. Nosek et. al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit
Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007). 
18. Jaclyn Ronquillo et al., The Effects of Skin Tone on Race-related
Amygdala Activity: An fMRI Investigation, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE &
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 39 (2007).
19. Multiple studies demonstrate that people apply racial stereotypes
to African-Americans who have stronger Afrocentric facial fea-
tures than to African-Americans who are have weaker Afrocentric
facial features. Keith B. Maddox, 8 Perspectives on Racial
Phenotypicality Bias, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 383
(2004); Keith B. Maddox & Stephanie Gray Chase, Manipulating
Subcategory Salience: Exploring the Link between Skin Tone and
Social Perception of Blacks, 34 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 533 (2004).
must continue the inquiry to include the subtleties of the
study. The study included much more revealing correlations.15
The study also used the “startle blink reaction,” which
measures the reactions of the muscles around the eyes when
the subject is presented with certain stimuli. The startle-blink
reaction is a measurable indication of fear. The reaction is very
difficult to control or hide, and often the strength with which
the subject blinks or the number of times the subject blinks
when presented with certain visual stimuli is unknown to the
subject himself. Researchers found a direct correlation
between the level of amygdala activation and the startle-blink
reaction when subjects were presented with pictures of
African-American and Caucasian male faces.16 The subjects
who had increased left-superior amygdala activation when
viewing African-American faces demonstrated a correspond-
ingly greater startle blink reaction when viewing African-
American faces.
The study also collected explicit measures of bias (i.e., bias
that the subjects are conscious of or willing to admit to them-
selves or others). Explicit measures required the subject to
state whether or not they held racial preferences and to what
degree. The explicit reports demonstrated that when it comes
to race, people rated themselves as only marginally biased or
not biased at all against African-Americans.17 Notably, the
explicit measures or admissions of bias did not correlate with
the level of amygdalae activation or the startle-blink reaction.
INCREASED AMYGDALA
ACTIVATION BASED ON
AFROCENTRIC FACIAL
FEATURES
The affect of race on the
brain is potentiated by the
level of “typically” African
or “typically” Caucasian
facial features. The more
African a person’s face
appears, the higher the level
of fear; and the more
Caucasian a person’s face
appears, the lower the level of fear. Research revealed that
there was increased amygdala activation in subjects who
viewed faces with more pronounced Afrocentric facial fea-
tures.18 A series of photographs of both African-American and
Caucasian faces were presented to subjects. One photograph
was an African-American male face with strong Afrocentric
features (full lips, broad nose, dark skin, and curly hair). One
photograph was a picture of an African-American male with
more Eurocentric features. Another photo was of a Caucasian
male with more Afrocentric features. And the final photo-
graph was of a Caucasian person with more Eurocentric fea-
tures. The amygdala activation was highest for the African-
American male face with the Afrocentric features.19 The next
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20. Y. Moriguchi, T. Ohnishi, T. Kawachi et al., Specific Brain
Activation in Japanese and Caucasian People to Fearful Faces, 16
NEUROREPORT 133 (2005).
21. Matthew D. Lieberman, Ahmad Hariri, Johanna M. Jarcho, Naomi
I. Eisenberger, & Susan Y. Bookheimer, An fMRI Investigation of
Race-Related Amygdala Activity in African-American and Caucasian-
American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720 (2005).
22. P. Wright, G. He, N. A. Shapira, W. K. Goodman, & Y. Liu, Disgust
and the Insula: fMRI Responses to Pictures of Mutilation and
Contamination, 15 NEUROREPORT 2347 (2004).
23. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991).
24. Jennifer A. Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, Why Do Interracial
Interactions Impair Executive Function? A Resource Depletion
Account, 88 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 934 (2005);
Jennifer A. Richeson, Sophie Trawalter, & J. Nicole Shelton,
African-Americans’ Racial Attitudes and the Depletion of Executive
Function after Interracial Interactions, 23 SOCIAL COGNITION 336
(2005).
25. While it may be argued that in-group preference can be shown by
any racial group, it must be noted that the majority of judges in the
U.S. are Caucasian. Carl Tobias, Commentary: Diversity and the
Federal Bench, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1195 (2010). In many state courts,
over 90% of the judges are Caucasian. With few exceptions, the
overwhelming majority of state supreme courts are all Caucasian.
26. Irene V. Blair, Charles M. Judd, & Kristine M. Chapleau, The
Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 674 (2004); Irene V. Blair, Charles M. Judd, & Jennifer
L. Fallman, The Automaticity of Race and Afrocentric Facial Features
in Social Judgments, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 763 (2004).
highest level of amygdala activa-
tion occurred with the African-
American face that had more
Eurocentric features. The subjects
also showed amygdala activation
for the Caucasian face with
Afrocentric features (though not
as strong as the reaction to the
African-American faces).20
INSULA ACTIVATION
In addition to stronger amygdala activation for African-
American faces, studies also demonstrate a stronger insula
reaction among some Caucasian people for African-American
faces.21 The insula has been typically associated with aversion,
revulsion, or disgust; for example, it is the part of the brain
that activates when we smell rotting garbage.22 In the study,
the subjects viewed faces of African-Americans and
Caucasians while undergoing fMRI scans. The insula reaction
was significant when the subjects saw the faces of individuals
from a different race. 
Notably, criminal-law scholars and economists have cited
revulsion as a component of the motivation for incapacita-
tion.23 Someone whose crime is repulsive to a judge will be a
prime candidate for removal from society, and for longer peri-
ods of time. If a defendant’s appearance or identity creates an
aversion or repulsion response, this may enhance the adverse
response to the crime. The prospect of sending someone back
into society who creates the same reaction in a judge as the
smell of rotten garbage is likely to be avoided. If the revulsion
reaction is potentiated by race, the African-American defen-
dant may receive a longer term in prison based on this imper-
missible factor. Unfortunately, the process of analyzing the
need for incapacitation may include deciding whether or not
a defendant can be returned to society or whether they are
associated with the emotion of aversion and cannot re-join
society for an extended period of time. The analysis requires
the judge to tap into the revulsion response to make this
assessment, and the revulsion response may be biased by race. 
DIMINISHED PREFRONTAL-CORTEX EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONING 
In addition to the increased amygdala activation as a result
of racial bias, resources needed for other brain functions will
be depleted. As bias increases, garnering resources to fit the
level of amygdala and insula reaction, other cognitive skills
such as executive functioning are substantially impaired. An
fMRI study measured impairment to executive functioning in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when Caucasians
interacted with African-Americans.24
In the study, some of the participants interacted with an
African-American (possibly to create an amygdala and insula
reaction in the brain) and some interacted with a Caucasian
person. The participants were then required to perform a task
that should have recruited their executive functioning—a
cognitive color-matching test called the Stroop Test. The par-
ticipants who interacted with the African-American person
before attempting to complete the color-matching test were
slower and less accurate when completing the test. Moreover,
those who interacted with the African-American person
before they attempted the color-matching test showed dimin-
ished activation in their dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
In this context, if executive functioning is diminished due
to neurophysiologic reactions to African-Americans, then the
decision maker will be less able to access the proper rules to
apply to the sentencing decision but will simply apply default
rules (such as implicit associations equating “Black” with
“bad”) to the decision instead. 
Aversion and disgust, when combined with fear, threat, dis-
trust, and diminished executive functioning, create a formida-
ble combination for the African-American defendant to over-
come.25 A judge’s determination of the level of threat a defen-
dant poses and whether the defendant should be separated
from others in society is not simply permissible, it is required
in the incapacitation analysis. However, in assessing these fac-
tors, the judge may include the reaction of fear, threat, and
aversion. The neurophysiologic reaction to the African-
American male, particularly the African-American male with
strong Afrocentric facial features, is worthy of further discus-
sion. The potential connection to resulting disparities in crim-
inal sentencing is stark.
AFROCENTRIC FACIAL FEATURES AND CRIMINAL
SENTENCING 
Afrocentric facial features have an impact on the length and
type of sentences given to inmates.26 A Stanford University
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27. David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil
Alan Weiner, & Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discrimination and the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
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& Sheri Lynn Johnson, Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing
Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383 (2006).
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http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingra
cialdisparity.pdf. 
30. Id. at 8, citing WILLIAM J. SABOL, HEATHER COUTURE, & PAIGE M.
HARRISON, PRISONERS IN 2006 (2007), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.pdf.
31. Lauren E. Glaze & Thomas P. Bonczar, Probation and Parole in the
United States (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1984) specifically calls for the judge to
consider the characteristics of the defendant as well as the crimi-
nal history:
(a) Factors to Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant . . . .”
[Emphasis added.] 
33. To determine the severity of past convictions, offenders receive a
designated number of criminal-history points for every prior sen-
tence of imprisonment exceeding 1 year and 1 month. The
researchers also quantified criminal history by adding points based
on whether the offense was committed while the offender was
under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole,
supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or escape status.
study demonstrated that facial features of African-American
male defendants correlate to imposition of the death penalty.27
The study showed that as the faces of the defendants depicted
higher levels of Afrocentric facial features, the defendants
were more likely to receive the death penalty. Using mug shots
of faces of men convicted of crimes for which the death
penalty could be imposed, the researchers coded the faces for
Afrocentric features. Those individuals with more Afrocentric
facial features were more likely to receive the death penalty
when controlling for numerous other factors.28 The level of
Afrocentric facial features potentiated the desire of the jury to
impose the death penalty. This result aligns with the fMRI
studies showing increased amygdala and insula activation for
African-Americans.
DISPARITIES IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING AND THE
NEUROSCIENTIFIC CORRELATES
Nationwide, African-Americans constitute 38% of the jail
and prison population, but they constitute only 13% of the
United States population.29 In response to such statistics,
many immediately advance the rationale that African-
Americans simply commit more crimes and, therefore, they
are overrepresented in the prison population. However, a
more thorough analysis of the statistics demonstrates a dis-
turbing disparity not explained by alleged increased crime
rates. According the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, in 2006, African-Americans made up only 14% of
illegal-drug users, in parity with their 13% representation in
the U.S. population. Yet they are overrepresented in the sub-
sequent steps in the criminal justice pipeline. African-
Americans represent 35% of arrests for drug offenses, 53% of
convictions for drug offenses, and 45% of those incarcerated
for drug offenses.30 Additionally, the more lenient sentencing
option of probation is given more freely to Caucasian offend-
ers. In 2006, 56% of those on probation were Caucasian,
while only 29% were African-American.31
FEDERAL SENTENCING
STUDY
In a study of sentencing pat-
terns nationwide, researchers
compiled data from 77,256
defendants sentenced in fed-
eral courts under the United
States Sentencing Commission
Guidelines. The researchers
conducted a regression analy-
sis, which controlled for multiple factors that should affect the
length of sentences, including crime seriousness or offense
level and criminal history.32
Offense level was determined by the severity of the offense.
The offense was assigned a base value that correlated to the
offense level identified in the code. This base value was then
increased or decreased based on other characteristics of the
offense (i.e., whether the offense resulted in a substantial like-
lihood of death or serious bodily injury; the monetary amount
gained by the offender; whether the victim was a minor;
whether the crime was committed with a gun, etc.). The study
also controlled for criminal history, including the severity and
number of past offenses and whether the offense was commit-
ted while on probation or parole, etc.33
While all of these factors affected sentencing, there was
still a disparity in the sentences handed down, and race was
the determinative factor. African-Americans received 5.5
more months in prison than their Caucasian counterparts for
the same crimes, with the same criminal history and the same
aggravating and mitigating factors. Latinos received 4.5
months in jail more than Caucasians who were charged with
the same crime. A combined group of Asians, Pacific
Islanders, Native Americans, and those of mixed heritage was
included in the analysis as well. This group received 2.3
months more in prison than their Caucasian counterparts.
These disparities remained significant even when the
researchers controlled for income, education level, citizen-
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text in the doctrine of unclean hands. 
ship, age, language status,
etc. After these adjustments
for socioeconomic factors,
African-American defen-
dants received 4.5 months
more in prison than
Caucasians for the same
crime; Latino defendants
received 2.5 more months
in jail; and the aggregate
group of Asian-Americans,
Pacific Islanders, and Native Americans still received 2.3
more months in federal prison. 
The additional time in prison for being African-American is
equivalent to the additional time provided for a prior felony con-
viction. Thus, in this context, being African-American was equiv-
alent to committing an additional crime. 
AFROCENTRIC FACIAL FEATURES AND THE
AMYGDALA
The most telling correlation between amygdala studies and
statistical data can be found with Afrocentric facial features.
Amygdala activation increases as the level of Afrocentric facial
features of the person being viewed increases. A recent study
found that sentence length also increases as Afrocentric facial
features increase. Researchers studied Afrocentric facial fea-
tures across racial lines. Using mug shots, faces of African-
American men and Caucasian men who had been convicted of
felonies in Florida were coded for Afrocentric features on a
scale of 1 to 9, 9 being the highest and 1 being the lowest. The
researchers then reviewed the case files and controlled for 11
separate factors that may also affect the length of the sentence,
such as seriousness of the primary offense, number of addi-
tional concurrent offenses, seriousness of additional concur-
rent offenses, number of prior offenses, and seriousness of
prior offenses.
The researchers found that African-American inmates
with more Afrocentric features received longer sentences.
Inmates who were one standard deviation greater than the
norm for Afrocentric features received 7 to 8 months more in
jail than inmates who were 1 standard deviation below, con-
trolling for the 11 other factors. The stronger facial features
accounted for a 2% increase in sentence length. While this
may seem minor, it should be noted that having an addi-
tional concurrent serious offense charged increased the sen-
tence length by 3%. In other words, having a broader nose,
darker skin, fuller lips, and curlier hair was almost equivalent
to being saddled with an additional serious criminal charge. It
was as if the Florida Penal Code listed looking African-
American as a crime as serious as aggravated assault or pos-
session with intent to sell. 
Surprisingly, Caucasian inmates with Afrocentric features
also received longer sentences than their Caucasian counter-
parts with more Eurocentric features. Once again, inmates
who were one standard deviation greater than the norm for
Afrocentric features received 7 to 8 months more in jail than
inmates who were 1 standard deviation below, controlling for
seriousness of crime, prior convictions, additional crimes
charged, and several other factors. 
We need not stop the inquiry here, however. The four prin-
ciples that underlie the sentencing process go beyond the sim-
ple detection of threat or aversion.34 Retribution includes the
assessment of appropriate levels of counter-injury. 
II. RETRIBUTION 
Retribution in sentencing theory is based on the conclu-
sion that a crime “demands punishment as a moral imperative
in its own right.”35 As with the other factors in sentencing,
retribution includes a consideration of the impression left by
a defendant on the mind of a judge (i.e., culpability and
intent).36 However, retribution also requires the judge to con-
sider the victim. The judge must consider the level of pain or
injury suffered by the victim along with the victim’s value or
status, affording the victim the right to have a counterbalanc-
ing punishment for a defendant that fits the crime.37 Indeed,
the calculation surrounding what charges to bring and what
chances a case has in front of a jury includes, at its core,
whether or not there is a sympathetic victim that the jury will
relate to and want to vindicate. 
Empathy is an outgrowth of an individual’s ability to
relate to the victim—to find a connection with the victim’s
identity and plight so that the individual can imagine the
pain of the victim as his or her own pain. For retribution, the
analysis of the level of the injury and the empathy and value
for the victim are inextricably intertwined. The law explic-
itly and reasonably increases penalties for the same injury
suffered by someone who is helpless (e.g., a child or an
elderly person) verses someone who is capable of defending
themselves. Likewise, retribution may be unconsciously and
impermissibly increased for the same injury suffered by
someone for whom a judge feels more empathy versus some-
one for whom the judge feels very little or no empathy.
Additionally, there is the ever-present “how dare you” factor.
This embodies the notion that as an individual empathizes
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with the pain of a victim, he is offended that anyone would
hurt a person for whom he can feel such empathy. A judge
may place greater value on a victim if the judge relates to the
victim and if the judge more poignantly feels the victim’s
pain. The value or status of the victim is, therefore, also a
part of the calculation for retribution.38 Thus, for the pur-
poses of retribution, culpability is potentiated by the empa-
thy felt for the victim.39
Another factor that modulates the level of retribution
downward is the level of pain and sympathy felt for the
Caucasian defendant. A prison sentence will inflict pain on
the defendant. If a judge has an empathetic pain response for
a defendant then he will be less motivated and less likely to
impose a higher level of punishment and pain in the form of
a prison sentence. 
As a judge determines the appropriate level of retribution,
he is required to assess the culpability and the level of empa-
thy that should be applied towards both the victim and defen-
dant. However, this assessment, like the threat assessment for
incapacitation, is inextricably and disturbingly intertwined
with neurophysiologic reactions and bias. 
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF PAIN EMPATHY 
A study demonstrates that pain empathy may be affected by
race. In the study, participants were monitored for physiologic
reactions as they were shown videos of three different hands
being stuck by a hypodermic needle. In a randomized order,
participants watched a Caucasian hand, an African-American
hand, and a purple hand being stuck by a hypodermic needle.
Pain empathy is measured by the level of sensory motor con-
tagion and corticol spinal inhibition. If an individual
empathizes with another person’s pain, that individual will
have a physiologic reaction that is akin to actually suffering
the physical injury. When an injury occurs in the body, the
brain attempts to dampen down the level of pain felt. The
brain achieves this by lessening or inhibiting the level of sen-
sation felt in the injured area—this is called cortical spinal
inhibition. When someone watches another person being
injured and he feels empathy for the pain, he also feels corti-
cal spinal inhibition. It is as if the pain experience is “conta-
gious.” This phenomenon is called sensory motor contagion.
Therefore, if, as a person observes another person receiving a
painful hand injury, the observer has an increased level of cor-
tical spinal inhibition in his own hand, then scientists con-
clude the observer empathizes with the pain of the injured
person. Conversely, if the observer does not feel empathy for
the pain he witnesses, then his brain will not initiate cortical
spinal inhibition because there is no risk of sensory motor
contagion. The brain does not need to dampen down the
empathetic sensation if the observer is not having an empa-
thetic response. 
In the study, the Caucasian subjects experienced high lev-
els of cortical spinal inhibition and sensory motor contagion
when they watched the
Caucasian hand being stuck
with the hypodermic nee-
dle.40 When the Caucasian
subjects saw the purple hand
being stuck, they demon-
strated a measurable but low
level of pain empathy.
However, as the Caucasian
subjects saw the African-
American hand being stuck
in the same painful manner, there was an opposite reaction to
cortical spinal inhibition. There was an absence of empathy.
Notably, the level of pain empathy felt correlated with the
level of unconscious or implicit racial bias as shown on the
Race IAT. The higher the level of implicit racial bias against
African-Americans on the IAT, the lower the amount of empa-
thy for the pain of the black person. Since 74% to 87.1% of the
Caucasian population in America shows implicit bias against
African-Americans on the Race IAT, it is possible that a signif-
icant percentage of the population may show a differential
level of pain empathy toward people of African descent and a
higher level of pain empathy toward Caucasians. Additionally,
since the Race IAT scores among Caucasian judges are in
alignment with the level of IAT results for the general popula-
tion, it can be reasonably concluded that similar conclusions
can be drawn for some judges. 
Additionally, African-American subjects felt greater empa-
thy for the black hand and less empathy for the Caucasian
hand. However, since the level of empathy correlates with
Race IAT scores and African-Americans’ IAT results in large
samples demonstrate that one third of African-Americans
show bias in favor of Caucasians, one third show no bias
toward either racial group, and only one third show bias
against Caucasians, the possibility of differential pain empa-
thy is reduced. Additionally, since African-American judges
show a higher level of implicit preference for Caucasians than
the general African-American population, the possibility that
African-American judges may feel less pain empathy for
Caucasian victims is further significantly diminished. 
If a judge feels greater pain empathy for Caucasian defen-
dants, he may not provide those defendants with long prison
sentences. As the judge sends the defendant to prison, he
may unconsciously imagine the harm occurring to himself.
This differential and racially biased empathetic reaction may
account for both the lower sentences and the downward
departures from the federal sentencing guidelines for
Caucasian defendants. Additionally, if a judge feels greater
empathy for the pain of the victim, then any cases with
Caucasian victims may result in higher sentences. The syn-
ergy between these two aspects of pain sympathy may
explain why African-American defendants who are con-
victed of killing Caucasian victims are most frequently given
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cause harm. Furthermore the perpetrator must believe that the
behavior will harm the target, and that the target is motivated
to avoid the behavior. Actual harm is not required. [Citing
ROBERT A. BARON, DEBORAH R. RICHARDSON, HUMAN AGGRESSION
(2d ed. 2004); RUSSELL G. GEEN, HUMAN AGGRESSION (2d ed.
2001); LEONARD BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION—ITS CAUSES,
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45. See Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R.
Damasio, Fear and the Human Amygdala, 75 J.  NEUROSCIENCE 5879
(1995), stating: 
Studies of the amygdala in humans have come largely from
two sources: surgical lesions and electrical stimulation.
Although surgical lesions of the human amygdala suffer from
the drawback that they may be incomplete, and that the sub-
jects may not be normal prior to the surgery [citations omit-
ted], a review of these cases [citation omitted] strongly sup-
ports the role of the amygdala in processing fear and aggres-
sion and in social behavior. 
the death penalty by
juries.41
III. AGGRESSION AND
THE AMYGDALA 
The retribution factor
inherently recognizes that
the penalty to be provided
will cause pain or injury to
the defendant. In fact,
some penal codes state
that the purpose of sentencing is no longer rehabilitation but
punishment.42 Whether retribution is a primary or secondary
consideration, retribution analysis requires a judge to deter-
mine how much pain or injury to cause. 
The process whereby one person intentionally causes
another person pain, even if that pain is justified, is aggres-
sion. The lay definition of aggression has both negative and
positive connotations. However, the psychological and bio-
logical definition of aggression is limited to wanting or pur-
posely acting to cause pain or injury to another.43 All human
aggression is not physical aggression. Injury or harm caused
intentionally is aggression, even when that hurt or harm is
simply demeaning another person, causing them psychologi-
cal distress, or incarcerating them. 
While painted in well-meaning nomenclature designed to
increase society’s comfort level with the task of placing another
human being in jail, the process of incarceration can be an out-
growth of aggression. The application of retribution can be
based on revenge or retaliation. The principle’s relationship to
revenge or retaliation is so basic in the law that it can be found
in the popular hornbook, Criminal Law, which states:
Retribution: This is the oldest theory of punishment,
and the one which still commands considerable respect
from the general public. By this theory, also called
revenge or retaliation, punishment (the infliction of suf-
fering) is imposed by society on criminals in order to
obtain revenge, or perhaps (under the less emotional
concept of retribution) because it is only fitting and just
that one who has caused harm to others should himself
suffer for it. [Emphasis added.]44
At first blush, it may offend the sensibilities of judges to
claim that application of retribution is tied to aggression. The
judicial canons look down upon displays of some forms of
aggression from individual judges, but those displays are ones
that demonstrate malice or overt self-satisfaction with causing
pain to a defendant. Such aggression is distasteful and not
publicly sanctioned. However, human aggression can be chan-
neled through sanctioned processes. It can be aligned with
governmental purposes. It can even be mandated by law. Legal
scholars and the United States Supreme Court have recog-
nized the purpose of punishment as related to government-
sanctioned aggression. 
The amygdala is intimately involved in aggression.45 The
amygdala initiates aggressive behavior in human and other
mammals, and its involvement in aggression is linked to the
racial-bias studies involving the amygdala. Higher levels of
amygdala activation for African-American faces will likely
result in higher levels of aggression. However, the level of acti-
vation is only one aspect of the amygdala reaction. The length
of the neuropathway is also implicated in aggression for the
amygdala. 
The amygdala may be activated by a series of preceding
56 Court Review - Volume 49 
At first blush, it 
may offend the 
sensibilities of 
judges to claim 
that application of 
retribution is tied 
to aggression.
46. M. Fendt & M.S. Fanselow, The Neuroanatomical and
Neurochemical Basis of Conditioned Fear, 23 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 743 (1999).
47. John A. Bargh, Mark Chen & Lara Burrows, Automaticity of Social
Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation
on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996).
48. Id. See O’Hear, supra note 9; see also DRESSLER, supra note 9: “A
rehabilitative sentence will involve some form of therapy, treat-
ment, or training to help address the underlying causes of crimi-
nal behavior.”
steps. The longer path to the amygdala begins at the thalamus,
proceeds through the sensory cortex, and then reaches the
amygdala. The sensory cortex “weeds out” extraneous or
inappropriate considerations and recognizes subtleties before
the amygdala is activated. For instance, a face that is not smil-
ing may be seen as angry or simply unhappy. If the observer is
able to maximize the number of steps before initiating aggres-
sion, he will consider the possibility that the person is not
smiling because the person is on trial for a crime, and is there-
fore scared and possibly depressed. 
However, when a person has a predisposition to find cer-
tain faces to be threatening or to conclude that certain indi-
viduals should invoke aggression, the brain will take a neu-
ropathway “shortcut.” The thalamus will activate and then the
amygdala will activate, skipping the sensory cortex.46 Thus,
fewer extraneous components will be weeded out of the deci-
sion-making process and more subtleties will be missed. A
person who is not smiling may be seen, unconsciously, as
angry or hostile instead of scared and sad. This neuro-short-
cut increases the likelihood that otherwise non-threatening
faces will be seen as threatening and will initiate a higher level
of aggression. 
Increased hostility and increased aggression have been
shown in studies utilizing race as a factor. A recent study
demonstrates that African-Americans, independent of cir-
cumstances, engender hostility in individuals from other
groups. In an experiment conducted at New York University,
participants were required to engage in the boring task of
counting circles flashed in a computer screen.47 They were to
record whether or not an odd or even number of circles
appeared on the screen, and after they counted the number of
circles and recorded the answer, yet another picture of circles
would appear on the screen for them to count and record. As
they proceeded with the task, pictures were flashed sublimi-
nally on the computer screen. For some of the participants, a
picture of a young African-American man was flashed sub-
liminally; and for another, a picture of a young Caucasian
man was flashed. After the participants counted the circles on
130 consecutive slides flashed in the screen, the computer
crashed. The participants were told that all of the data had
been lost and they would be required to begin the exercise
again. 
The researchers then meticulously measured the level of
hostility demonstrated by each group after the computer
crashed. Three individuals, including 2 who were blind to
condition, used a unipolar scale of hostility ranging from 0 to
10 to rate the participants. All of the individuals who rated
the participants consistently concluded that those who saw
the subliminal African-American male pictures during the
counting task were more hostile than those who saw the
Caucasian male pictures.
Increased hostility toward
an individual defendant, not
engendered by the evidence,
creates an additional barrier
to fair treatment under the
law. It could inspire a judge
to unknowingly impose
more severe retribution for a
criminal act. It may also
decrease a judge’s willingness
to exercise his discretion to
ensure due process, such as
allowing for certain wit-
nesses, providing sufficient
latitude during questioning, and sustaining or denying
motions in limine so that certain evidence is admitted or
excluded. 
IV. REHABILITATION 
While retribution requires assessment of culpability, the
analysis for rehabilitation requires a determination of
whether the convicted criminal’s character is resilient enough
that he can refrain from committing crimes in the future.
Rehabilitation can be viewed as increasing a prison sentence
under the guise that the time in prison causes a convicted
criminal to change and improve behavior. This theory has
been roundly rejected by legislatures and many judges.
Conversely, rehabilitation can be viewed as the rationale for
imposing probation, counseling, anger management, educa-
tional, and job-skill programs—correspondingly reducing the
length of time in prison.48 Under either view of retribution, if
a defendant is seen as less amenable to change, he will receive
more time in prison. Individuals who are seen as pathologi-
cal or who have the proclivity to commit crimes will be seen
as less able to respond to rehabilitative efforts. If the criminal
is seen as having an endemic criminal nature, then he cannot
be rehabilitated. Just as in the analysis for incapacitation,
rehabilitation is also linked to dangerousness and potential
threat. Those who are inherently more dangerous and pose a
greater potential threat are less likely to respond to rehabili-
tation efforts. 
AFRICAN-AMERICANS, NEGATIVE CONCEPTS, AND
CRIME
Researchers have attempted to determine whether there is
an implicit association between African-Americans and
crime, and to determine if African-Americans are seen as hav-
ing an endemic criminal nature. In a study conducted at
Stanford University, researchers first primed the participants
with either a picture of an African-American male or a
Caucasian male (a third control group received no priming
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images).49 After the partici-
pants were primed, they were
shown degraded images of
various objects. Some of the
objects were crime related:
guns, knives, and handcuffs.
Other objects were not crime
related, such as a suitcase and
a piece of fruit. Each image
was initially shown in a blurry
state—so blurry that the
object could not be identified.
But with each advancing frame, the image on the screen
became increasingly clear. 
However, there was a significant difference in how quickly
participants could identify the crime-related objects based
upon the priming mechanism used. Participants primed with
the African-American face were able to correctly identify the
crime-related objects more quickly than the non-crime-related
objects. Crime-related objects were identified on average by
the 18th frame when subjects were primed with the African-
American face (non-crime-related objects were identified at
approximately the 23rd frame). It would be reasonable to
assume that the subjects primed with the Caucasian face
would identify the crime-related and non-crime-related
objects in the same way as the subjects primed with the
African-American face. However, the subjects identified the
non-crime-related objects at almost the same frame (24th) on
average (compared to 23rd for the non-crime related objects)
as the subjects who were not primed and the subjects who
were primed with the African-American face. However, sub-
jects primed with the Caucasian face were not able to identify
the crime-related object until approximately the 27th frame,
almost 10 frames later than the group primed with the
African-American face and 4 frames later than the participants
who were not primed with any pictures. The Caucasian face
actually diminished the subjects’ ability to identify the crime-
related objects. Notably, participants who were not primed
with any faces identified both the crime-related and non-
crime-related objects at approximately the 23rd frame. 
Surprisingly, this result demonstrated two important con-
cerns. First, the participants needed far less information to
conclude that crime was at issue when they were thinking
about African-American males. Second, the participants
resisted drawing the conclusion that crime was at issue when
they were still thinking about Caucasian male faces. African-
Americans are not just more closely associated with crime in
the eyes of their Caucasian counterparts, and therefore at risk
of receiving higher sentences; being Caucasian provides a
bonus or advantage, so that the imposition of a Caucasian
defendant will cause the decision maker to avoid the conclu-
sion that crime is at issue. By extension, it will require less
information or evidence for a judge or jury to conclude that
an African-American person is related to alleged criminal
activity. The burden of proof is higher for a Caucasian defen-
dant under this theory and the burden of proof is lower for
African-Americans. 
WEAPONS IDENTIFICATION TEST 
In another experiment, the participants were required to
engage in a quick-reaction, computerized test to quickly and
accurately identify pictures of both construction-related tools
and guns—the Weapons Identification Task (WIT). The par-
ticipants were primed with a picture of either an African-
American or a Caucasian male face. The picture of the face
would flash on the screen and would be immediately followed
by a picture of a tool or a gun. The participants would then be
required to quickly press a pre-assigned keyboard key to indi-
cate whether they had seen a gun or a tool. If they took too
long to identify the gun or tool, the screen would post a mes-
sage saying they had run out of time for that particular iden-
tification. Just as with the Race IAT, the computer recorded
the number of errors that the participant made and the
amount of time in milliseconds that it took the participant to
respond after each picture of the gun or the tool was flashed
onto the screen. Participants were required to identify over
100 pictures during the exercise. 
The researchers found overwhelmingly that participants
were more likely to mistake the tool for a gun immediately
after they saw the picture of an African-American face flashed
on the screen. They also found that the participants were
more likely to mistake a gun for a tool immediately after they
saw the picture of a Caucasian face flashed on the screen. 
Additionally, the researchers found that the responses
were differentially delayed. Participants took longer to iden-
tify the pictures of tools when they followed an African-
American face than when they followed a Caucasian face.
Additionally, participants took longer to identify the picture
of a gun when it was followed by a Caucasian face than when
it followed an African-American face. The researchers con-
cluded that the pictures of the African-American faces facili-
tated the responses to guns and interfered with the responses
to tools. 
These studies have disturbing implications for the criminal
justice system. If finders of fact more quickly and easily ana-
lyze, recognize, and associate images of crime objects when
primed with faces of African-Americans than with
Caucasians, the association of crime objects as evidence to
certain defendants may occur with greater ease as well.
Moreover, if viewing a Caucasian face diminishes a person’s
ability to see, recognize, and associate crime objects, being
Caucasian affords an impermissible advantage. 
If a judge sees a defendant as closely linked with crime
regardless of the facts of the case, regardless of the indications
that he can be rehabilitated, the judge might be less likely to
apply rehabilitation as a potential solution to criminal behav-
ior. A defendant who is endemically criminal cannot be easily
changed, so rehabilitation efforts would be wasted on such a
Participants
primed with the
African-American
face were able to
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the crime-related
objects more
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defendant. Therefore, the use of rehabilitation as a counter-
balance to the length of incapacitation would be folly. 
SHOOT NO-SHOOT TEST
In addition to assessing endemic criminal behavior, the
rehabilitation analysis is also closely aligned with the assess-
ment of threat. The prior discussion of threat assessment and
its neurophysiologic correlates reveals a striking racial dispar-
ity. A recent study reveals how racial bias concurrently affects
threat assessment and conclusions that African-Americans are
endemically criminal. 
In the Shoot No-Shoot test, conducted at the University of
Chicago, pictures of African-American and Caucasian men in
various poses are flashed on the computer screen.50 In each
picture, the person depicted is holding either a gun, a cell
phone, or a soda can. The test subjects, or “players,” must as
quickly as possible press a key on the computer keyboard to
indicate that they will either “shoot” or “not shoot” the man
in the picture. They are directed to hit the designated key-
board key to “shoot” if they believe that the man has a gun, or
to hit the key for “no shoot” if they believe that the man in the
picture has a soda can or a cell phone. As with the other reac-
tion-time-measure tests mentioned in previous studies, the
computer measures the length of time it takes the player to
respond in milliseconds and records the number of errors. 
Previous studies have repeatedly found that the over-
whelming majority of players take longer to determine that
the African-American man is holding a soda can or a cell
phone than it takes them to make the same determination for
the Caucasian man. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of
players will make more mistakes and “shoot” the African-
American man when he is not holding a gun than they will
when deciding to shoot or not shoot the Caucasian man. 
While the other studies demonstrated that the Caucasian
participants showed a stronger association between crime,
threat, or fear and African-Americans, this study demonstrates
that that association led to differential action. The subjects in
this study were required to make a choice that, while simu-
lated, served as a protective measure in response to a potential
or perceived threat. Arresting, charging, convicting, and sen-
tencing individuals are all protective measures taken in
response to potential or perceived threats. If associations
cause people to take more severe protective measures, those
concerned with fairness must become increasingly concerned
about whether there is differential application of the laws to
African-Americans in the criminal justice system. 
DETERRENCE 
In setting prison sentences, a judge must determine how
long each defendant would need to be in prison to deter him
from future criminal behavior. The United States Code states
that a judge “shall consider” in determining a sentence how
the sentence will “afford ade-
quate deterrence to criminal
conduct.”51
Numerous economists have
treated a judge’s decision-mak-
ing process on deterrence as a
calculation that involves the
weighing of factors and setting
of values.52 A judge will likely
take into account whether or
not a defendant will be par-
tially deterred by the defen-
dant’s own ethical considera-
tions, his remorse for the injury he has caused, and his dis-
comfort in a prison setting. Ethical considerations, remorse for
injuring another being (regardless of the potential recourse),
and the ability to reason in advance to avoid repercussions are
primarily human attributes. Conversely, if a judge were seeking
to deter a household pet from rule breaking, he would decide
that the pet’s ethical considerations and remorse for rule break-
ing were minimal and the pet’s ability to reason through reper-
cussions would be based on the judge repeatedly punishing the
pet in the past. This is not to equate any defendant with a pet.
Rather the example is designed to demonstrate the extremes of
human encoding.  In practice human encoding occurs on a con-
tinuum as opposed a binary state. To make these determina-
tions about a defendant in a criminal case, a judge must create
a neurophysiologic reaction in his own brain to encode the
defendant as more or less human. The judge also must activate
the neural substrates that come online when predicting the
behavior and assessing the social values of individuals.
Therefore, to determine the necessary level of deterrence and
set the proper length of a prison sentence accordingly, the judge
must activate the neurophysiologic process in earnest for
encoding humanness and assessing values. Herein lies the prob-
lem. The activation of the encoding process may occur in sig-
nificantly different ways based on the defendant’s attributes.
And the activation of the neural substrates will occur differently
if the judge sees the defendant as similarly situated to himself. 
The assessment of the necessary level of deterrence is based
upon a series of determinations. In an ordered society, the pre-
sumption is that most actors will engage in a rational thought
process when faced with a choice of committing a crime or not,
and that they will ultimately arrive at the decision to comply
with the law and avoid causing injury to others. This internal
mechanism, in conjunction with the concern that a criminal
penalty will be imposed, prevents most people, most of the
time, from engaging in criminal activity. Additionally, current
sentencing law assumes that criminal or deviant acts guided by
an “end/means calculation” will be dictated by the value system
of the actor. Before the actor commits a crime, he has identified
a potential benefit or pleasure to be derived from engaging in a
[T]he activation 
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criminal act. Even if the actor
seems to commit the crime
with very little prior analysis,
he has at least quickly consid-
ered the basic outlines of the
potential benefits or reward for
engaging in the criminal act.
Even if he decides quickly, he
will compare the cost or pain
that may result from the act to
the potential benefit. This
analysis will prevent the actor
from proceeding or it will inspire the actor to proceed. 
The guilt from causing another person injury or pain will
serve as a cost to the person who is able to feel for other human
beings and to empathize when seeing others in pain. The more
he is able tap into this feeling of human empathy, the greater
the cost of injuring another person. It is this sense of empathy,
the caring for others, the guilt at injuring a stranger, that some
philosophers and theologians claim makes us human and sets
us aside from others in the animal kingdom.
If the actor does not conclude that causing pain to others is a
significant cost, it may be that the actor does not feel pain or suf-
fer emotional detriment when hurting others. Moreover, if the
actor derives pleasure from causing pain, the process of hurting
another person through violence or the taking of property will
be seen as a benefit and will skew the calculation significantly. 
If the apprehension against engaging in criminal behavior
is not internally derived through sufficient moral character,
empathy, or “humanness,” the motivation must be derived
externally. The possibility of apprehension and punishment or
retribution for engaging in acts that cause others pain will
mitigate against the benefit as perceived by the actor.
However, the more deviant the actor’s analysis of benefit (i.e.,
the more he derives pleasure from pain or, conversely, the less
he derives pain or perceives cost when he injures others), the
greater the punishment required to tip the scales against
engaging in criminal behavior. If internal motivation or deter-
rence (i.e., morality or human empathy) to avoid criminal
behavior is low, then the level of external motivation or deter-
rence (i.e., the sentence) must necessarily be higher.
Therefore, it will take a more severe sentence to balance the
decision-making process of a person with low internal moti-
vation or reduced “human empathy.”
When a judge is determining an appropriate sentence, the
analysis regarding the internal and external motivations of a
defendant must be considered. The lower the internal motiva-
tion to avoid criminal activity, the more dangerous the individ-
ual may be, or, minimally, the more likely the individual may be
to engage in future criminal activity. So the object of increased
punishment is to increase external deterrence for those without
the requisite “humanness,” “ethical proclivities,” or “moral
commitments” to achieve sufficient internal deterrence.53
The conundrum for a judge is whether or not there are hid-
den factors in the judge’s decision-making process, motivating
the judge to increase the sentences for some individuals but
not others. If a judge presumes that some defendants that
come before his court are less able to engage in internal deter-
rence, the defendant may receive a higher penalty to achieve
the balance in the actor’s cost-benefit analysis. However, if
that assessment of “humanness,” “ethical proclivities,” or
“moral commitment” is based on factors outside of the evi-
dence presented in court, the sentencing process falls outside
of the bounds of law. 
UNCONSCIOUS DEHUMANIZATION OF
MARGINALIZED GROUPS 
In a study conducted at Princeton University, participants
were required to make judgments about people whom they
had not met previously but who were described as having par-
ticular attributes. As the participants made the judgments
about each person, their brains were scanned using fMRI.
There were three people described: 1) a person who was
socioeconomically disadvantaged (i.e., homeless people); 2)
an IV-drug user; and 3) a person who was not addicted to
drugs and who was presumably middle class.54 While making
the judgments, the participants used a distinctly different part
of their neuro-anatomy for the stigmatized groups (i.e., IV-
drug users and homeless people) than for the non-stigmatized
groups. The participants specifically failed to use the portion
of the brain, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) that is nec-
essary for encoding individuals as social beings.55 If we fail to
use the mPFC to consider and judge individuals, we have
effectively dehumanized them. The mPFC allows us to
process exclusively human emotions for others, such as pity
and pride.56 If we are not activating our mPFC when consid-
ering certain individuals from particular social categories, we
are not feeling exclusively human emotions such as pity or
pride for them.57
This process of dehumanizing “others” is likely more pro-
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nounced when the otherness is based on race and, undoubt-
edly, potentiated when race and socioeconomic factors are
combined. Socioeconomically disadvantaged defendants may
be relegated to the realm of “other” by those who have
achieved privilege, which may indeed include judges.
However, the combination of socioeconomic disadvantage
and marginalized racial identity, such as with African-
Americans, would likely create an even more stark result. This
increase level of dehumanization is based upon the specific
animal association held in the unconscious minds of many in
the United States. 
A study from Stanford University demonstrated that many
Caucasians in the United States more closely associate
African-Americans with apes than they do with their
Caucasian counterparts. In their study, participants were
primed with either a picture of an African-American male or
a Caucasian male (a third control group received no priming
images).58 The participants were then shown blurred images
of various animals, including peacocks and apes. The initial
frame was so blurry that it could not be identified, but with
each advancing frame, the object became more distinct.
When the image reached the 32nd frame, it was completely
identifiable. However, most people were able to identify each
of the animals by the 16th frame. But there was a significant
difference in how quickly participants could identify the
apes, versus the other animals, based upon the priming
mechanism used. 
Participants primed with the African-American face were
able to correctly identify the picture of the ape more quickly
than the other animals. Participants primed with the
Caucasian face, and those who were not primed, were not able
to identify the ape earlier than any of the other animals. 
The association between African-Americans and apes has
been advanced repeatedly in both overt and subtle ways.
There is a long history of the association being used to justify
the oppression and increased punishment of African-
Americans, immigrants, and Jewish people during the
Holocaust.59 Historically, those who are stigmatized as less
than human often receive a less rigorous application of moral
considerations and rules.60
If African-Americans are more closely associated with apes
than are their Caucasian counterparts, African-Americans are
seen as more closely linked with the key aspects of apes as
compared to humans. African-Americans are seen by many,
whether or not they realize it, to be less able to control
impulses, more likely to engage in violent behavior, and lack-
ing a fully functional internal
moral code. 
While increased hostility
increases the motivation to
impose a more severe sentence,
and thus ensure greater retribu-
tion, decreased humanity exacer-
bates this effect. More severe ret-
ribution can be imposed when the
decision maker does not socially categorize a defendant as
human. If a judge cannot activate the mPFC effectively to
apply exclusive human emotions to a defendant, extenuating
or mitigating circumstances for the act may not be factored
into a sentencing decision. Additionally, if a judge sees a
defendant as less than human, the judge may be unable to
activate the mPFC to apply the principle of rehabilitation.
Programs that allow for reintegration into society, therapeutic
options, or community support may be seen by a judge as
inapplicable to someone without the requisite human attrib-
utes to be capable of being rehabilitated. If a judge’s neuro-
physiologic reaction to an African-American defendant is one
of fear, threat, and distrust, then the sentencing principle of
incapacitation becomes ever-more important as the judge
determines the length of the sentence. Additionally, the strong
association between African-American faces and crime objects
will solidify the conclusion that the defendant is a criminal
and belongs in prison. A less-than-human, threatening, untrust-
worthy defendant who is automatically associated with negative
concepts and crime cannot be easily deterred from committing
crimes in the future. And a defendant who engenderers increased
hostility in a judge is at a distinct disadvantage throughout a
criminal trial and at the time of sentencing. More severe penal-
ties may be imposed to ensure that someone without the req-
uisite internal motivation and with the proclivity to engage in
criminal behavior does not offend again. The end result—
African-Americans, all other factors being equal, would likely
receive longer sentences than their Caucasian counterparts
due to the neurophysiologic reactions related to implicit
biases in the mind of a judge. 
Of course, evidence that demonstrates innocence or the
presence of factors that may mitigate against a severe sentence
would presumably override bias in the courtroom. However, if
executive functioning is diminished, the decision maker’s
ability to “think past” the biases may be impaired. It may take
more evidence to counter the negative associations. The
African-American defendant may be required to present more
It may take
more evidence
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negative 
associations.
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evidence, and more reliable evidence, than his Caucasian
counterpart to be acquitted or to receive a similar sentence for
the same crime. Such an outcome would be abhorrent in the
eyes of the justice system. Consequently, while many judges
will admit that implicit bias exists and that they may hold cer-
tain biases, they remain convinced that their thoughtful and
rigorous process of decision making as well as the application
of the evidence rules and the penal code will minimize the
effects of the bias. 
CONCLUSION
Simply saying that neurophysiologic processes implicated
in bias affects criminal sentencing is a gross over-simplifica-
tion. Instead we must recognize that there are multiple aspects
of decision making that increase the level of bias in legal
analysis. These aspects potentiate the assessment of fear,
threat, and aversion; increase the level of aggression; decrease
pain empathy for African-Americans and encoding of African-
Americans as human; and decrease the use of portions of the
brain that use information other than bias to reach conclu-
sions about individuals. Understanding the complexity of the
forces affecting judges as they hand down sentences allows
the policy-makers to devise more effective solutions.
Assuming that judges can simply try harder to be fair, take
more time when making decisions, or utilize their egalitarian
value systems to eliminate bias in their decision-making
process is naïve. The solutions should be tailored to the neu-
rophysiologic reactions and the psychological processes that
infuse bias into the sentencing decisions. As judges and legis-
lators across the country become more amenable to change,
these solutions will be instituted. However, acceptance of the
implicit bias, the neuro-scientific correlates, and their role in
the sentencing process is the first step. 
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Fairness is a fundamental tenet of American courts. Yet,
despite substantial work by state courts to address issues of
racial and ethnic fairness,2 public skepticism that racial and
ethnic minorities receive consistently fair and equal treatment
in American courts remains widespread.3 Why?
THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT ASSOCIATIONS
Perhaps one explanation may be found in an emerging body
of research on implicit cognition. During the last two decades,
new assessment methods and technologies in the fields of
social science and neuroscience have advanced research on
brain functions, providing a glimpse into what National Public
Radio science correspondent Shankar Vedantam refers to as
the “hidden brain.”4 Although in its early stages, this research
is helping scientists understand how the brain takes in, sorts,
synthesizes, and responds to the enormous amount of infor-
mation an individual faces on a daily basis.5 It also is provid-
ing intriguing insights into how and why individuals develop
stereotypes and biases, often without even knowing they exist.
The research indicates that an individual’s brain learns over
time how to distinguish different objects (e.g., a chair or desk)
based on features of the objects that coalesce into patterns.
These patterns or schemas help the brain efficiently recognize
objects encountered in the environment. What is interesting is
that these patterns also operate at the social level. Over time,
the brain learns to sort people into certain groups (e.g., male or
female, young or old) based on combinations of characteristics
as well. The problem is when the brain automatically associ-
ates certain characteristics with specific groups that are not
accurate for all the individuals in the group (e.g., “elderly indi-
viduals are frail”). Scientists refer to these automatic associa-
tions as implicit—they operate behind-the-scenes without the
individual’s awareness. 
Scientists have developed a variety of methods to measure
these implicit attitudes about different groups, but the most
common measure used is reaction time (e.g., the Implicit
Association Test, or IAT).6 The idea behind these types of mea-
sures is that individuals will react faster to two stimuli that are
strongly associated (e.g., elderly and frail) than to two stimuli
that are less strongly associated (e.g., elderly and robust). In
the case of race, scientists have found that most European
Americans who have taken the test are faster at pairing a white
face with a good word (e.g., honest) and a black face with a bad
word (e.g., violent) than the other way around.  For African-
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13. JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 2 (NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS 2009).
14. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1225-26.
15. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1221.
16. See Nilanjana Dasgupta, David DeSteno, Lisa A. Williams, &
Matthew Hunsinger, Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence
of Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585
(2009).
17. For more information about the strategies, see HELPING COURTS,
supra note 1, Appendix G.  
Americans, approximately a third show a preference for
African-Americans, a third show a preference for European
Americans, and a third show no preference.7
There is evidence that judges are susceptible to these
implicit associations, too. One survey of judges found a strong
white preference on the IAT among white judges. Black judges
also followed the general population findings, showing no
clear preference overall (44% showed a white preference but
the preference was weaker overall).8
The question is whether these implicit associations can
influence, i.e., bias, an individual’s decisions and actions, and
there is growing evidence that the answer is yes. Research has
demonstrated that implicit bias can affect decisions regarding,
for example, job applicants,9 medical treatment,10 a suspect’s
dangerousness,11 and nominees for elected office.12
Law professor Jerry Kang gave this description of the poten-
tial problem this poses for the justice system:
Though our shorthand schemas of people may be
helpful in some situations, they also can lead to dis-
criminatory behaviors if we are not careful. Given the
critical importance of exercising fairness and equality in
the court system, lawyers, judges, jurors, and staff
should be particularly concerned about identifying such
possibilities. Do we, for instance, associate aggressive-
ness with Black men, such that we see them as more
likely to have started the fight than to have responded in
self-defense?13
The problem is compounded by judges and other court pro-
fessionals who, because they have worked hard to eliminate
explicit bias in their own decisions and behaviors, assume that
they do not allow racial prejudice to color their judgments. For
example, most, if not all, judges believe that they are fair and
objective and base their decisions only on the facts of a case (in
one study, for example, 97% of judges attending an educational
program rated themselves in the top half of the attendees—sta-
tistically impossible—in their ability to “avoid racial prejudice
in decisionmaking”14). Judges and court professionals who
focus only on eliminating explicit bias may conclude that they
are better at understanding and controlling for bias in their
decisions and actions than they really are. 
Law professor and social psychologist Jeffrey Rachlinski,
Judge Andrew Wistrich, and law professors Chris Guthrie and
Sheri Lynn Johnson also found preliminary evidence that
implicit bias affected judges’ sentences. Additional research is
needed to confirm these findings. More importantly for the
justice system, though, is their conclusion that “when judges
are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the
influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to sup-
press that bias, they appear able to do so.”15 The next section
discusses potential strategies judges and court professionals
can use to address implicit bias.
REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS
Compared to the science on the existence of implicit bias
and its potential influence on behavior, the science on ways to
mitigate implicit bias is relatively young and often does not
address specific applied contexts such as judicial decision
making. Yet, it is important for strategies to be concrete and
applicable to an individual’s work to be effective; instructions
to simply avoid biased outcomes or respond in an egalitarian
manner are too vague to be helpful.16 To address this gap in
concrete strategies applicable to court audiences, the authors
reviewed the science on general strategies to address implicit
bias and considered their potential relevance for judges and
court professionals. They also convened a small-group discus-
sion with judges and judicial educators (referred to here as the
Judicial Focus Group) to discuss potential strategies.  These
efforts yielded seven general research-based strategies that may
help attenuate implicit bias or mitigate the influence of
implicit bias on decisions and actions.17
Strategy 1: Raise awareness of implicit bias. Individuals can
only work to correct for sources of bias that they are aware
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18. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination
and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and
Evaluations, 116 PSYCH. BULL. 117 (1994). 
19. Cf. Green et al., supra note 10, at 1237 (finding support for the
IAT as an educational tool because most resident physicians were
“open to the idea that unconscious biases could affect their clini-
cal decisions, and that learning more about these biases could
improve their care of patients” and that physicians who were
aware of the study’s focus seemed to modulate the effects of
implicit bias on their treatment decisions). 
20. See Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), 66 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 83 (2003).
21. See Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I. Norton,
Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness
in Social Interaction. 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 918 (2008).
22. See  Laurie A. Rudman, Richard D. Ashmore, & Melvin L. Gary,
“Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 856
(2001); Richard J. Nussbaum & Jennifer A. Richeson, The Impact
of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindedness on Racial Bias, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 417 (2004).
23. See Henk Aarts, Peter M. Gollwitzer, & Ran R. Hassin, Goal
Contagion: Perceiving Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 23 (2004).
24. See Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus
Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 645 (2001).
25. See E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses to Other-
Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 486 (2001). 
26. See, e.g., Maja Djikic, J. Ellen Langer, & Sarah F. Stapleton,
Reducing Stereotyping Through Mindfulness: Effects on Automatic
Stereotype-Activated Behaviors, 15 J. ADULT DEV. 106 (2008);
Sophie Lebrecht, Lara J. Pierce, Michael J. Tarr, & James W.
Tanaka, Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial
Bias, 4 PLOS ONE 4, e4215 (2009); Katja Corcoran, Tanja
Hundhammer, & Thomas Mussweiler, A Tool for Thought! When
Cooperative Thinking Reduces Stereotyping Effects, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1008 (2009).
27. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics:
Evidence of Circadian Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCH. SCI.
319 (1990); John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-
Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 20 (1983).
exist.18 Simply knowing
about implicit bias and its
potentially harmful effects on
judgment and behavior may
prompt individuals to pursue
corrective action.19 Although
awareness of implicit bias in
and of itself is not sufficient
to ensure that effective de-
biasing efforts take place,20 it
is a crucial starting point that
may prompt individuals to
seek out and implement
additional strategies.
Strategy 2: Seek to identify
and consciously acknowl-
edge real group and indi-
vidual differences. The popular “color blind” approach to
egalitarianism (i.e., avoiding or ignoring race; lack of aware-
ness of and sensitivity to differences between social groups)
fails as an implicit-bias intervention strategy. “Color blindness”
actually produces greater implicit bias than strategies that
acknowledge race.21 Cultivating greater awareness of and sen-
sitivity to group and individual differences appears to be a
more effective tactic:  Training seminars that acknowledge and
promote an appreciation of group differences and multicul-
tural viewpoints can help reduce implicit bias.22
Diversity-training seminars can serve as a starting point
from which court culture itself can change. When respected
court leadership actively supports the multiculturalism
approach, those egalitarian goals can influence others.23
Moreover, when an individual (e.g., a new employee) discov-
ers that peers in the court community are more egalitarian, the
individual’s beliefs become less implicitly biased.24 Thus, a sys-
tem-wide effort to cultivate a workplace environment that sup-
ports egalitarian norms is
important in reducing indi-
vidual-level implicit bias.
Note, however, that manda-
tory training or other imposed
pressure to comply with egal-
itarian standards may elicit
hostility and resistance from
some types of individuals,
failing to reduce implicit
bias.25
In addition to considering
and acknowledging group dif-
ferences, individuals should
purposely compare and indi-
viduate stigmatized group
members. By defining individ-
uals in multiple ways other
than in terms of race, implicit
bias may be reduced.26
Strategy 3: Routinely check thought processes and deci-
sions for possible bias. When individuals engage in low-
effort information processing, they rely on stereotypes and pro-
duce more stereotype-consistent judgments than when
engaged in more deliberative, effortful processing.
(Bodenhausen, 1990). As a result, low-effort decision makers
tend to develop inferences or expectations about an individual
early on in the information-gathering process. These expecta-
tions then guide subsequent information processing:
Attention and subsequent recall are biased in favor of stereo-
type-confirming evidence and produce biased judgment.27
Expectations can also affect social interaction between the
decision maker (e.g., judge) and the stereotyped target (e.g.,
defendant), causing the decision maker to behave in ways that
inadvertently elicit stereotype-confirming behavior from the
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Strategy 2: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Participate in
diversity training that
focuses on multiculturalism,
associate with those commit-
ted to egalitarian goals,
and invest effort in identify-
ing the unique characteris-
tics of different members of
the same minority groups.
• Courts: Provide routine
diversity training that
emphasizes multiculturalism
and encourage court lead-
ers to promote egalitarian
behavior as part of a
court’s culture.
Strategy 1: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Seek information
on implicit bias by attending
educational sessions, taking
the IAT, and reading relevant
research.
• Courts: Provide education on
implicit bias that includes
judicial facilitators/presen-
ters, examples of implicit
bias across other profes-
sions, and exercises to make
the material more personally
relevant.
28. See Carl O. Word, Mark P. Zanna, & Joel Cooper, The Nonverbal
Mediation of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial
Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 553 (2005).
29. See B. Keith Payne, Conceptualizing Control in Social Cognition:
How Executive Functioning Modulates the Expression of Automatic
Stereotyping, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 488 (2005);
Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic
Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient
Means of Thought Control, 34 PERSONALITY & PSYCH. BULL. 1332
(2008).
30. See Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe:
Practical Methods for Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Bias, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2006).
31. See, e.g., Tracy D. Eells & Robert C. Showalter, Work-Related Stress
in American Trial Judges, 22 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 71
(1994); L.R. Hartley & R.G. Adams, Effect of Noise on the Stroop
Test, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 62 (1974);  Giora Keinan,
Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under
Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 639 (1987). 
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33. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen & Meryl Lichtenstein, Social
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PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 509 (1991); Jeffrey W. Sherman,
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35. See C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Godehausen, & Alan B. Milne, The
Dissection of Selection in Person Perception: Inhibitory Processes in
Social Stereotyping, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 397 (1995);
Jason P. Mitchell, Brian A. Nosek, & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCH.:  GEN. 455 (2003).
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Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett, & Aida Cajdric, Prejudice from Thin
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37. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Geoffrey P. Kramer, & Karin Susser
Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 621 (1994).
other person.28 Individuals
interested in minimizing the
impact of implicit bias on
their own judgment and
behaviors should actively
engage in more thoughtful,
deliberative information
processing.  When sufficient
effort is exerted to limit the
effects of implicit biases on
judgment, attempts to con-
sciously control implicit bias
can be successful.29
To do this, however, indi-
viduals must possess a cer-
tain degree of self-aware-
ness. They must be mindful
of their decision-making
processes rather than just
the results of decision mak-
ing30 to eliminate distrac-
tions, to minimize emo-
tional decision making, and
to objectively and deliberatively consider the facts at hand
instead of relying on schemas, stereotypes, and/or intuition. 
Strategy 4: Identify distractions and sources of stress in the
decision-making environment and remove or reduce them.
Tiring (e.g., long hours, fatigue), stressful (e.g., heavy, back-
logged, or very diverse caseloads; loud construction noise;
threats to physical safety; popular or political pressure about a
particular decision; emergency or crisis situations), or otherwise
distracting circumstances can adversely affect judicial perfor-
mance.31 Specifically, situations that involve time pressure32 that
force a decision maker to form complex judgments relatively
quickly33 or in which the deci-
sion maker is distracted and
cannot fully attend to incom-
ing information34 all limit the
ability to fully process case
information. Decision makers
who are rushed, stressed, dis-
tracted, or pressured are more
likely to apply stereotypes –
recalling facts in ways biased
by stereotypes and making
more stereotypic judgments –
than decision makers whose
cognitive abilities are not sim-
ilarly constrained. A decision-
maker may be more likely to
think in terms of race and use
implicit racial stereotypes35
because race often is a salient,
i.e., easily-accessible, attribute.
In addition, certain emotional
states (anger, disgust) can
exacerbate implicit bias in
judgments of stigmatized
group members, even if the
source of the negative emotion has nothing to do with the cur-
rent situation or with the issue of social groups or stereotypes
more broadly.36 Happiness may also produce more stereotypic
judgments, though this can be consciously controlled if the per-
son is motivated to do so.37
Given all these potential distractions and sources of stress,
decision makers need enough time and cognitive resources to
thoroughly process case information to avoid relying on intu-
itive reasoning processes that can result in biased judgments. 
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Strategy 3: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Use decision-sup-
port tools such as note-taking,
checklists, and bench cards
and techniques such as writ-
ing down the reasons for a
judgment to promote greater
deliberative as opposed to
intuitive thinking.
• Courts: Develop guidelines
and/or formal protocols for
decision makers to check and
correct for implicit bias (e.g.,
taking the other person’s per-
spective, imagining the per-
son is from a non-stigmatized
social group, thinking of
counter-stereotypic thoughts in
the presence of an individual
from a minority social group).
Strategy 4: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Allow more time
on cases in which implicit
bias might be a concern by,
for example, spending more
time reviewing the facts of
the case before committing
to a decision; consider
ways to clear your mind
(e.g., through meditation)
and focus completely on the
task at hand. 
• Courts: Review areas in
which judges and other
decision makers are likely to
be over-burdened and con-
sider options (e.g., reorga-
nizing court calendars) for
modifying procedures to
provide more time for deci-
sion making.
38. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism
and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 Psych. Sci. 315, 318
(2000); James D. Johnson, Erik Whitestone, Lee Anderson
Jackson & Leslie Gatto, Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential
Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 Personality & Soc.
Psych. Bull. 893  896-98 (1995).
39. See Eric L. Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria:
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(2005).
40. See, e.g., Leanne S. Son Hing, Winnie Li, & Mark P. Zanna,
Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Response Among Aversive
Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 71 (2002).
41. Cf. Saaid A. Mendoza, Peter M. Gollwitzer, & David M. Amodio,
Reducing the Expression of Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control
Through Implementation Intentions, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 512 (2010) at 512 (finding that study participants given
instructions to develop specific implementation intentions—in
which a specific behavioral response is linked to an anticipated
situational cue—demonstrated improved performance accuracy
and less implicit stereotyping in the Shooter Task, a reaction time
measure of implicit bias, compared to participants who were sim-
ply prompted with a general accuracy goal); Kim, supra note 20 at
91 (finding that study participants given specific instructions for
trying to fake the results of an IAT were more successful than par-
ticipants given no or only general instructions for faking results).
42. For a review on feedback effects, see Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E.
Tetlock, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 255 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Plant & Devine, supra note 25.
44. See Lisa Legault, Jennifer N. Gutsell, & Michael Inzlicht, Ironic
Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions
Can Reduce (But Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1472
(2011). 
Strategy 5: Identify
sources of ambiguity in the
decision-making context
and establish more con-
crete standards before
engaging in the decision-
making process. When the
basis for judgment is some-
what vague (e.g., situations
that call for discretion; cases
that involve the application
of new, unfamiliar laws),
biased judgments are more
likely.  Without more
explicit, concrete criteria for
decision making, individu-
als tend to disambiguate the
situation using whatever
information is most easily accessible—including stereotypes.38
In cases involving ambiguous factors, decision makers
should preemptively commit to specific decision-making crite-
ria (e.g., the importance of various types of evidence to the
decision) before hearing a case or reviewing evidence to mini-
mize the opportunity for implicit bias.39 Establishing this
structure before entering the decision-making context will
help prevent constructing criteria after the fact in ways biased
by implicit stereotypes but rationalized by specific types of evi-
dence (e.g., placing greater weight on stereotype-consistent
evidence in a case against a black defendant than one would in
a case against a white defendant).
Strategy 6: Institute feedback mechanisms. Providing egali-
tarian consensus information (i.e., information that others in
the court hold egalitarian beliefs rather than adhere to stereo-
typic beliefs) and other feedback mechanisms can be powerful
tools in promoting more egalitarian attitudes and behavior in
the court community. To encourage individual effort in
addressing personal implicit biases, court administration may
opt to provide judges and other court professionals with rele-
vant performance feedback. As part of this process, court
administration should consider the type of judicial decision-
making data currently avail-
able or easily obtained that
would offer judges meaning-
ful but nonthreatening feed-
back on demonstrated
biases. Transparent feedback
from regular or intermittent
peer reviews that raise per-
sonal awareness of biases
could prompt those with
egalitarian motives to do
more to prevent implicit
bias in future decisions and
actions.40 This feedback
should include concrete
suggestions on how to
improve performance41 and
could also involve recogni-
tion of those individuals
who display exceptional
fairness as positive rein-
forcement. 
Feedback tends to work
best when it (a) comes from
a legitimate, respected
authority, (b) addresses the
person’s decision-making
process rather than simply
the decision outcome, and
(c) when provided before
the person commits to a
decision rather than after-
wards, when he or she has already committed to a particular
course of action.42 Note, however, that feedback mechanisms
that apply coercive pressure to comply with egalitarian stan-
dards can elicit hostility from some types of individuals and
fail to mitigate implicit bias.43 By inciting hostility, these
imposed standards may even be counterproductive to egalitar-
ian goals, generating backlash in the form of increased explicit
and implicit prejudice.44
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Strategy 5: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Commit to deci-
sion-making criteria before
reviewing case-specific infor-
mation .
• Courts: Develop protocols
that identify potential sources
of ambiguity; consider the
pros (e.g., more understand-
ing of issues) and cons (e.g.,
familiarity may lead to less
deliberative processing) of
using judges with special
expertise to handle cases
with greater ambiguity.
Strategy 6: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Seek feedback
through, for example, partici-
pating in a sentencing round
table discussing hypothetical
cases or consulting with a
skilled mentor or senior judge
about handling challenging
cases; ask for feedback from
colleagues, supervisors and
others regarding past perfor-
mance; document and review
the underlying logic of deci-
sions to ensure their sound-
ness.
• Courts: Periodically review a
judge’s case materials and
provide feedback and sug-
gestions for improvement as
needed; develop a bench-bar
committee to oversee an infor-
mal internal grievance
process and work with judges
as needed; convene sentenc-
ing round tables to discuss
hypothetical cases involving
implicit bias issues and
encourage more deliberate
thinking.
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Strategy 7: Increase expo-
sure to stigmatized group
members and counter-
stereotypes and reduce
exposure to stereotypes.
Increased contact with
counter-stereotypes—specif-
ically, increased exposure to
stigmatized group members
that contradict the social
stereotype—can help indi-
viduals negate stereotypes,
affirm counter-stereotypes,
and “unlearn” the associa-
tions that underlie implicit
bias. “Exposure” can include
imagining counter-stereo-
types,45 incidentally observ-
ing counter-stereotypes in
the environment,46 engaging
with counter-stereotypic
role models,47 or extensive
practice making counter-
stereotypic associations.48
For individuals who seek
greater contact with
counter-stereotypic individ-
uals, such contact is more
effective when the counter-
stereotype is of at least equal
status in the workplace.49
Moreover, positive and meaningful interactions work best:
Cooperation is one of the most powerful forms of debiasing
contact.50
In addition to greater contact with counter-stereotypes,
this strategy also involves decreased exposure to stereotypes.
Certain environmental cues can automatically trigger stereo-
type activation and implicit bias. Images and language that
are a part of any signage, pamphlets, brochures, instructional
manuals, background music, or any other verbal or visual
communications in the court may inadvertently activate
implicit biases because they convey stereotypic informa-
tion.51 Identifying these communications and removing them
or replacing them with non-stereotypic or counter-stereo-
typic information can help decrease the amount of daily
exposure court employees and other legal professionals have
with the types of social stereotypes that underlie implicit
bias.
CONCLUSION
Research shows that individuals develop implicit attitudes
and stereotypes as a routine process of sorting and categoriz-
ing the vast amounts of sensory information they encounter on
an ongoing basis. Implicit, as opposed to explicit, attitudes and
stereotypes operate automatically, without awareness, intent,
or conscious control, and can operate even in individuals who
express low explicit bias.52 Because implicit biases are auto-
matic, they can influence or bias decisions and behaviors, both
positively and negatively, without an individual’s awareness.
This phenomenon leaves open the possibility that even those
dedicated to the principles of a fair justice system may, at
times, unknowingly make crucial decisions and act in ways
that are unintentionally unfair. Thus although courts may have
made great strides in eliminating explicit or consciously
endorsed racial bias, they, like all social institutions, may still
be challenged by implicit biases that are more difficult to iden-
tify and change. 
Psychology professor Patricia Devine argues that “prejudice
need not be the consequence of ordinary thought processes” if
individuals actively take steps to avoid the influence of implicit
biases on their behavior.53 Avoiding the influence of implicit
bias, however, is an effortful, as opposed to automatic, process
and requires intention, attention, and time. Combating implicit
bias, much like combating any habit, involves “becoming aware
of one’s implicit bias, being concerned about the consequences
of the bias, and learning to replace the biased response with
non-prejudiced responses—ones that more closely match the
values people consciously believe that they hold.”54
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Strategy 7: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: View images
(e.g., by hanging photos, cre-
ating new screen savers and
desk top images) of admired
individuals (e.g., Martin
Luther King, Jr.) of the stereo-
typed social group; spend
more time with individuals
who are counter-stereotypic
role models; practice making
positive, i.e., counter-stereo-
typic, associations, with mem-
bers of minority social
groups.
• Courts: Assess visual and
auditory communications for
implicit bias and modify to
convey egalitarian norms and
present counter-stereotypic
information; increase repre-
sentation of stigmatized
social groups in valued,
authoritative roles in the court
to foster positive intergroup
relations and provide immedi-
ately accessible counter-
stereotype examples.
55. Shawn Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, 18 JUV. & FAMILY J. TODAY
16, 18 (2009)(acronyms omitted).
Once judges and court professionals become aware of
implicit bias, examples of strategies they can use to help com-
bat it and encourage egalitarianism are:
• Consciously acknowledge group and individual dif-
ferences (i.e., adopt a multiculturalism approach to
egalitarianism rather than a color-blindness strategy
in which one tries to ignore these differences); 
• Routinely check thought processes and decisions for
possible bias (i.e., adopt a thoughtful, deliberative,
and self-aware process for inspecting how one’s deci-
sions are made); 
• Identify sources of stress and reduce them in the deci-
sion-making environment; 
• Identify sources of ambiguity and impose greater
structure in the decision-making context;
• Institute feedback mechanisms; and 
• Increase exposure to stereotyped group members
(e.g., seek out greater contact with the stigmatized
group in a positive context). 
Those dedicated to the principles of a fair justice system
who have worked to eliminate explicit bias from the system
and in their own decisions and behaviors may nonetheless be
influenced by implicit bias. Providing information on implicit
bias offers judges and court staff an opportunity to explore this
possibility and to consider strategies to address it. It also pro-
vides an opportunity to engage judges and court professionals
in a dialog on broader race and ethnic fairness issues in a
thoughtful and constructive manner: 
Recognizing that implicit bias appears to be relatively
universal provides an interesting foundation for broad-
ening discussions on issues such as minority over-repre-
sentation, disproportionate minority contact, and gen-
der or age discrimination. In essence, when we look at
research on social cognitive processes such as implicit
bias we understand that these processes are normal
rather than pathological. This does not mean we should
use them as an excuse for prejudice or discrimination.
Rather, they give us insight into how we might go about
avoiding the pitfalls we face when some of our informa-
tion processing functions outside of our awareness.55
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
Resource Guide for Courts
on Combatting Implicit Bias
http://www.ncsc.org/ibeducation
The National Center for State Courts
has put together an excellent collection
of resources that courts and judges can
turn to in addressing implicit bias
(detailed in this issue in an excellent arti-
cle by several NCSC researchers; see page
64). The website includes materials used
in a pilot project with judges in three
states (California, Minnesota, and North
Dakota). The California website includes
video presentations by several experts on
emerging and settled research in neuro-
science and social psychology, describing
how unconscious or subconscious
processes may affect our decisions. You
can also find tests to see how you may be
affected by implicit bias, and there are
several resources you can look at for
addressing the issue.
The article in this issue of Court
Review is a good starting point, and this
web-based set of resources enables you to
explore the area much more fully, includ-
ing the online tests.
Access Brief on 
Access-to-Justice Commissions
http://www.ncsc.org/atj
In our last Court Review, we told you
of the National Center for State Court’s
new Center on Court Access to Justice for
All, which seeks to assist judges and
courts in providing better access to jus-
tice to everyone they serve. One key fea-
ture of the Center is a series of “Access
Briefs,” short papers on key topics in the
field. Readers of this special issue may be
interested in a new paper published in
January 2013 in access-to-justice com-
missions (http://goo. gl/OTXSo). 
According to the paper, twenty-seven
states and the District of Columbia have
established access-to-justice commis-
sions—most created since 2000—and
several other states are presently looking
into the possibility of doing so. The
Access Brief also provides a useful collec-
tion of resources on existing commis-
sions, with links to other web resources. 
We do want to note one good resource
that wasn’t included in the Access Brief:
Liz Neeley’s 2009 Court Review article,
“From Investigation to Implementation:
Factors for Successful Commissions on
the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic
Bias” (http://goo.gl/U8yRW). Her article
discusses a number of questions that are
good to consider when setting up any
statewide commission to address a spe-
cific issue. (And it also explains the work
of the National Consortium for Racial
and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts.)
A
NEW PUBLICATIONS
Future Trends in State Courts 2012
http://www.ncsc.org/trends
For more than two decades, the
National Center for State Courts has been
producing an annual look at “future
trends” in the state courts. This has
become a big-time process:  In addition
to National Center staff, there’s now an
Editorial Board just to provide feedback
on each potential submission for the lat-
est edition of this monograph. 
The 2012 edition (which may be
downloaded in its entirety at
http://goo.gl/wSBjw) runs 165 pages and
contains 31 separate articles. Key features
of the Future Trends series are that the
articles are short and easy to grasp, often
contain a helpful chart or graph, and usu-
ally include further resources that can be
used to explore that topic. So it’s an
enjoyable publication that provides an
excellent overview of lots of issues affect-
ing judges and their courts.
The 2012 edition focused on courts
and the community, with articles on vet-
erans courts, housing courts, improved
access to court for non-English speakers,
how to encourage effective court-com-
munity collaboration, and how to better
work with Indian tribes in child-protec-
tion cases. There also are groupings of
articles on four other topics:  court lead-
ership, making better courts, court edu-
cation, and the intersection between pri-
vacy policies and court technology. 
NATALIE KNOWLTON & MALIA REDDICK,
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: GENDER,
ETHNICITY, AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION (2012)
(http://goo.gl/XfWbO)
The Institute for the Advancement of
the American Legal System at the
University of Denver (IAALS) recently
released a report that considers whether
judicial-performance-evaluation pro-
grams are fair to women and minority
judges. IAALS researchers Natalie
Knowlton and Malia Reddick carefully
consider whether implicit bias against
women or minority judges might impact
formal evaluations of their performance
as judges. 
Knowlton and Reddick looked closely
at four states with long-established judi-
cial-performance-evaluation programs—
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah.
Although women and minority judges
scored lower in evaluations by attorneys,
the differences were quite small. But in
detailed reviews of data from these states,
they concluded that the differences,
though small, “tend to be pervasive.” 
The study does a good job of summa-
rizing the available data, past studies of
bias in judicial-performance-evaluation
programs, and general reviews of implicit
bias in forming opinions about judges.
Because implicit bias—to the extent it
exists—could impact judicial-perfor-
mance-evaluation programs “in ways
that are difficult to detect,” Knowlton
and Reddick provide a series of recom-
mendations to minimize it to the extent
possible. 
The Resource Page
g
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